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AGENDA
of the lirst part of the thirty-first ordinary session
Paris, 20th-23rd MaY 1985
I. Report of the Council
Thirtieth annual report of the Council to
the AssemblY
II. Political Questions
l. The new outlook for WEU - reply to ReporttabtedbyMr.vanderSandenonbehafoftt. thirtieth annual report oi the the General AJlairs Committee
Council
2. East-West relations ten years after the Report tab-!-ed by Mr.. Haase on behalf of the
Helsinki final act General Affairs Committee
3. Cyprus and European security Rep-ort tabled.by*S.ir Frederic Bennett on behalf
of the General Affairs Committee
III. Defence Questions
l. Application of the Brussels Treaty - Report.tabled by_Ar. Sclyer on behalf of theiiirii i" the annual report of itre Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-Council ments
2. State of European security - the central Report tabled by- 2r. Miller on behalf of the Ii.gioo Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments
3. Emerying technology and military stra- \epoy tabled by M!. u^an de1 Bergh on behaT oftegy thi Committee on Defence Questions and Arma'
ments
W. Technical and Scientilic Questions
The military use of computers - reply to Report.tabled by^Mr. *ruLon behalf -of the.theannualr.portoitLeCou"cif Committee on- Scientific, Technological and
Aerospace Questions
V. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly
Revision and interpretation of the Rules Repgrt.tabled Uy_U,A..Eysin(' Jessel, Spies von
of procedure Billesheim and Llnland on behalf of the Commit-
tee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges
YI. Relations with Parliaments
Activities of the Committee for Relations Report tabled by Mr. Giust on-behaT of the
with Parliamenis 
- 
partiamentary debates Committeefor Relations with Parliaments
on the evolution of WEU
l0
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ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session
Paris, 20th-23rd May 1985
MONDAY,20th MAY
Morning
Meetings of political groups.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session.
7. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi on behalf of the presidential
Committee.
TUESDAY,2tst MAy
Morning I0 a.m.
l. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Haase on behalf of the General Alfairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Cyprus and European security:
qresentation of the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Aflairs
Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi recommendation.
3. Military use of computers 
- 
reply to the annual report of the council:
presentation 
-of tle report tabled by Mr. Fourr6 on behalf of the Committee on Scientific,Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi recommendation.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
1. Emerying technology and military strategy:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on
Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
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3.30 p.m.
2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the
United Kingdom.
3. Emerying technology and military strategy:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the drafi recommendation.
4. State ofEuropean security - the central region:
presentation of the report tabled by Dr. Miller on behalf of the Committee on Defence
Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi recommendation.
WEDNESDAY' 22nd MAY
Morning 10 a.m.
l. New outlook for WEU - reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs
Committee.
Debate.
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence
Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Thirtieth annual report of the Council:
presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Atrairs of the Federal Republic of
Germany, Chairman-in-OfEce of the Council.
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the annual report of the Council:
Resumed debate.
Votes on the draft recommendations-
THURSDAY' 23rd MAY
Morning 10 a.m.
1. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure:
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Eysink, Jessel,.Spies von Bullesheim and Unland on
Uetratf of tne Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
Votes on the drafi resolutions.
2. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments - parliamentary debates on the
evolution of WEU:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Giust on behalf of the Committee for Relations with
Parliaments.
Debate.
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION
t2
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Thirtieth annual report of the Council to the Assembly
of Western European Union on the Council,s activitiesfor tie period
lst January to 31st December l9E4
In implementation of Article IX of the Brussels Treaty modified and completed by theprotocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954, the Council of Western European Union'here-
with transmits to tlg Assembly the thirtieth annual report on its activities, covering ttieperiod lst January to 3lst December 1984.
In view of the important developments which have taken place during the year, it was
considered 
-a-ppropriate to make some changes to the traditional layout of the-Councit rlport in
order to highlight, in a separate section, the future prospects for the organisation.
It has also seemed more rational to refer to the dialogue between the Council and the
Assembly_ throughout this document rather than in a separate opening chapter as in previousyears. (However, for conve^nience, th9 various aspects of this- dialogue have been -brought
together in a table at the end of the report.)
This rearrangement of the contents will also avoid the repetitions and cross-references to
other chaPters that the previous presentation entailed. These changes should facilitate the
reading ofthe report.
TABLE OFCONTENTS
IxrnooucuoN
PanrOxe
I. The council and political and defence questions concerning European security
A. Consultations held by the Council
B. Dialogue between the Council and the Assembly
l. Replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions
2. Joint informal meeting with the General Alfairs Committee and the Commit-
tee on Defence Questions and Armaments
3. Statements by ministers to the Assembly
C. Council visit to SHAPE
II. Implementation of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty on forces of
Western European Union
A. I*vel of forces of member states
l. Forces under NATO command
2. Forces under national command
B. United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe
III. Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments
A. Situation concerning the control of atomic, chemical and biological weapons
l. Atomic weapons
2. Biological weapons
3. Chemical weapons
B. Controls from documentary sources
l. Information processed by the Agency
2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments
C. Field control measures
l. Preparation of the programme of field control measures
2. Type and extent of field control measures
l3
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D. Other activities
l. Documentation and studies
2. Technical information visits
3. Production and procurement of armaments
E. General conclusions
IV. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee
A. Study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU
B. Study on the development of the Japanese arnaments industry and its pos-
sible consequences for EuroPe
C. WEU Agreement 4.FI.6 on trials methods for wheeled vehicles
D. Activities of the working groups
1. Working Group No. 8 on operational research
2. Working Group No. 9 on possible hindrances to enemy action
E. Meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments
F. Activities of the international secretariat
V. Activities of the Public Administration Committee
A. Meetings of the committee
B. Seminars for government officials
C. Study visits
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions
A. Budget
B. Activities in the framework of co-ordination
PnnrTwo
Examination by the Council, in conjunction with the Assembly, of the
future prospects for Western European Union
ANNExES
I. List of the various aspects of the dialogue between the Council and the
Assembly in 1984
II. Production and procurement of armaments for the forces of WEU member
countries stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1984
III. Summary of WEU main budget for 1984; national contributions called for
under this budget
IV. Report on the reactivation of WEU published by the Foreign Ministers on
l2th June 1984 in Paris
V. Declaration and document on the institutional reform of WEU published by the
Foreign and Defence Ministers on2TthOctober 1984 in Rome
t4
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Introduction
1. During 1984, the Council met at minis-
terial level on I 2th June in Paris under the chair-
manship of Mr. Cheysson, the French Ministerfor External Relations; on 26th and 27th
October in Rome, the Foreign and Defence
Ministers met in extraordinary session to mark
the thirtieth anniversary of Western European(Jnion, under the chairmanship of Mr. Gen-
scher, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany.
It held seventeen meetings at permanent
representative level in London.
The Council was assisted in its work by
the working group made up of assistants to the
pennanent representatives, which met thirty
times, by special working gtroups (eight meet-
ings) including delegates from the respective
national administrations 
- 
to prepare for the
ministerial meetings of the Council 
- 
and by the
Secretariat-General.
2. During this anniversary year, the Council
gave thorough consideration to the future of
Western European Union. At its extraordinary
meeting on 26th and27th October, it decided to
make fuller use of the organisation and to adapt
its institutions accordingly. Its decisions were
set forth in the declaration and in the document
on the institutional reform of WEU, published
in Rome and transmitted to the Assembly.
3. The Council has held consultations on a
number of political and defence questions
concerning European security.
It has also ensured that the commitments
entered into by the member states of WEU
under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty
and its protocols were observed.
4. The Council has noted with interest the
reports drawn up by the Asspmbly committees
and has closely followed the Assembly's discus-
sions during the two part$ of its thirtieth
ordinary session and at its extraordinary session
on 29th October in Rome.
The Council has maintained a close dialo-
gue with the Assembly, through oflicial exchan-
ges between the two organs and by informal
contacts, covering all the questions relating to
the implementation of the modified Brussels
Treaty the Assembly has examined. In co-
operation with the Assembly, whose contribu-
tion was much appreciated, the Council pursued
its deliberations about the future prospects of
WEU, and the decisions taken in Rome are very
much in line with the proposals put forward by
the Assembly.
15
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PART ONE
I. The Council and political and defence questions
concerning European security
A. Consultations held by the Council
At their meeting of l2th June 1984 in
Paris, the Foreign Ministers had an exchange of
views on East-West relations. They confirmed
that their respective governments were resolved
to continue to work for the establishment of a
more constructive dialogue between East and
West and for arms control and disarmament
along the lines set out in the conclusions to the
meeting of the North Atlantic Council from 29th
to 3lst May in Washington and the declaration
published after the meeting.
Certain aspects of the Mediterranean
situation which lack of time prevented the
ministers from discussing in Paris were raised in
the Permanent Council on the basis of a commu-
nication from the Italian Delegation.
At the extraordinary session of the Coun-
cil on 26th and 27th October in Rome jointly
attended - for the first time in the history of the
organisation 
- 
by both the Foreigp and Defence
Ministers, a number of political and defence
questions concerning European security were
examined. The Chairman-in-Oflice of the
Council, Mr. Genscher, briefed the Presidential
Committee of the Assembly after this meeting
and addressed the Assembly at its extraordinary
session on 29th October. In his address to the
Assembly, he stated:
"...We considered East-West relations and
their implications for European security.
The dividing line between the two allian-
ces runs through Europe. Changes in the
balance between East and West directly
affect Europe. Europe's specific security
situation calls for a specifically European
contribution to the dialogue between
East and West. The states of Western
European LInion, together with the other
European members of NATO, make a
substantial contribution to defence within
the Atlantic Alliance. We are prepared to
accept the responsibility this entails. But
we also want to be heard. Europe's voice
will be duly heard in the transatlantic dia-
logue if the Seven adopt a common
stance. WEU is the appropriate forum
for the alignment of their positions on
security issues.
The ministers spent some time discussing
ways of improving armaments co-oper-
ation within WEU. They took the view
that the development of today's advanced
technologies imposes a fresh and
extremely costly burden on the arrn-
aments industries of all the member
states. The Europeans must accept this
technological challenge together, or they
will lag behind in international com-
petition. They must therefore pool their
resources and co-operate more closely in
the armaments sector.
WEU will provide the necessary political
impetus. It is also the appropriate body
for the co-ordination ofEuropean interests
in the spheres of defence technology and
associated basic research."
B. Dialogae betwun the Council
and the Assembly
During 1984, the Assembly was kept
informed of the position of WEU member coun-
tries on all the subjects dealt with by the Assem-
bly. In this connection, it was given informa-
tion on the progress of work within various
international fora to which the member coun-
tries contribute.
1. Replhs to Assembly rucommeadations and writtcn qucstions
The Council would like to reiterate the
main points of its replies to the following recom-
mendations and written questions: Recommen-
dation 396 on European security and burden-
sharing in the alliance, Recommendation 400 on
the harmonisation of research in civil and
military high technology fields, Recommenda-
tion 401 on economic relations with the Soviet
Union, Recommendation 403 on the situation in
the Middle East and European security, Recom-
mendation 404 on the state of European secu-
rity, Recommendation 405 on AWACS and
Nimrod aircraft, Recommendation 408 on the
control of armaments and disarmament, Recom-
mendation 410 on the military use of space and
Written Question 240 on European co-operation
on armaments.
(a) European security and burden-sharing in
the alliance
In its reply of 5th June 1984 to Recom-
mendation 396, the Council stated that while the
commitment of the United States and Canada is
vital for the security of Western Europe it is
equally essential that the European members of
the Atlantic Alliance, and especially the coun-
l6
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tries of WEU, make a determined contribution
to the common effort.
The Council drew attention to the fact
that the contribution of the European countries
is considerable. Of the alliance's ready forces in
Europe, they provide about 90% of the ground
forces, 80% of the combat aircraft, 80% of the
tanks and 90% of the armoured divisions; at sea,
in European waters and in the Atlantic, they
provide 70% of the fighting ships. Moreover,
the United States forces deployed to strengthen
Europe in time of tension would receive a grcat
deal ofhelp through host nation support, secure
lines of communication and means of transport.
The Council noted that during the 1970s
the European allies who are members of the inte-
grated military structure of NATO increased
their real defence spending by over 2Vo eachyear,
while United States real defence spending
declined on average by just over l% per year.
The extent and value of the European defence
effort is recognised in Mr. Weinberger's reports
to Congress on burden-sharing of 1982 and
1983.
Whereas the record does therefore appear
to be fairly satisfactory, it was the Council's
opinion that the European allies must maintain
and even strengthen their contribution to the
common effort. In view of the present budge-
tary constraints called for in all the member
states, it is clear that these efforts should, inter
alia, concentrate on improved co-ordination.
To this end, the WEU members of the integrated
military structure of NATO approve the mea-
sure for maintaining and improving NATO's
defence effort detailed in the Assembly recom-
mendation.
In its reply to the Assembly, the Council
underlined the need to put across the European
position on security and defence in an appro-
priate and more effective way in the United
States. Useful work in this direction has
already been started within the framework of the
Eurogroup.
Likewise, public opinion and European
political circles must be clearly aware of the
United States contribution to the security of our
countries.
The Council stated that the competent
European organisations have an important
responsibility in this regard, in particular WEU,
which has a complete institutional structure
suited to this task. The Eurogroup and the
IEPG also have an important r6le.
The Council pointed out that the Assem-
bly should play a vital r6le in putting across to
the European and American public the scale and
effectiveness ofboth the European defence effort
and transatlantic co-operation. The North
Atlantic Assembly, for its part, could contribute
to this work of explanation and presentation.
State of European security
Since Recommendation 404 on this sub-ject related essentially to the structures of the
integrated military organisation of NATO, the
Council deemed it advisable to inform the
competent authorities of the Atlantic Alliance of
the recommendation and of the specific ideas
that it contained.
In its reply of 17th October 1984, the
Council stated that it shared the Assembly's
belief on the advisability of formulating a
European view on defence pqlicy within WEU,
in close consultation with all the other allies.
Like the Assembly, the Council was
convinced that the security of the WEU member
countries continues to be assured by the Atlantic
Alliance to which WEU is linked by virtue of the
modified Brussels Treaty. Accordingly, every
effort must be made to streEs the overriding
importance of solidarity amonrg allies and of the
strengthening of the contribution of WEU
member countries to the transatlantic dialogue,
as well as the necessity for all the member
countries to assume their full responsibilities
within the alliance.
AWACS and Nimrod aircraft
The Council welcomed the Assembly's
interest in the development of a new airborne
early warning force based in Western Europe.
As indicated in its reply of 30th November to
Recommendation 405, the Council considers
that this system will contribute geatly to the
enhancement of the air defenoes of the member
countries of the Atlantic Alliance. With this
goal in mind, the United Kingdom has selected
Nimrod; other countries have opted for the
E-3A and France, which has decided to procure
an equivalent system, is currently evaluating the
various possibilities. The Cbuncil has noted
the Assembly's views on the adoption by indivi-
dual member countries of the alliance of differ-
ent AEW systems, but considers that all these
systems will make a major and valuable contri-
bution to the goal stated by the Assembly.
The Council understands that:
- 
Interoperability betwebn different com-
ponents of the AEW force has been a
priority concern of the various NATO
authorities responsible for the co-
ordination of operational planning and
procurement; the degree of interopera-
bility is intended to be very consider-
able (including for example software to
common NATO standards) although it
t7
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will not be practicable to introduce lite-
rally the same type of hardware and
software for a number of tasks.
- 
The E-3A component, like the Nimrod,
already has an air-to-air refuelling capa-
bility, and crews are now being trained
in its operation.
- 
The question of training staff officers,
and the likely benefit accruing there-
from, must be examined in the light of
the requirements and preoccupations of
the member states.
- 
The extension of a mixed force concept
to other applications and the develop-
ment of a set of general rules for such
requirements is something which needs
to be explored in the light ofexperience,
when the AEW force is fully operational.
The Council noted that the French Govern-
ment's decision to procure for its forces, under
its l98rt-88 programme law, an airborne early
warning system has not been changed. The
study relating to the type of aircraft and equip-
ment has entered its final phase and the choice
should soon be made. Interoperability with
other alliance forces will make it possible to
increase, where necessary, the volume of exchan-
ges of air-defence data.
(b) Harmonisation of research in civil and
military high technology Jields
In its reply, dated 29th May 1984, to
Recommendation 400, the Council expressed its
full agreement with the Assembly on the need to
strengthen co-operation between member coun-
tries in the field of high technology, considering
that the joint development of these advanced
technologies and the industrial-scale production
of the resultant components was one of the
prerequisites for co-operation in respect offuture
weapons systems and hence for the maintenance
of a credible defence by the western countries.
The Council added, however, that it believed
that co-operation could take place not only
within the context of WEU but also on a wider
European basis.
The Council observed that industry had,
unquestionably, an important part to play in any
form of co-operation. The governments of the
member countries, it pointed out, fully accepted
the idea that the interests of industry should be
taken into account since this, after all, was the
key to the success of any programme in this
field. Contact should therefore be encouraged
and diversified with a view to promoting the
establishment of a European industry for advan-
ced military technology. Such considerations
could provide the framework for a symposium
for the industries concerned, and could be
modelled on the one on international aero-
nautical consortia held in London on 9th and
l0th February 1982 under the auspices of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and
Aerospace Questions.
The Council noted that the member states
of WEU generally recoglrised the essential nature
ofEuropean preference. It agreed that the spirit
of solidarity must constitute a very important
factor in the national armaments planning and
decision-making process, thus enhancing the
European contribution to the common defence
effort.
Status of and prospects for European arms
co-operation
The information given by the Council in
its reply of lTth September 1984 to Written
Question 240 was as follows:
At their meeting on 2lst September 1983,
the Defence Ministers of the Federal Republic of
Germany, France and the United Kingdom
made a general survey of the situation and noted
with interest the status of armaments co-
operation, reaflirming their interest in the
following: the European development of an
advanced combat aircraft in the mid-nineties;
the production in Europe of a multiple-launch
rocket system (MLRS); third-generation anti-
tank missile programmes.
The ministers also confirmed their strong
interest in the development of emerying techno-
logies in Europe as well as closer European
industrial links.
Within the framework of the Atlantic
Alliance, the European countries agreed to
encourage co-operation on technologies and
components, this being the only means of
achieving increased collaboration on weapons
systems in the future. This would involve the
transfer of technologies among European coun-
tries and between the United States and Europe.
With respect to the NATO frigate pro-
gramme for the nineties, a memorandum of
understanding for starting the feasibility studies
has been signed between France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States
and Canada. These studies will enable the
satisfactory level of standardisation to be achieved
As for guided anti-tank weapons, the
Defence Ministers of the United Kingdom, the
Federal Republic of Germany and France have
signed a memorandum of understanding relating
to the definition phase of the third-generation
anti-tank weapons systems, including two
concepts 
- 
one medium-range and the other
long-range (with a land-transported version and
l8
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a helicopterJaunched version). The develop-
ment phase will begin around the middle of
1985. Wider co-operation is being discussed to
include Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece
and Spain.
As regards tactical combat aircraft, the
Assembly was informed by the Council (reply to
Written Question 239) of the procedure set in
motion for intra-European co-operation in this
area.
With respect to operational specifications,
note should be taken of the particularly impor-
tant work of the FINABEL Broup, which will
allow work to be done on common bases as
regards military requirements.
(c) The control of armaments and disarm-
ament
In its reply of 27th November 1984 to
Recommendation 408, the Council expressed
the following views and gave the following infor-
mation to the Assembly:
The Council fully shares the importance
the Assembly attaches to maintaining and
improving the East-West dialogue in the interest
of peace, security and stability in Europe. The
WEU member states will continue to pursue
their efforts to achieve, within the framework of
an extended political dialogue, balanced, equi-
table and verifiable arms control agreements
with the Soviet Union and its allies. It is
important that this dialogue should include
meetings at high political level. In fact, quite
frequent talks between members of WEU
governments and the leadership of the Soviet
Union and other East European states have
already taken place on a bilateral basis and in
the maryins of multilateral fora such as the
United Nations.
The Council shares the Assembly's view
that arms control is one of the important
elements in the relationship between East and
West. It recalls that at the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council on 3lst May this year the WEU
member countries adopted, together with the
other members of the Atlantic Alliance, the
Washington statement in which they reaffirmed
their offers to improve East-West relations,
made most recently in the declaration of
Brussels of 9th December 1983. At the same
time they restated their aim of achieving security
at the lowest possible level of forces through
balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements on
arms control, disarmament and concrete confi-
dence- and security-building measures.
The WEU member states have welcomed,
on various occasions, the readiness of the
United States to resume bilateral negotiations on
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and
strategic arms reduction (S[ART) with the
Soviet Union without precoirditions and have
called on the Soviet Union to return to the nego-
tiating table. They welcome the announcement
that the United States and the Soviet Union
have agreed to hold high-level talks in Geneva
on 7th and 8th January 1985.
Major individual and cpllective proposals
have been put forward by w$stern countries at
the existing arms control and disarmament fora
as further proof of western determination to
make every effort to ensure progress. It is
regrettable that no positive Soviet response to
these proposals has been fonhcoming.
The WEU member countries hope that in
a first stage of the Stockholm conference agree-
ment can be reached on a set of militarily signifi-
cant and verifiable confidence- and security-
building measures covering the whole of Europe
and designed to diminish the risk of military
confrontation there. This will pave the way for
further stages of the conferenee where the parti-
cipating states would continue their efforts for
security and disarmament in Europe with a view
to concrete and verifiable results.
Together with the other western states, the
WEU members have made every effort to
ensure a sustained negotiating pace in Stockholm.
At the beginning of the first round of the confe-
rence, they tabled detailed prciposals for a set of
concrete confidence- and security-building mea-
sures. On a number of important points the
proposals tabled by the neutral and non-aligned
countries at the end of the first round are in line
with the western proposals. The Soviet Union
tabled proposals only at the beginning of the
second round, which gave comparatively little
attention to the kind of concfete measures that
are the aim of the conference, in accordance with
the mandate defined in Madrid in 1983. The
Soviet negotiators have so far proven reluctant
to engage in a substantive discussion of such
measures.
The WEU member countries are deter-
mined to seek ways to achieve progress. The
Council hopes that intensive efforts to set up a
work structure will lead to a result.
The WEU member countries concerned
recall that the NATO countries participating in
the MBFR initially favourgd a two-phased
approach and proposed, in an effort to speed up
agreement, a simplified interirp phase I in 1979.
The East, however, insisted on a strong
link between the two phases in order to ensure
the continuity of the reduction process. To
meet this concern and at the same time to do
away with complicated discussions on how to
link the two phases, western participating coun-
tries proposed in 1982 to seek a single compre-
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hensive agreement. The East agreed to the
concept of a single treaty, but proposed initial
United States-Soviet reductions followed by a
freeze prior to signature of the actual treaty.
These introductory steps would, according to the
East, have the character of a political commit-
ment. These proposals for phasing the reduc-
tions, however, could not be pursued further
with the East because of lack of agreement on
the fundamental and interrelated issues of data
and verification which remain crucial and
cannot be evaded or circumvented.
In April 1984, the western delegations in
Vienna, with full participation of the WEU
member countries involved, tabled new and
open-minded proposals which specifically
address these issues and at the same time
portray how the " data impasse " could best be
overcome. The WEU member countries
concerned regret that, hitherto, eastern reactions
to these proposals have not been encouraging.
The Council would also underline the
importance of the r6le of the United Nations,
especially the Assembly's First Committee on
Disarmament and Security and the United
Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), as
well as the Geneva Conference on Disarmament
(CD), in all of which the WEU member coun-
tries play an active rOle. The Council welcomes
the efforts made by the Conference on Disarma-
ment to achieve, among other things, a complete
and worldwide ban on chemical weapons.
Military use of space
In its reply of 27th November 1984 to
Recommendation 410, the Council gave the
following information to the Assembly:
The member countries of WEU consider
it of the utmost importance to prevent a destabi-
lising arms race in outer space.
They therefore encourage bilateral talks
between the USSR and the United States, the
two main space powers, on verifiable steps to
avert this danger, and hope that significant
progress can be achieved also through multi-
lateral work at the Conference on Disarmament.
Also, the existence and potential further
development of anti-satellite systems pose a
problem of immediate concern and develop-
ments in the field of anti-ballistic missiles raise
new questions about the future relationship
between offensive systems and ABM techno-
logies.
In view of the inseparable link between
offensive and defensive systems, a resumption of
negotiations on the limitations and reductions of
offensive nuclear weapons is as important as
ever.
WEU member countries have regretted
that bilateral talks between the two leading space
powers have until now not taken place. They
have, however, been encouraged by recent state-
ments by the leaders of those two powers that
both sides recognise that a dialogue to deal with
these questions is needed. They welcome the
announcement that the United States and the
Soviet Union have agreed to hold highJevel
talks in Geneva on 7th and 8th January 1985.
WEU member countries stress the conti-
nuing importance of the 1972 ABM treaty
between the United States and the USSR and
the 1967 outer space treaty.
As far as the implications of developments
in space for European industry are concerned,
the Council would point out that opportunities
already exist in this field for European indus-
tries. Moreover, two important conclusions
may be drawn from the Assembly recommend-
ation in this connection. Firstly, the European
space industry is a reality; its achievements are
considerable and its potential is far from insigni-
ficant. Secondly, it is clear that Europe's inter-
national influence, and to some extent its secu-
rity, will, in the long term, also depend on what
position it will occupy in the field of space
activities. In this connection the Council
underlines the importance for the WEU member
states to strengthen and improve their collabor-
ation in the field of space technology. General-
ly speaking, it should be borne in mind that the
principle of co-operation between the United
States and Europe raises no difliculties and can
be mutually profitable.
(d) Economic relations with the Soviet Union
In its reply, dated 27th March 1984, to
Recommendation 401, the Council gave the
following information in particular:
A concerted, realistic and cautious
approach towards the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe in economic matters has long been a
major concern of the WEU member countries.In this regard, the Council attaches high
importance to continuing western co-operation
and consultation. Western countries have met
in various fora in order to discuss a common
approach consistent with their political and
security interests. Since 1982, a study dealing
with these aspects of East-West economic rela-
tions has been undertaken within the Atlantic
Alliance. The outcome of this and other studies
was reflected in the terms of various communi-
qu6s adopted at the conclusion of ministerial
meetings such as those of the North Atlantic
Council on 9th-l0th June and 8th-9th December
1983.
The WEU member states consider that
their security interests are best served by stable
20
DOCUMENT 1006
economic and political relations with the Soviet
Union. The benefits of East-West trade to the
Soviet and Eastern European economies must be
weighed against this consideration, and against
the advantages which such trade brings to
western businesses and economies.
As they have already stated, the WEU
member countries undertake to manage finan-
cial relations with the Warsaw Pact countries on
a sound economic basis, including commercial
prudence also in the granting of export credits.
The studies and consultations referred to
above have been undertaken in a constructive
and co-operative spirit. They have led to a cla-
rification of national views and interests and to a
greater common understanding of the issues at
stake, thereby contributing to western unity and
security. The Council stated that the member
countries of WEU will therefore continue to seek
ways of strengthening and intensiffing this
process within various bodies and at various
levels.
(e) Situation in the Middle East and Euro-
pean security
In its reply to Recommendation 403,
dated 4th November 1984, the Council stated:
The member countries of WEU have
made all possible efforts, with the competent
international agencies as well as in bilateral
contacts with the parties concerned, in favour of
a negotiated solution to the conflict between Iran
and Iraq, in order to avoid it spreading. More-
over, they have supported the action of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations in this
direction which has brought about as a first
result the suspension of the bombing of civilian
targets.
Confirmation of the use of chemical wea-
pons in the Gulf conflict has underlined the
urgency of reaching agxeement at the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament on a total world-
wide ban on the manufacture, stockpiling and
use of chemical weapons. It is only through a
comprehensive and effectively verified global
ban that these odious weapons can be removed
once and for all. Neither strengthening of
European controls under the aegis of WEU nor a
regional ban in Europe as a first step would be a
substitute.
The member countries of WEU have
always maintained that a peaceful solution to
the kbanese question can only be achieved by
safeguarding the unity, independence and natio-
nal integrity of the country, and they have
stressed the importance of tho withdrawal of all
foreign forces whose presence is not authorised
by the Lebanese Government.
On several occasions, individually and in
the context of the EEC, member countries of
WEU have expressed themselves in favour of
the recognition of the right to existence and to
security of all the countrios in the region,
including Israel, and justice for all. This
implies the association of the representatives of
the Palestinian people and consequently of the
Palestine Liberation Organisation with a future
peace process. Such a process must be based on
the recognition of the right to self-determination
of the Palestinians, with evefything which this
entails. In the same context, the member states
of WEU have repeatedly affirmed their belief
that Israel's settlement policy on the occupied
territories constitutes a negative factor as far as
the commencement of the peace process is
concerned.
2. loint inlormal t4eetiag
with thc General Alfairs Committee
aad the Committee on Delence Qucslions aad Armmerrts
During this meeting, held on l2th June
1984 in Paris, the Chairman-in-Oflice of the
Council replied to questions put by the members
of the committees on the problems of defence,
arms control and disarmamest, the situation in
the Near East and relations between Europe and
China.
3. Statemcats by miaisters to thc Assembly
The ministers who took part in Assembly
debates in 1984 gave their views on the main
items on the Assembly agenda in the speeches
they delivered and in the replies they gave to
questions from members of the Assemblyt.
C. Council visit to SHAPE
On 29th March, the Council visited
SHAPE at the invitation of $ACEUR. Topics
on which views were exchanged included: a
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and
WEU's r6le, promotion of public awareness of
western security interests, increased coherence in
long-term defence planning, improvements to
western consultations on arms control questions,
regular contacts between the Council and
SHAPE.
2t
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II. Implementation of Protocol No, II of the modified
Brussels Treaty on forces of Western European Union
A.I*vel of forces of member states
The Council has undertaken its customary
tasks concerning controls of forces (and of arma-
ments for these forces) during 1984.
1. Forces under NATO command
The maximum levels of ground, air and
naval forces which member states of WEU place
under NATO command are fixed in Articles I
and II of Protocol No. II to the modified
Brussels Treaty. Article III of the protocol
provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to
enable these levels to be increased above the
limits specified in Articles I and II.
So that it may satisff itself that the limits
laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II
are not exceeded, the Council receives informa-
tion every year concerning the levels in question,
in accordance with Article IV of that protocol.
This information is obtained in the course of
inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, and is transmitted to the
Council by a high-ranking officer designated by
him to that end.
The information, as at the end of 1983,
was conveyed at the appropriate time. It was
presented to the Council on 4th April 1984 by
SACEUR's representative to the Council.
Information grving the status of these
forces as at the end of 1984 was requested in
December.
Furthermore, the Council takes the neces-
sary steps to implement the procedure laid down
in its resolution of l5th September 1956 where-
by the levels of forces under NATO command
are examined in the light of the annual review.
For the year 1983, the permanent repre-
sentatives (or their substitutes) to the North
Atlantic Council of Belgium, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom, at a meeting
held on 12th January in Brussels, examined the
levels of forces of WEU member states and
reported to the Council.
The Council, at its meeting of 28th
February, noted that the level of forces of the
member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO
Force Plan, fell within the limits specified in
Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as at present
in force. It also took note of a declaration on
French forces made by the representative of
France.
The same procedure is under way for the
year 1984.
2. Forceo undu national command
The strength and armaments of forces of
member states maintained on the mainland of
Europe and remaining under national command
- 
internal defence and police forces, forces for
the defence of overseas territories, and common
defence forces 
- 
are fixed each year in accord-
ance with the procedure specified in the agree-
ment signed in Paris on l4th December 1957 in
implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II.
***
By means of the methods set out in para-
graphs I and,2 above, the Council has been able,in 1984, to carry out its obligations under
Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty
concerning levels of forces.
B. anitud Kingdomforces stationed
on the mainland of Europe
l. In accordance with the Council's reply to
Assembly Recommendation 331, the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom have informed the
Council that the average number of British land
forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in
1984 in accordance with the commitment in
Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified
Brussels Treaty was 56,467. The continued
need for the presence of troops in Northern
Ireland made it necessary for units of the British
Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short
tours ofduty there. In 1984 there were on ave-
rage 972 men in Northern Ireland. As has been
previously stated, these units would be speedily
returned to their duty station in an emergency
affecting NATO.
Furthermore, in accordance with the
Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation
348, the Government of the United Kingdom
have informed the Council that the strength of
the United Kingdom's contribution to the
Second Allied Tactical Air Force in 1984 was:
ROle Airoaft/Equipment Squadrons
Strike/Attack
Offensive support
Reconnaissance
Air defence
Air transport
Ground defence
Jaguar
Tornado
Harrier
Jaguar
Phantom
Rapier surface-to-air
missiles
Puma
Chinook
RAF regiment
I
4
2
I
2
4
I
I
I
22
DOCUMENT 1006
2. In addition, in her June address to the
Assembly, Baroness Young referred to the sub-
stantial numbers of British ground and air forces
on the mainland of Europe who make an essen-
tial and elfective contribution to the forward
defence of the alliance in Germany, and to the
security and cohesion of Western Europe.
The Agency continued to carry out the
tasks assigned to it under the terms of Anicle
VII of Protocol No. IV.
It performed its control activities in 1984
in accordance with the same methods and essen-
tially at the same level as the previous year.
A. Sitaation concerning the control of atomic,
chemical and biological weapons
7. Atomic weapons
Since the situation has remained the same
as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise
any control in the field of atomic weapons.
2. Biological weapons
All the member countries again gave their
agreement, for 1984, on the renewal of the list of
biological weapons subject to control as accepted
by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the
fact.
As in previous years, however, the Agency
did not exercise any control in the field of biolo-
gical weapons.
3. Chemical weopons
The Agency asked member countries for
their agreement to renew in 1984 the list of che-
mical weapons subject to control. This agree-
ment was given and the Council noted the fact.
The Agency therefore continued to use
this list for its control activities in 1984.
The competent authorities of the country
concerned provided the Agency with a detailed,
precise and complete reply to the request for
information aimed at facilitating the control of
non-production of chemical weapons which was
sent to them by the Agency in accordance with
the resolution approved by the Council in 1959
and with the directive received from the Councilin 1960. In addition, the procedure applied
with these authorities since 1973 was again used.
Furthermore, Mr. Luco in December, in
making the same point about the British Army
of the Rhine, stated that the United Kingdom
saw WEU as firmly integrating it with its other
European allies on the one hand and with the
transatlantic alliance on the other.
The agreed non-production controls
carried out by the Agency in I 984 are referred to
under pointC.Z(b) of this chapter.
In application of Artiqle III of Protocol
No. IIL which lays down conditions to enable
the Council to fix levels of bhemical weapons
that may be held on the maiqland of Europe by
those countries which have not given up the
right to produce them, and in accordance with
the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked
the countries concerned, in its questionnaire,
whether production of chemical weapons on
their mainland territory had passed the experi-
mental stage and entered the effective produc-
tion stage. As in the past, all these states
replied in the negative.
In addition, the Agency asked the member
states, in the covering letter to its questionnaire,
to declare any chemical weapons that they mlght
hold, whatever their origrtr. Since all the
member states replied in the negative, the
Agency carried out no quantitative controls of
chemical weapons in 1984.
B. Controls from documantary sources
The main aim of the Agency's work in this
field of its activity has been to compare, by
studying the relevant documents, the quantities
of armaments held by the member states with
the levels fixed by the Council, in order to estab-
lish whether these constituted appropriate levels
within the terms of the fnodified Brussels
Treaty.
1. Information prxessed by thc Agenq
Under the usual procodure, the Agency
studied the member states' replies to its annual
questionnaire, and the information given by the
state concerned in reply to its annual request for
information concerning the non-production of
certain types of armaments. It compared this
information with: the data supplied by NATO;
the information received, through the Council,
from the Governments of the United States and
Canada concerning their prognammes of external
aid in military equipment to the forces of
III. Activities of the Agency for the Contol of Armaments
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member states stationed on the mainland of
Europe (since 1966, no aid has been provided by
these countries to the forces concerned); the
conclusions of its budgetary studies; the inform-
ation culled from open sources (specialised
press) and the detailed statistics arising from its
controls in previous years.
2, Yerification of appropriate lewls olannaments
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces
placed under NATO command
After receiving and processing the
member states' replies to the annual question-
naire and studying the statistical reports fur-
nished by the authorities of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (Article YlI, 2(a) of Pro-
tocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO
international stafi the Agency arranged, as each
year, for the annual consultations with the
NATO military authorities called for by Article
XIV of Protocol No. IV.
These consultations included a joint study
session at Casteau on l3th November 1984
attended by Agency experts and the appropriate
oflicers from SHAPE, and concluded with a
meeting in Paris on 29th November 1984 which
was attended by representatives of the Agency,
SHAPE, SACLANT and CINCHAN and the
international military staff of NATO. The
meeting concluded that the quantities of arma-
ments declared by the member states for their
forces placed under NATO authority and sta-
tioned on the mainland of Europe corresponded
to the appropriate levels for the control year
1984 within the terms of Articles XIV and XIX
of Protocol No. IV, in respect of those arma-
ments over which the Agency has hitherto been
able to exercise its mandate of controlling stock
levels.
(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces
maintained under national command on
the mainland of Europe
In accordance with the procedure in force
for the implementation of the agreement of
l4th December 1957, the Agency supplied the
Council with the information relating to the
armaments of this category of forces which had
been supplied by the member states in response
to the Agency's annual questionnaire. The
Agency, having received from the Council the
statements by the member states on force levels,
analysed on the Council's behalf the data for
armaments and forces, having regard to the r6les
oftheir forces.
The Council subsequently accepted or
approved for 1984 the maximum levels of arma-
ments of these forces and notified the Agency
accordingly with a view to drawing up the final
tables of the abovementioned forces.
C. Field control measares
The aim of this aspect of the Agency's
activities was to verifu, physically, the accuracy
of the information obtained from documental
controls.
1. Preparation ofthe programme olfield control meosures
(a) Initial studies
The accumulated experience, information
received and the results of its controls in 1983
led the Agency to draw up a provisional pro-
gramme for 1984 on the same scale and lines as
those of previous years, i.e.:
- 
for non-production field control mea-
sures, a limited programme was consi-
dered adequate for verifoing the under-
taking of a member state not to manu-
facture specified armaments. The
Agency was again aided in this task by
the reply to its request for information
from the member state concerned;
- 
for the quantitative field control mea-
sures, the sampling methods were again
thought adequate to provide an accep-
table level of confidence in the Agency's
documental control.
(b) ProgrammedeJinition
No factor has emerged to prompt the
Agency significantly to vary the distribution of
field control measures either between member
states or between the armaments of their land,
sea and air forces.
The system of joint Agency/SHAPE
inspections at depots under NATO authority,
introduced in 1957 and used each year since,
was again authorised in 1984. Some depots
were programmed for inspection by an Agency/
SHAPE team.
On the basis of these considerations and
of the information already available to it, the
Agency was able to draw up its 1984 programme
with sufficient confidence early in the year. In
keeping with the usual procedure, this provi-
sional programme was later modified following
analyses and reviews of the member states'
replies to the Agency's questionnaire, and some
minor changes were made.
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2. Type and eilent offieU contol moutares
The total number of field control mea-
sures was sixty-six.
These measures fall broadly into the
following categories:
(, quantitative control measures at
depots;
(ii) quantitative control measures at units
of forces under national command;
(iii) factory control measures:
- 
agreed quantitative control mea-
sures;
- 
agreed non-production control
measures.
Most of the quantitative control measures
related to land materiel and ammunition (all
services), others related to air mat6riel and naval
materiel; a significant number of these measures
related to missiles.
The agreed quantitative control measures
at manufacturing plants related to land mat6riel,
missiles, rockets, aircraft engines, warships and
ammunition. The agreed non-production
control measures were carried out at chemical
plants.
D. Other octivities
1. Documentation and studies
(a) In the context of the Council's exa-
mination of the future tasks of WEU and of its
specialised organs, the Agency, which maintains
a collection of open sources of information 
-
also made available to the SAC 
- 
has developed
its doclrmentary activity in the main general
areas ofdefence and security, i.e. defence, indus-
trial, economic and financial policies; East-West
negotiations; developments in international
organisations and the associated legal aspects.
(b) The Agency has continued to update the
" overviews " which summarise the way in
which the armed forces in each of the WEU
member countries are organised.
One of the other studies carried out by the
Agency related to the United States ,trms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
2. Techaical infonnatioa yisits
Technical information visits designed to
keep the Agency experts up to date on weapons
technology and military thinking were again
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organised in 1984, although on a much reduced
scale in order not to exceed the previous years'
expenditure levels.
At the invitation of the German autho-
rities, the land force experts visited the Federal
Republic of Germany to obsenve the Flinker Igel
exercise. The experts concerned with naval
problems visited the naval expositions at Genoa(Italy) and Le Bourget (France).
The air and naval experts visited the air
shows at Hanover (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) and Farnborough (United Kingdom) and
the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental
Establishment at Boscombe Down (United
Kingdom).
3. Productioa and prucaremetlt olarmanents
The information gathefed by the Agencyin 1984 concerning the proourement and con-
struction of armaments for the forces of the
WEU member countries stationed on the main-
land of Europe is set out as Annex II to this
report.
E. General conclusions
In accordance with Articles VII and XIX
of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to
report to the Council that, as a result of the
control exercised in 1984, the figures obtained in
aocordance with Article XItr of kotocol No. IV:
- 
for armaments of forces under NATO
command under the terms of Article
XIV of Protocol No. IV, and
- 
for armaments of forces maintained
under national command under the
terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of
Protocol No. IV and the agreement ofl4th December 1957, concluded in
execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,
represented the appropriate levels of armaments
subject to control for each of the member states.
As required by Article XX of Protocol No.
IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of
field control measures carried out at force units
and military depots and during agreed control
measures at production plants, it did not detectfor the categories of armaments which it
controls:
- either the manufacture of a category of
armaments that the government of the
member state concef,ned had under-
taken not to manufacture (Annexes II
and III of Protocol No. III);
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or the existence, on the mainland of
Europe, of stocks of armaments in
excess of the appropriate levels (Article
XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified
by export requirements (Article XXII of
Protocol No. IV).
In 1984, the Standing Armaments
Committee met four times, ot 27th January,
17th April, 28th September and 7th December.
On l4th February, it took part in the meeting of
the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint produc-
tion of armaments.
The main items on the agenda of its meet-
ings were: the study of the armaments sector of
industry in the member countries of WEU; the
study on the development of the armaments
induitry in Japan and its possible repercussions
for Europe; the updating of the WEU Agree-
ment 4.FT.6 on trials methods for wheeled
vehicles; the activities of Working Group No. 8
on operational research and the reconvening of
Working Group No. 9 on possible hindrances to
enemy action.
A. Study on the armaments sectot of industry
in the member countries of WEU
l. The Standing Armaments Committee,
which was instructed by the Council to carry out
a simplified annual updating of the classified
version of the first section of the economic part
of the study on the arrnaments sector of industry
in the member countries of WEU, has prepared
a 1984 revision - based on data supplied by the
member countries - covering the period
1975-82.
At the Council's request, it has also pre-
pared a declassified version, which the Council
forwarded to the Assembly on 14th November.
2. With regard to the preparation by the SAC
of the second section of the economic part of its
study 
- 
which will give an analytical description
of the armaments industries based on the
information supplied by them - the Committee
abided by its decision to await the replies to the
questionnaire sent out by the IEPG, to avoid
duplicating the work of this body.
B. Study on the development of the Japanese
amaments industry and its possible conseqaences
for Europe
Work on the preparation of this study was
continued by the international secretariat, which
collected the documentation available from
several countries, particularly the United States
As in previous years, the help and co-
operation given to the Agency by the national
and NATO authorities, the directors and staff of
the military establishments and private firms
which the Agency visited played an important
part in the accomplishment of its mission.
IY, Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee
and Japan itself. Experts and specialists were
also consulted in Europe and in the United
States where detailed studies on Japan in general
and its advanced technologies in particular are
being carried out by government, industry and
the universities.
C. IAEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods
for wheeM vehicles
In the light of the conclusions reached by
the group of experts responsible, which met in
December 1983, the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee gave its agreement that this group should
update WEU Agreement 4.FT.6.
The Committee also noted the intention
of a NATO committee to use this updated agree-
ment when drafting a NATO standardisation
agreement on combat vehicle testing.
D, Activities of the working groaps
1, llo*ing Group No.8 on operational research
The remit of this working group is to
exchange the findings of national operational
research studies, to organise symposia on opera-
tional research methods and techniques and
arrange visits to national operational research
centres.
In 1984, the group held two meetings, the
first of which was coupled with a seminar on
methodology and the second to a visit to the
Industrieanlagen Betiebsgesellschaft and to the
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm company at Otto-
brunn (Federal Republic of Germany).
(a) Exchanges of information
During the year, the delegations presented
a number of information forms concerning new
studies and updatings.
(b) Seminar on methodology
The theme of the seminar was " Operator/
computer interface and related subjects ". Papers
were presented by the German, Belgian, French
and Netherlands Delegations and were followed
by discussions.
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(c) Visit to Ottobrunn
At the invitation of the German autho-
rities, the group visited the IABG and the MBB
company. Talks were given on the implications
of new weapons technology and on anti-tank
warfare by engineers from the two establish-
ments and these were followed by a demon-
stration.
(d) Lexicographical activity
Following completion of the pilot study to
assess the time needed to produce a second
improved and extended edition of the five-
language glossary of operational research terms,
the Standing Armaments Committee gave the
go-ahead to produce the new edition.
2. llorhing Group No.9 on possible hindrunces
to enemy action
The request for a contribution to a study
on anti-tank obstacles made by FINABEL was
not taken up by the Standing Armaments
Committee as there was no consensus.
E. Meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee
on the joint production of armaments
The aim of these meetings is to supply
technical information on the SAC's activities to
representatives of the Assembly.
At the request of the Committee on
Defence Questions and Armaments of the
Assembly and with the Council's agreement, the
sub-committee met on l4th February 1984 in
Paris.
The Chairman-in-Office of the Standing
Armaments Committee read out the SAC replies
to the written questions submitted in advance by
the Assembly committee; he replied, within the
limits of his competence, to the supplementary
questions put at the meeting.
F, Activities of the internatrional secretariat
l. The international secretariat has assisted
the SAC and Working Group No. 8 in their
work.
2. On 22nd, May 1984, the Assistant Secre-
tary-General, head of the international secreta-
riat, presented an oral report to the Council on
the SAC's activities. On this occasion, the
Council continued to discuss the future work of
the Committee, inter alia, on the basis of this
report.
3. As a follow-up to each part of the thirtieth
ordinary session of the WEU Assembly and to
the extraordinary session held in Rome to mark
the thinieth anniversary of the organisation, the
international secretariat distributed to SAC
members a document containing extracts of any
speeches, reports, debates and recommendations
dealing with armaments questions.
4. Relations between the SAC international
secretariat and the FINABEL secretariat have
continued in accordance with the provisions for
co-operation laid down in 1973.
5. Acting on the Council's instruction, the
head of the international secretariat forwarded
to the IEPG presidency the classified version of
the 1984 revision of the SAC economic study on
the armaments sector of indugtry in the member
countries of WEU.
6. As regards contacts with NATO, the head
of the international secretariat attended the
thirtieth annual session of the North Atlantic
Assembly, and was represented by his assistant
at the April and October meetings of the Confer-
ence of National Armamentg Directors, which
took place at NATO headquarters in Brussels.
An observer from the international secre-
tariat was present at the June and December
meetings in Brussels of the NATO Naval Arma-
ments Group.
7. In reply to a request from the Committee
on Defence Questions and Armaments in
December, the Council gave its agreement for
the international secretariat to collaborate in
preparing the next report of this committee on
emerying technology and military strategy.
The meetings were mainly devoted to
exchanges of information on significant adminis-
trative developments in the member countries
during the preceding six months and to the pre-
paration of the multilateral serninar for govern-
ment oflicials, held in the autumn of each year
under the auspices of the committee.
Y, Activities of the lrablic Adminisfiation Committee
A. Meetings of the committee
In 1984, the Public Administration Com-
mittee held its two annual meetings, which
take place in each of the member countries in
turn, in Spoleto (Italy) from llth to 13th April
and in Louvain (Belgium) from 25th to 27th
September.
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During the year under review, the dele-
gates kept abreast of the various changes taking
place in the machinery of government and admi-
nistration in their respective countries following
government changes or realignments. The
main new items of legislation having a signifi-
cant bearing on the administration were reported
and, where appropriate, texts distributed.
The committee also discussed a number of
administrative problems common to the major-
ity of the member countries. As has been the
pattern now for several years, many of these
problems are directly linked to the conditions
created for all the countries - and hence for their
administrations - by a difficult economic and
financial situation, e.g. the fight against unem-
ployment through a variety of measures used in
different ways depending on the country concer-
ned (part-time employment, early retirement,
shorter working week, etc.); the policies pursued
in most of the member countries in order to
limit public expenditure. As regards the admi-
nistration, the concern to save public funds has
manifested itself in a number of ways: efforts to
limit the area and scope of government interven-
tion, measures designed to increase the effi-
ciency of the administrative machinery.
Attempts are being made to reorganise the civil
service in order to improve the level of manage-
ment. New qualities are being expected of ofli-
cials in positions of responsibility, for example:
knowledge of and aptitude for business and staff
management, budget management and cost
control; capacity to introduce the requisite
changes; concern for quality and performance in
the face of a better informed and more
demanding public.
In order to improve management capa-
bitity and enhance efficiency, increasing reliance
is being placed on the development of data-
processing and office automation systems, and
on better training. In several countries, for
example, courses or seminars have been organ-
ised for senior officials. At the same time
efforts are being made to improve the selection
procedures to meet the new requirements.
Emphasis is also being placed on greater mobi-
lity within the civil service to broaden civil
seryants' experience and give them a clearer per-
ception of government policy as a whole. In
short, serious efforts are being made by all the
member countries, to varying degxees, to reorga-
nise, modernise and rationalise their admi-
nistrations.
B. Seminars for government olficials
As stated in the last annual report, the
1983 seminar for government officials was heldin Ostend from 16th to 22nd October. Its
objective was to allow senior civil servants from
the member countries to examine the stage
reached, as at the end of 1983, in introducing
oflice automation into the public services in the
seven countries and also to investigate the
changes brought about by the introduction of
office automation systems.
The chosen topic proved to be of great
interest, in view of the rapid developments
taking place in office automation technology and
the need for a detailed study of its impact on
government departments. The participants
especially appreciated the opportunity for an ex-
change of views with representatives of other
European countries, given the uneasiness felt in
the civil service about the administrative prob-
lems likely to arise from the widespread intro-
duction of information technology.
The participants' comments, culled after
the seminar, testified to the excellent way in
which the seminar had been organised from both
the practical and intellectual points of view;
they also revealed that the seminar had high-
lighted both the many-sided aspects of office
automation and the diflerent ways in which it is
perceived, the di{ferences being attributable
more to the character of the people responsible
or to the particular government department
involved than to nationality.
The 1984 seminar for government officials
was held in Paris from 22nd to 27th October and
brought together eighteen senior civil servants
representing all the member countries of WEU.
The topic under discussion was " The r6le of
national service or short-term voluntary enlist-
ment in fitting young people for active civilian
life ". In other words, the aim was to assess
how the armed forces utilised the skills acquired
by young people during their schooling and to
evaluate whether and how the training acquired
during military service was or could be used to
facilitate their entry or return to civilian life.
An appraisal of the course will be made at
the next meeting of the Public Administration
Committee, once all the findings and comments
of the various national delegations are known;
this will be reported in the next annual report of
the Council.
C. Study visits
Each year, the Public Administration
Committee organises, through its members'own
initiatives, a number of carefully prepared study
visits, the results of which are embodied in a
report and communicated to both the committee
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and the host government concerned. These
visits enable an oflicial to spend one or two
weeks in the administration of another member
country studying in his own specialist field.
Examples of rrisits organised during the
year are: the administrative arrangements for
implementing the Seveso directive on major
accident hazards; influence of part-time farming
on farm management (subj9ct studied in the
Federal Republic of Germany); methods used to
train the oflicers who adrminister the social
security benefits (subject studied in Belgium);
administration of sea fisheries statistics; assess-
ment and collection of social security contribu-
tions from people employed in casual agricul-
tural employment (subjectq studied in the
Netherlands).
YL Budgetary and administative questions
A, Budget
(a) The economic situation in the member
countries has continued to exert a strain on the
budget and a policy of utmost discipline in
expenditure was again pursued in 1984.
The approved budgets for 1985 of the
three ministerial organs combined show an
increase of the total net expenditure, including
the cost for pensions of 4.53% over the 1984
budgets. If the total net cost for pensions were
to be excluded, then the total increase would be
1.63%.
The average of the forecast rates of infla-
tion for the United Kingdom and for France is
slightly more than 4%. The increase for 1985,
therefore, is well in line with zero growth.
A summary table of the budget is attached
as Annex IIL
It should be recalled in this context that
approximately 80% of the ministerial budgets
consists of expenditure relating to salaries and
allowances, pensions and travel. Pensions
represent l5% ofthis percentage.
(b) The costs resulting from the increased
activities in the second half of 1984 of the Per-
manent Council, working groups as well as from
the special additional meeting of the Council in
Rome, concerning the reactivation of WEU,
could only be met with the co-operation of the
Secretariat-General and the skilful management
of its budget.
The relatively considerable extra costs
have been fully met by the savings from vacan-
cies in the Secretariat-General. These vacancies
have been maintained, whenever possible, pen-
ding the outcome of the reactivation and its
associate reorganisation. They have been filled
on a temporary and intermittent basis as and
when the increased activities have demanded
this.
B, Activities in theframework of co-ordination
The Co-ordinating Committee of Govern-
ment Budget Experts held ten meetings. In
addition there were fifteen meetings of the
Heads of Administration, twelve joint meetings
of the Standing Committee of Secretariei-
General and the Standing Committee of the Staff
Associations, as well as two meetings of the
Secretaries-General.
The main subjects dealt with, some of
which are still under review, were:
- 
the improvement of staff participation
in the framework of co-ordination;
- 
a reconsideration of the amount of wage
restraint in the remuneration of A and
L grade staff by amending the tempo-
rary levy on the basic salary;
- a reconsideration of the amount of wage
restraint in the remuneration of B and C
grade staff by way of amending the
compensation for fringe benefits;
- 
the periodic adjustment of salary and
allowances;
- the tender for contract and selection of
a suitable institution/firm to carry out a
feasibility study on comparisons of
duties, grades and levels of remunera-
tion in the co-ordindted organisations,
international organis4tions, certain civil
services and certain private sector
firms;
- the problem of retention or disconti-
nuation of the use of international
indices for salary comparisons;
- a comparison between the children's
allowances in the international organi-
sations and a number of reference
countries.
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PART TWO
Examination by the Council, in coniunction with the Assembly,
ofthe future prospects for lYestern European Union
A.1. Responding to the initiative taken by
the French Government, the Council began in
the early months of 1984 to reflect on the future
of the organisation. The French and Belgian
Governments submitted memoranda to the
Council on this subject.
A special working $oup was instructed to
draw up a report on the prospects for reactiva-
tion of WEU. It studied the question from three
different angles, i.e. Why reactivate WEU now?
What content would such a reactivation have?
What would be the implementing procedures?
Its report, together with the French and
Belgian memoranda, provided the basis for an
initial consideration of this question by the
ministers on 12th June in Paris. This document
was distributed to the representatives of the
Assembly after the ministerial meeting 2.
2. In his address given at the luncheon meet-
ing between the Council and the Presidential
Committee of the Assembly and when opening
the joint meeting held in the afternoon with the
General Affairs Committee and the Committee
on Defence Questions and Armaments of the
Assembly, the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Cheys-
son, set out the main reasons for and objectives
of the Council's initiative, emphasising that it
was to be seen as a contribution to the cohesion
of the Atlantic Alliance and not as an attempt to
create a substitute for it. He stated that the study
of the measures required to make better use of
WEU would be considered in greater detail with
a view to the decisions to be taken by the minis-
ters at their next meeting. He answered ques-
tions from the members of the committees on
this subject.
At the Assembly session of l8th-21st June,
Mr. Genscher, speaking as the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Baroness Young, United Kingdom Minis-
ter of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, and Mr. van Houwelingen, the Dutch
Secretary of State for Defence, confirmed their
governments' interest in the efforts being made
by the member countries to reactivate WEU and
stated their positions on the subject.
B.1. In accordance with the views expressed
by ministers in Paris and in conformity with the
procedure laid down in Article II of Protocol
No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, the
Council, in a unanimous decision taken on
27th June 1984, cancelled the remaining restric-
tions considered to have become outdated which
- 
under Articles IV and VI of Annex III to this
protocol 
- 
concerned the manufacture of
ionventional weapons by the Federal Republic
of Germany.
This decision follows what the Assembly
has been recommending since 1982, and most
recently at its June session.
2. At the ministers'behest, the following four
points were examined with the help of a special
working group:
- 
activation of the Council (subjects to be
dealt with and procedures);
- 
relations between Council and Assem-
blv;
- 
future activities of the Agency for the
Control of Armaments and of the Stan-
ding Armaments Committee;
- 
contacts with non-member states.
The proposals put forward by the Assem-
bly, particularly in Recommendations 406 and
407 and in the memorandum which the Assem-
bly President, on his visit to Bonn in mid-
September, handed to the Chairman-in-Oflice of
the Council, have been studied extensively.
Mr. Genscher also received Mr. Caro and certain
members of the Assembly on 9th October in
Gymnich for discussions with a view to the
ministerial meeting in Rome.
C.l. At this anniversary meeting on 26th and
27th October, the Foreign and Defence Ministers
took a number of important decisions con-
cerning the organisation and how to make better
use of it.
Thus the ministers decided to hold com-
prehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise
their views on the specific conditions of security
in Europe, in particular:
- 
defence questions;
- 
arns control and disarmament;
- 
the effects of developments in East-
West relations on the security of
Europe;2. See Annex IV.
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- 
Europe's contribution to the strengthen-
ing of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in
mind the importance of transatlantic
relations;
- 
the development of European co-
operation in the field of armaments in
respect of which WEU can provide a
political impetus.
It was noted that they might also consider
the implications for Europe of crises in other
regions of the world.
The Chairman-in-Offrce of the Council
outlined the ministers' conclusions to the Presi-
dential Committee of the Assembly prior to the
publication of the Rome declaration and the
document on the institutional reform of WEU 3.
The Permanent Council was instructed to
prepare reports on the following topics for sub-
mission to the ministers at their next meeting:
- 
structural reform of the Agency for the
Control of Armaments, the Standing
Armaments Committee and its inter-
national secretariat;
- 
ways of improving WEU public rela-
tions activities;
- 
how the experience of military experts
can be used for the work of the WEU
Council of Ministers.
The Council was also invited to submit a
proposal on the recent application by Portugal
for membership of WEU.
Furthermore, as stated in the document
on the institutional reform of WEU, the Secre-
tary-General was instructed to prepare a report
as soon as possible on the work carried out by
the Secretariat-General and to consider what
measures might be needed to strengthen its
activities.
2. On 29th October, the Chairman-in-Office
of the Council addressed the Assembly at its
extraordinary session to report on the outcome
of the ministerial meeting in Rome. He pointed
out that the decisions taken by the Council were,
on many points, in line with the Assembly's pro-
posals to the Council.
In his concluding remarks, he said that:
"...Western European Union has made
considerable progress since the beginning
of this year. The decisions taken by the
ministers at the meeting held in Rome to
mark WEU's thirtieth anniversary are
constructive and forwardJooking. The
great success of our meeting is hrghly
encouraging for us all and for Europe. We
must continue our work with the same
vigour, with the Council of Ministers and
the Assembly collaborating as closely as
possible. I am convinced that the Assem-bly will play an active part in the
achievement of our goafls.
The sign that has been given in the Rome
declaration shows that European defence
policy is assuming definite shape. Greater
European solidarity within WEU v/ill
strengthen the solidarity between Europe
and North America. It will encourage the
process of European unification ani for-
tiry the European pillar of the alliance.
We shall thus all be making a major
contribution to the maintenance of
peace. "
The Italian Foreign and Defence Minis-
ters, Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Spadolini, also
addressed the Assembly and reiterated the
importance they attached to the revival of WEU.
D.1. Immediately after the Rome meeting,
the Permanent Council began the work of imple-
menting the ministers'instructions. It set about
this task actively, intent on working diligently
and making the best use of ell the appropriate
help available (assistance of experts from the
capitals, the Secretary-General and the heads of
the specialised agencies of WEU).
2. Contact with the Assembly has been
maintained by the Chairman-in-Oflice of the
Council, Mr. Genscher, who again received the
Assembly President and certain members of the
Assembly on l9th November in Gymnich.
Furthermore, Mr. Genscher and three
other ministers, namely Mr. Spadolini, the
Italian Defence Minister, Mr. Cheysson, the
French Minister for External Relations, and Mr.
Luce, United Kingdom Minister of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, addressed
the Assembly during the sqcond part of its
thirtieth ordinary session. They underscored
their governments' determination to see the
decisions taken in Rome implemented rapidly
and clarified their views on this subject.
The Council has begun a careful study of
the proposals put forward by the Assembly in
the recommendations it adopted at the begin-
ning of December.
3l
3. See Annex V.
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ANNEX I
List of the varioas aspects of the dialogae between
-the Council and the Assembly in 1984
l. Twenty-ninth annual report of the Coun-
cil on its activities for the period lst January to
3lst December 1983, communicated to the
Assembly pursuant to Article IX of the modified
Brussels Treaty.
2. Council replies to Recommendations 396
to 410 adopted by the Assembly during the
second part ofits twenty-ninth ordinary session
and the first part of its thirtieth ordinary session.
3. Council replies to Written Questions 240
to 248 put by members of the Assembly.
4. Contacts between the Council and Assem-
bly bodies:
(i) Luncheon meeting between the Council of
Ministers, under the chairmanship of Mr. Cheys-
son, French Minister for External Relations, and
the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on
l2th June 1984 in Paris.
(ii) Joint informal meeting between the Coun-
cii of Ministers, under the chairmanship of
Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External
Relations, and the General Affairs Committee
and the Committee on Defence Questions and
Armaments of the Assembly on the afternoon of
l2thJune 1984inParis.
(ii, Presentation of the conclusions of the
exiraordinary meeting of the Council of Minis-
ters to the Presidential Committee of the Assem-
bly on 27th October in Rome.
5. Informal contacts between the Chairman-
in-OfIice of the Council, Mr. Genscher, and the
Assembly President, Mr. Caro, and certain
members of the Assembly on 9th October and
19th November respectively at Gymnich.
6. Documents transmitted by the Council to
the Assembly:
- 
rules of access to the archives of the
Brussels Treaty Organisation for
research purposes, approved bY the
Council on lst February 1984;
- 
document on the prospects for the
reactivation of WEU, published by the
Foreign Ministers on l2th June 1984 in
Paris;
- 
Rome declaration and document on the
institutional reform of WEU, published
by the Foreign and Defence Ministers
on27thOctober 1984;
- 
resolution concerning Annex III to Pro-
tocol No. III of the modified Brussels
Treaty, adopted by the Council on 27th
June 1984;
- 
declassified version ofthe 1984 revision
of the economic study by the Standing
Armaments Committee of the arrna-
ments sector of industry in the member
countries of WEU, communicated to
the Assembly on 14th November 1984;
- 
resolution concerning Annex IV to
Protocol No. III of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, adopted by the Council on
23rdJanuary 1985.
7. Statements by the Chairman-in-Oflice
of the Council and other ministers to the
Assembly:
(i) During the first part of the thirtieth ordi-
nary session of the Assembly in Paris:
- 
Mr. Genscher, speaking as Chairman-
in-Office of the Council in presenting
the twenty-ninth annual report of the
Council to the Assembly and as Foreign
Minister of the Federal Republic of
Germany, on 20th June;
- 
Baroness Young, United Kingdom
Minister of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs, on l9th June;
- 
Mr. van Houwelingen, State Secretary
for Defence of the Netherlands, on 20th
June.
(iil At the extraordinary session of the Assem-
bly in Rome on 29th October:
- 
Mr. Genscher, as Chairman-in-Office
of the Council reporting on the out-
come of the extraordinary meeting of
the Council of Ministers and as Foreign
Minister of the Federal Republic of
Germany;
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- 
Mr. Andreotti, Italian Minister for
Foreign Affairs;
- Mr. Spadolini, Italian Minister of
Defence.
(iii) During the second part of the thirtieth
ordinary session of the Assembly in Paris:
- 
Mr. Genscher, as Chairman-in-Oflice of
the Council and as Foreign Minister of
the Federal RepubliC of Germany, on
5th December;
- Mr. Spadolini, Italian Minister of
Defence, on 5th December;
- 
Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for
External Relations, on 5th December;
- 
Mr. Luce, United Kingdom Minister of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, on 4th Decennber.
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ANNEX II
Production and procurement of armanents for the
forces of lfEU member countrics stotioned
on tha mainbnd of Europe in 1984
1. Armaments for l.and forces
(a) The Federal Republic of Germany has
continued to improve its strength of battle tanks
and APCs. Leopard II and TPZ-I (transport
Panzer) wheeled transport vehicles have been
introduced.
An increased number of Gepard self-
propelled anti-aircraft gun tanks have been
brought into service.
Considerable quantities of ammunition
for tank guns, 155 mm heavy artillery, anti-tank
and anti-aircraft systems have been delivered.
(b) The Belgian anny has continued to
improve its anti-tank capability by further
adding to its holdings of Milan missiles. Bel-
gium has also purchased some M-l 13 armoured
personnel carriers (APCs) and has increased its
munition stocks for heavy mortar and 155 mm
artillery.
(c) The French army has continued to re-
equip its forces with modern high-performance
armoured vehicles such as the main battle tank
AMX-30 and APCs including YAB (v4hicule de
I'avant blindQ and AMX-10 variants.
The artilery has taken delivery of 155 mm
howitzers, most of which are the GCT version(grande cadence de tir) and Roland anti-
aircraft systems, with considerable quantities of
appropriate missiles.
The anti-tank capability has been steadily
increased through the purchase of Hot systems.
With regard to munitions, large quantities of
155 mm howitzer, 105 mm tank gun, 120 mm
mortar and anti-tank missiles Hot and Milan
have been acquired.
(d) Italy has continued to modernise its tank
and anti-tank potential by procuring Leopard I
tanks in several variants and through the pur-
chase of Tow launchers; ABCs of the VCC-I
type (veicolo corazzato da combattimento) have
been delivered. In the field of munitions, small
quantities have been ordered for 105 mm tank
guns and 155 mm artillery; larger quantities of
modern anti-tank missiles of the Milan and Hot
type have entered the inventory.
(e) No change in the Luxembourg army's
holding of Milan guided-weapon systems has
been reported.
A The Netherlands has continued to increase
ammunition holdings with deliveries of rounds
for tank guns, rounds for artillery and mortiars,
and Tow anti-tank missiles.
(g) The BAOR has continued to modernise
its tank and anti-tank potential by introducing
new Challenger battle tanks and Milan and Tow
anti-tank missile launcher systems. Holdings of
rounds for the aforementioned systems and for
155 mm artillery have been increased.
2, Naval armaments
(a) In the Federal Republic of Germany the
following have been procured: the KOln and
Karlsruhe, thus completing the series of the
F-122 class frigates; the Dachs, Ozelot, Wiesel
and Hyine, the last four units of the type 143
fast attack craft; Tornado aircraft; a number of
Sidewinder AIM 9L (for Tornado) and Seaspar-
row missiles (for F-122 frigates).
The production of Tornado aircraft has
continued.
(b) In France, the Jean de Vienne, of the
type C-70 anti-submarine destroyers, and the
Saphir, a SNA 72 nuclear attack submarine,
were commissioned in the fleet. Five Super-
Etendard AM-39 air-to-surface missiles have
been delivered.
SNA 72 type nuclear submarines, C-70
type destroyers (anti-submarine), C-70 type
destroyers (anti-aircraft) and a Durance+lass
under-way replenishment tanker are under
construction.
@ In Italy, the Euro and Espero frigates of
the Maestrale class were commissioned.
The light aircraft-carrier Garibaldi is in its
final stage of construction.
(d) In the Netherlands the Jacob van Heems-
kerk and the Witte de With, two anti-air frigates,
and two submarines, the Walrus and the Zee-
leeuw, are under construction.
Orders have been placed for four M-type
frigates and an option has been taken out for
four additional M-type frigates.
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3. Airlorce amaments
(a) The German air force has continued to
procure Tornado aircraft as well as new genera-
tion Sidewinder 9L air-to-air missiles.
The production of Tornado and RB-199
engines destined for the naval and air forces has
continued.(b) The Belgian air force has continued its
programme of modernisation through the acqui-
sition of F-16 aircraft.(c) The French air force has continued its
modernisation through the introduction into
service of new Mirage 2000 aircraft (attack ver-
sion) and Mirage F-I-CR (reconnaissance ver-
sion). Crotale (S/A) and Matra Super 530-R(A/A) have been procured, as well as a second
holding of Thomson Brandt 100 mm rockets.
The production of Mirage 2000, Mirage
F-1, Mirage 5 and the Alpha-Jet has continued.
With regard to engines, besides the normal
production of units for aircraft under construc-
tion, mention must be made of the appearance
of the very modern M-88 engine (whose first
model made its initial run at the beginning of
January).
The production of missiles has continued
normally and has concentrated especially on
Crotale, Matra Super 530, Magic and AS-37 anti-
radar.
(d) The Italian air force has procured Tor-
nado aircraft, which have already equipped two
squadrons soon to be operational. The Kormo-
ran air-to-surface missiles, which will equip Tor-
nado aircraft in the anti-shipping r6le, and the
first Sidewinder 9L (new generation) air-to-air
missiles have also been procured.
Production in Italy has continued to
concentrate on the Tornado and its RB-199
engils. The light AM-X fighter, whose flight
trials have already started, should also be
mentioned.
With regard to missiles, the production of
the multirOle missile Aspide, which will soon be
used in the air-to-air, ground-to-air and surface-
to-air r6les, is worthy of mention.
(e) Delivery to the Netherlands air force of
F-16 aircraft and their production in the Nether-
lands have continued. Ground-to-air Patriot
missiles have also been procured.
(l) As regards the air force of the BAOR, the
Buccaneers and half the Jaguars have been
replaced by Tornado aircraft.
In the field of missiles, the Bloodhound
and Sidewinder 98 systems have been replaced
by the Slqrflash and the Sidewinder 9L.
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ANNEX III
Summary of WEU main budgetfor 1984
Salaries and allowances
Pensions
A* B* cr Total B + C
f F. frs F. frs F. frs
1,276,880
I I1,935
30,305
202,730
12,030
10,417,800
1,507,130
180,600
720,950
31,000
25,000
22,105,300
3,802,300
747,900
1,068,850
61,500
45,000
32,523,100
5,309,430
928,500
1,789,800
92,500
70.000
Trevel
Other operating costs . . .
Purchase of furniture, etc.
Buildinss
TorernxpeNoITURE
W'FI T tav
1,633,880 12.882.480 27.830.8s0 40,713,330
475,490
42,530
46,670
3,560,100
182,000
301,000
7,612,200
396,500
696,000
11,172,300
578,500
997,000
()thcr reneints
Pension receiots
ToTALNCOME 564,690 4,043,100 8,704,700 12.747.800
Npr rorar 1,069,190 9,939,380 19,126,150 27,965,530
Natianal contributions called for under the WEU nain budga for 1984
Raloi
60Oths f F. frs
59
120
120
r20
2
59
120
105,137.02
213,838.00
213,838.00
213,838.00
3,563.96
105,137.02
213,838.00
2,749,943.78
5,593,106.00
5,593,106.00
5,593,106.00
93,218.44
2,749,943.78
5.s93.106.00
Frence
G
Irrlv
f rrvpmlrnrr
Npthpdcn.l
United Kinsdom
ToTAr 600 1,069,190.00 27,965,530.00
*A Secretariat-General.
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.
C Agency for the Control of Armaments.
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ANNEX IV
Report on the reactivation of llEU published by the
Foreigt Ministers on 12th June 1984 in Parts
The working group instructed by the
Council and the political directors to examine
the prospects for reactivating WEU considered
that this question could be approached from
three different angles as follows:
- 
Why reactivate WEU now?
- 
What content would such a reactivation
have?
- 
What would be the implementing pro-
cedures?
The replies to each of these questions were
as follows:
1. WEU is at present the only European
organisation empowered by treaty to discuss
defence and security matters. It has a well-
developed institutional structure, in particular a
Council and a parliamentary Assembly. Its
reactivation is prompted by the following consi-
derations:
l.l. Consultation and joint indepth reflec-
tion by the member countries of WEU are
needed on the problems liable to affect their
security, together with a more assertive Euro-
pean presence in the field of defence and
security.
1.2. The international situation and especially
the continuing build-up of Soviet military
forces deployed against Western Europe are a
matter of major concern.
1.3. As partners in the Atlantic Alliance, the
member states of WEu are aware of the need to
step up their contribution to the transatlantic
dialogue.
1.4. It is important that public opinion be
involved in the debate about defence and secu-
rity, principally through an improved dialogue
between the WEU Council and the Assembly
and by raising the profi.le of the activities of
those bodies.
In these circumstances, a better utilisation
of WEU would demonstrate that the member
countries have the will to reflect jointly and in
depth on the conditions of their security in the
face of the threat they have to meet. This will,
however, require a determined effort to adapt
and revive the organisation.
Such reactivation must, and perfectly well
can, be achieved with due regard for the areas of
competence of the other existing Atlantic and
European institutions. This will require an
exchange of information, taking into account the
activities of these institutions:
As regards the Aflantic Alliance, with
which WEU has very close links for co-operation
under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty(Articles IV and VII), the proposed reactivation
should be seen as a contribution to the cohesion
of the alliance itself and not as an attempt to
create a substitute for it. It ls along these lines
that the other members of thp alliance, who are
not members of WEU, would be kept informed;
the ambassadors of the Seven to the alliance
could play a useful r6le in this respect.
Whereas the Ten, as they declared at
Stuttgart, are called upon to drscuss the political
and economic aspects of security, this does not
at present extend to the field of defence. A
reactivation of WEU would serve as an example
ofwhat can be achieved through co-operation on
the European plane and as a device to keep this
important area of European co-operation active
which the Community and the Ten are at pre-
sent unable to exploit to the extent that some of
them would wish.
2. As to the content, a reactivation of WEU
should lead to a fuller dialogue on topics of
common and major interest, taking into consi-
deration the European dimension of security
questions.
2.1. An urgent topic is the growing threat to
Europe in its various guises, i.e. military, poli-
tical and psychological. This is a problem
which, unquestionably, can profitably be dis-
cussed within the Seven without duplicating
work and studies carried out elsewhere. Such a
discussion among Europeans is even comple-
mentary as it may be conducted from a different
and specific angle. Moreover, European public
opinion expects its leaders to give thought to the
problem and to present reasoned arguments
which meet its preoccupations and worries.
2.2. The discussions could, as provided for
by Article VIII.3 of the treaty, also focus on the
effects of the international situation on Euro-
pean security. Even if the Seven have no
special interests to express on all these problems,
they at least have specific viewpoints and ideas.
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2.3. Another topic could be ways of streng-
thening the transatlantic dialogue in all its
forms.
2.4. In the field of arms co-operation, the
magniluds of the tasks to be accomplished in
Europe 
- 
in particular as regards the use ofnew
technologies to strengthen conventional defence
- 
demands that no opportunity for consultation
at European level be overlooked. Without
encroaching on bodies such as the Independent
European Programme Group (IEPG) or the
Conference of National Armaments Directors(CNAD), which have their own structure and
responsibilities, WEU could play a useful r6le as
a forum for discussion and a source of political
impetus.
3. As regards implementing procedures, this
reactivation of WEU should lead to greater use
of the existing institutions, with a number of
changes. Special attention should be directed to
the pair formed by the Council and the
Assembly.
3.1. The Council has an essential rdle to
play.
It fulfils this r6le more particularly when it
meets at ministerial level. These meetings thus
provide the required political impetus and at the
same time enhance the work of the Permanent
Council. They could be held twice a year.
The Permanent Council could, in turn,
meet more frequenfly, these meetings being
expanded, as appropriate, to include senior
central government staff (political directors,
experts on politico-military and defence ques-
tions, ...).
3.2 Any reactivation of the Council will
have implications for its subsidiary bodies 
-
the Standing Armaments Committee and the
Agency for the Control of Armaments.
3.3 The Assembly has a vital r6le to play as
the link with public opinion on such an impor-
tant issue as security. To this end, it would
appear that a dialogue of greater substance
should be established between the Council and
the Assembly, independently of the work done
by each.
In this context, it might be envisaged that:
- 
the exchange of views between the
Assembly and the Council should be
directed primarily to the reactivation of
WEU and how this is to be brought
about. The value of earlier Assembly
studies and reports on the subject
should be borne in mind;
- 
the procedure for answering Assembly
recommendations and written questions
should be improved.
Quite clearly the work of the Council and
that of the Assembly interact and the debates in
one of them cannot fail to stimulate discussions
in the other.
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ANNEX V
Rome declarution
l. At the invitation of the Italian Govern-
ment, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the
seven member states of Western European
Union met in extraordinary session in Rome on
26th-27th October 1984 to mark the thirtieth
anniversary of the modffied Brussels Treaty.
2. The Ministers stressed the importance of
the treaty and their attachment to its goals:
- 
to strengthen peacc and security;
- 
to promote the unity and to encourage
the progressive integration of Europe;
- 
to co-operate more closely both among
member states and with other European
organisations.
3. Conscious of the continuing necessity to
strengthen western security and of the specifi-
cally Western European geographical, political,
psychological and military dimensions, the
Ministers underlined their determination to
make better use of the WEU framework in
order to increase co-operation between the
member states in the field of security policy
and to encourage consensus. In this context,
they called for continued efforts to preserve
peace, strengthen deterrence and defence and
thus consolidate stability through dialogue and
co-operation.
4. The Ministers recalled that the Atlantic
Alliance, which remains the foundation of
western security, had preserved peace on the
continent for thirty-five years. This permitted
the construction of Europe. The Ministers are
convinced that a better utilisation of WEU
would not only contribute to the security of
Western Europe but also to an improvement in
the common defence of all the countries of the
Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity
among its members.
5. The Ministers emphasised the indivisibil-
ity of security within the North Atlantic Treaty
area. They recalled in particular the vital and
substantial contribution of all the European
allies, and underlined the crucial importance of
the contribution to common security of their
allies who are not members of WEU. They
stressed the necessity, as a complement to theirjoint efforts, of the closest possible concertation
with them.
6. The Ministers ate convinced that
increased co-operation within WEU will also
contribute to the maintenance of adequate
military strength and political solidarity and,
on that basis, to the pursuit of a more stable
relationship between the countries of East and
West by fostering dialogue and co-operation.
7. The Ministers called attention to the need
to make the best use of existing resources
through increased co-operation, and through
WEU to provide a political impetus to institu-
tions of co-operation in the fteld of armaments.
8. The Ministers therefore decided to hold
comprehensive discussions and to seek to
harmonise their views on the specific conditions
of security in Europe, in particular:
- 
defence questions;
- 
arms control and disarmament;
- 
the effects of developments in East-
West relations on the security of
Europe;
- 
Europe's contribution to the strength-
ening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing
in mind the importance of transatlantic
relations;
- 
the development of European co-opera-
tion in the field of armaments in respect
of which WEU can provide a political
impetus.
They may also consider the implications for
Europe of crises in other regions of the world.
9. The Ministers recalled the importance of
the WEU Assembly which, as the only
European parliamentary body mandated by
treaty to discuss defence matters, is called upon
to play a growing r6le.
They stressed the major contribution
which the Assembly has already made to the
revitalisation of WEU and called upon it to
pursue its efforts to strengthen the solidarity
among the member states, and to strive to
consolidate the consensus among public opinion
on their security and defence needs.
10. In pursuance of these goals, the Ministers
have decided on a number of specific measures
with regard to the better functioning of the
WEU structure and organisation, which are set
out in a separate document.
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Institutional reform of WEU
At their meeting in Rome on 26th and
27th October 1984 to mark the thirtieth
anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty of
1954, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the
signatory states decided to make fuller use of
the institutions of WEU and, accordingly, to
bring the existing institutions into line with the
changed tasks of the organisation.
l. Activttion of the Coaacil
The Ministers regard activation of the
Council as a c€ntral element in the efforts to
make greater use of Western European Union.
In conformity with Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty, which allows the Council to
decide on the organisation of its work and to
consult or set up subsidiary bodies, the Ministers
decided the following:
l. The Council would in future normally
meet twice a ye r at ministerial level. One of
these sessions could take place in a small group
with no formal agenda. These meetings would
bring together the Foreign Ministers and
Defence Ministers. Separate meetings of the
Foreign Ministers and/or Defence Ministers
could also take place, if the member states
considered it necessary, to discuss matters lying
within their respective area of responsibility.
2. The presidency of the Council will be
held by each member state for a one-year term.
Meetings of the Council will in principle take
place in the country holding the presidency.
3. The work of the Permanent Council will
have to be intensified in line with the increased
activities of the Council of Ministers. The
Permanent Council, mandated to discuss in
greater detail the views expressed by the
Ministers and to follow up their decisions, will,
pursuant to the second paragraph of the
abovementioned Article VII[, make the neces-
sary arrangements for this purpose, including
as appropriate the setting-up of working groups.
4. The Secretariat-General should be
adapted to take account of the enhanced
activities of the Council of Ministers and the
Permanent Council.
5. The Ministers have asked the
Secretariat-General to submit, as soon as
possible, a report on the work done by the
secretariat and to consider what measures might
be necessary to strengthen its activities. In this
connection, the Ministers stated that any
reorganisation in the staffing of the
Secretariat-General should take account of the
adjustments made elsewhere in the other WEU
institutions. They stressed that any proposed
adjustments should not result in an overall
increase in the organisation's establishment.
ll. Relations between Council and Assembly
The Ministers supported the idea of
greater contact between the Council and the
Assembly.
Recalling that, under Article IX of the
treaty, the Assembly is expressly required to
discuss the reports submitted to it by the
Council of Ministers on matters concerning the
security and defence of the member states, and
considering that the practice adopted has
enabled the Assembly to widen the topics of its
discussions, the Ministers wish to see the
Assembly playing an increasing r6le, particu-
larly by contributing even more to associating
public opinion in the member states with the
policy statements of the Council, which
expresses the political will of the individual
governments. Accordingly, the Ministers submit
the following proposals to the Assembly:
l. In order to improve the contacts between
the Council and the Assembly, the Ministers
believe there are a number of options, notewor-
thy among which are:
- 
A substantial improvement in the existing
procedures for giving written replies to
Assembly recommendations and questions. On
this point, the Ministers consider that a leading
r6le should be given to the presidency, making
the best use of the services of the Secretariat-
General.
- 
The development of informal contacts between
government representatives and the representa-
tives of the Assembly.
- 
If appropriate, a colloquium involving the
presidency of the Council and the committees
of the Assembly.
The improvement of the contacts that
traditionally take place after the ministerial
meetings of the Council, and more generally,
the improvement of the procedures under which
the Assembly is kept informed by the presi-
dency, whose representatives could 
- 
between
the Assembly sessions keep the various
committees up to date with the work of the
Council and even take part in their discussions.
- 
The possibility that the Assembly might make
use of contributions from the technical institu-
tions of WEU.
2. Convinced that greater co-operation
between the Council and the Assembly is a key
factor in the enhanced utilisation of WEU, the
Ministers underscored the importance they
attach to the recommendations and work of the
Assembly.
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3. Without wishing to pre-empt the decision
of the members of the Assembly, the Ministers
also stress the value, in their eyes, of developing
a dialogue between the Assembly and othei
parliaments or parliamentary institutions.
4. The Ministers also stated that the
member states were always ready to inform
their national delegations of their governments'
attitude to questions dealt with in Assembly
reports and were prepared to offer informatioir
to their rapporteurs.
lll. Agency lor the Contol ol Armaments and the
Staading Armaments Committee
The Ministers also considered the activity
of the Agency for the Control of Armaments(ACA) and the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee (SAC).
l. In connection with the Agency, which
was set up in 1954 to monitor compliance with
the voluntary arms limitations agreed by the
contracting parties, the Ministers underlined
the exemplary nature of these commitments,
which had instilled confidence among the
signatory states and for this reason they
acclaimed the work that the Agency had done.
Noting the value of the experience thus
gained, the Ministers emphasised the interest
that they attached to the development by the
WEU member states of reflection on arms
control and disarmament questions.
2. As regards the SAC, the Ministers
recalled the importance of the tasks defined in
the decision of the Council of 7th May 1955
which established this body.
In this connection, they emphasised that
the existence of an effective and competitive
European armaments industry was a fundamen-
tal aspect of Europe's contribution to the
Atlantic Alliance. In this context, it seemed
very important to them that the seven member
states of WEU should be able to harmonise
their positions in this sphere and co-ordinate
their efforts with a view to increasing the
effectiveness of co-operative activity in the
various multilateral fora.
3. With the aim of better adapting the
institutions of WEU to present and future
requirements, the Ministers reached the follow-
ing decisions.
(a) Noting that the control functions origi-
nally assigned to the ACA have now become,
for the most part, superfluous, the Ministers
decided, in accordance with Article V of
Protocol No. III, which allows the Council to
make changes to the ACA's control activity, to
abolish gradually the remaining quantitative
controls on conventional weapons. The Ministers
agreed that these controls should be substan-
tially reduced ty lst January 1985 and entirely
lifted by lst January 1986. The commitmenti
and controls concerning ABC weapons would
be maintained at the existing level and in
accordance with the procedures agreed up to
the present time.
(b) The Ministers have instructed the Per-
manent Council to define, in consultation with
the directors of the ACA and the SAC, the
precise modalities of an overall reorganisation
affecting both the ACA, the international
secretariat of the SAC and the SAC which
could be structured in such a way as to fulfil a
threefold task:
- 
to study questions relating to arms
control and disarmament whilst cafiy-
ing out the remaining control functions;
- 
undertake the function of studying
security and defence problems;
- 
to contribute actively to the develop-
ment of European armaments co-opera-
tion.
(c) As regards the first two functions indi-
cated above, the intention would be to have
available a common basis of analysis which
could form a useful point of reference for the
work of both the Council and the Assembly
and also for informing public opinion.
This reorganisation will have to be carried
out taking into account, on the one hand,
changes in duties resulting first from the
reduction and then from the abolition of the
control tasls and, on the other hand, the need
to have the appropriate experts available.
(d) As regards armaments co-operation,
WEU should be in a position to play an active
r6le in providing political impetus:
- 
by supporting all co-operative efforts
including those of the IEPG and the
CNAD;
- 
by encouraging in particular the activ-
ity of the IEPG as a forum whose main
objective is to prornote European co-
operation and also to contribute to the
development of balanced co-operation
within the Atlantic Alliance;
- 
by developing continuing concertation
with the various existing bodies.
(e) In this general context, the Permanent
Council will also take into account the existence
of the FINABEL framework.
A In carrying out this overall reorganisation
the Permanent Council will have to:
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- 
propose a precise organisation table
whi-ch will make it possible to define
and give a breakdown of the Posts
requiied for carrying out the three
functions referred to above;
- 
ensure that the various arrangements
proposed remain within the present
Iimits in terms of staff and the
organisation's budget, without weaken-
ing WEU's ability to play its rdle.
The Ministers asked the Permanent
Council to complete its work before their next
session. They eipressed the wish, however, that
in the meantime a start should be made on all
or part of the new tasks as soon as possible.
lY. Coatuts with non-member states
l. The Ministers also attached great import-
ance to liaison with those states in the alliance
which are not members of WEU.
2. Invoking the relevant provisions of the
modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular
Article IV, the Ministers pointed out that it
was the responsibility of the presidency of WEU
to inform [hose countries on either a bilateral
or multilateral basis.
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The military use of computers -
reply to the thirrieth annual report of the Council
REPORTI
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospoce Questioni
by Mr. FourrA, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnert RecoMMENDArroN
on the military use of computers 
- 
reply to the thirtieth annual repmt of the
Council
ExpteNerony Mruonexouu
submitted by Mr. Fourr6, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Military aspects
- 
Requirements of a military system
- 
Requirements specific to each of the armed forces
- 
Military communications
- 
Computers for weapon systems
- 
Computers for logistics
- 
Supercomputers
- 
Software
- 
United States
- 
Soviet Union
- 
France
- 
The lack ofEuropean co-operation
III. Reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council
IV. Conclusions
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2..Members_of the_committee: Mr. Lenzer (Chairman); MM. Wilkinson, Bassinet (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts,
Adriaensers, Bhhm, Colajanni, Fiandrotti, Fourr4, Ganett, Sir Paul Hawkins, MM. Hengel, McGuire '(Alternate : .Sii
,!o!r1 ps_b.orn)r_-Mezzapesa, Rizzi (Alternate: Sarti), Schmidt, Souvet, Spies von BUlleiheim, Mrs. Saeh-Dompas,
MM. Valleix, Worrell.
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
oa lhe military use of comPuters -
repty ,o thc thirtiefi anaual repoa olthc Couacil
The Assembly,
(i) Aware of the preponderant importance of computers for the defence of the western world,
whether they are incorpolated in weapons systems or used for command, control, communications and
intelligence;
(ii) Considering the importance ofmilitary computers which have been prime movers for the deve-
lopment of civil computer industries for the last twenty years ;
(iit) Considering also that, since the failure of Unidata - Philips, SieEens. and CII - Western Europe
trai naa no common co-ordinated policy and is only now starting the Esprit programme which covers
no military use;
(iv) Considering the United States and Japalese 
_challengt in the world computer market and
U/estern Europe'ibackwardness that involves serious drawbacks owing to excessive dependency on the
United States and Japan and which, on the one hand, requires a commo_n European policy and, on the
other hand, co-operatlve action with American and eventually Japanese firms ;
(v) Considering the extremely fast development of computer technology ;
(vi) Considering the need to face up to this phenomenon and, to this end, instructing its Committee
bn Scientific, Teihnological and Aerospace Questions to prepare a supplementary report on this
important question in order to keep the Assembly informed of the evolution of the situation in the eco-
nomic, technological and military sectors,
RrcoutrreNos rner rnr CoLTNCIL
1. Urge the member governments to stimulate and co-ordinate research and development of basic
technologies for manufacluring very-high-speed integrated circuits and provide the funds necessary to
encourage the industries concerned ;
2. Draw up a common policy in a Western European framework based on a co-ordinated strategy to
be worked ouf by the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU for the military applications of compu-
ter systems ;
3. Prepare the ground for the next generation of military computers in weapon sys-tem_s which will
be intercliangeable and interoperational between units of European forces assigned for the common
defence;
4. Promote a single European market for military computers, and particularly supercomputers,
which will stimulate the civil market;
5. Advocate a common computer language to facilitate the interoperability of all systems used by
the armed forces of Western Europe ;
6. Call for the standardisation of computer components such as very-high-speed integfated circuits ;
7. Reflect on the impact on European computer industries due to the research and development to
be undertaken in conneCtion with the American strategic defence initiative and European-American co-
operation on the space station.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Found, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
L A crucial question affecting the produc-
tion of computers which will have to be
answered in the next few years is whether a
technology gap is developing between Europe on
the one hand and Japan and America on the
other. The lead achieved by the United States
and Japan in information technology is undoub-
tedly one of the main reasons why this
question is uppermost in the minds of many
politicians and industrialists. They are very
much aware that information technology has
been a major factor in the spectacular econo-
mic growth in recent years in the United States
and Japan and that the lack of it largely explains
Europe's economic difliculties.
2. Europe's performance in the information
industry is the more disturbing because the high
dollar should have sent Europe's balance ofelec-
tronic strength in the right direction. This poor
performance is the more regrettable as the pro-
duction side of information technology is
already one of the world's biggest industries.
3. For instance, it is estimated that the
annual 30% drop in cost performance in micro-
electronics and optical telecommunications is
reflected at least to the same extent in the prices
of new products and processes. It also accele-
rates and encourages product changes.
4. A question directly related to the one
above and no less fundamental is can Europe
overcome its backwardness and, if so, how
should it proceed ?
5. The EEC countries' overall balance of
electronic strength was already more than $9 bil-lion in deficit last year. Most information
technology is now being bought for incorpora-
tion into other products or for use in processing
information. The use of electronics has impor-
tant repercussions on some 80% of industrial
production in an advanced country.
6. The best example is the American defence
budget: in 1970, 20% ofthe Pentrgon's procure-
ment was in electronics. This will be 40% at the
end of the 1980s. In 1985, $6.5 billion will be
spent on the promotion of industrial research
and development. In his report (Document
992) on United States-European co-operation in
advanced technology, Mr. Hill wrote:
" Computers have the highest priority.
Research and development is being
conducted first in very-high-speed inte-
$ated circuits which provide the capabi-lity for massive and fast data-processing,
second, in stealth aircraft, third in advan-
ced software and fourth in micropro-
cessors.
For software technology, $9 billion is
earmarked for development and main-
tenance. Up until the year 1990, $13 bil-
lion will be spent on several software pro-
grammes with the help of a software engi-
neering institute. Tho software techno-logy for adaptable reliable systems(STARS) programme will improve the
United States ability t0 develop and sup-
port software for missibn critical systems.
This tri-service effort; built up on the
Defence Department'$ ADA computer
language progmmme, will deal with criti-
cal problems in the cost transportability,
reliability and suryivability of computer
software in weapons sy$tems. "
7. Another example of Europe's lack of pro-
gress is its consumption of semiconductor chips
which are the foundation for all other electronic
production and which has fallen in the past ten
years from 30% to 19% of the world's total.
Per head consumption is only one-third of that
in the United States and one-quarter of thatin Japan. European production of chips has
fallen in ten years from 14.5% to 9.5%.
8. The life-cycle of microelectronic-related
products has shrunk from eight to ten years to
three years on average whiCh means that the
high investment funds which are required must
be recouped within two years. This does not
make those who develop new technology eager
to license it to anybody else. It should also
be noted that European cofnputer companies
cannot launch their next generation systems
until much later than their cotnpetitors.
9. In the Economic Comrnunity, the Esprit
plan was adopted at the beginning of 1984 and an
agency has been set up to promote information
technology. This agency has concluded that
technology has a considerable impact on Wes-
tern Europe's overall economic activity.
10. Information technology companies in Eu-
rope have only between 35 and 40% of their
own domestic markets. IBM sells as much in
Europe as its nearest nine competitors combined
and these include other United States as well as,
to an increasing extent, Japanese companies.
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11. The agency considers that by 1986 the
balance of trade specifically in information tech-
nology products will show a deficit of some $5
billion.
12. Here, your Rapporteur wishes to point out
that the technology gap between Europe and its
main overseas competitors has a direct influence
on employment in Western Europe. The agen-
cy considers that the nineteen million jobs crea-
tad in the United States in less than a decade is
twenty-five times the Community's performance
over ihe same period. In the second half of
1983, the United States created more jobs than
the Community in ten years.
13. One of the main reasons why Euro-
pean firms do not have an even chance of
competing with their American and Japanese
rivali is the existence of semi-independent natio-
nal markets which is of course a political pro-
blem. One of the main goals of the new Chair-
man of the European Community Commission,
Mr. Jacques Delors, is the expansion of the
Common Market internal market through intra-
community trade measures covering goods and
services. It should be realised however that an
open and unified market will automatically also
mean that some European electronics companies
will be forced out of business.
14. The purpose of the Esprit plan, which has
a five-year budget of $1.1 billion, is to enhance
the competitivity of the ten member states, espe-
cially vis-i-vis the United States and Japan. Its
work is concentrated on five major information
technology sectors: advanced microelectronics,
software technology, advanced information pro-
cessing, offtce automation and computer-aided
manufacturing.
15. This Community programme is parallel
with those of individual nations. Thus, France
has Telematique - the fusion of telecommunica-
tions and data-processing. The United King-
dom has a f350 million information technology
programme and the Federal Ministry for Re-
ieaich and Technology has a DM 3.5 billion
four-year plan to support microelectronic deve-
lopment in the Federal Republic.
16. Europe's fragmented markets have caused
an appalling waste of resources. Japan, North
America and Western Europe are similar sized
markets. Japan's total research and develop-
ment expenditure for instance on the latest gene-
ration of public digital switches in traditional
telecommunications was $1.5 to $2 billion,
North America's some $3 billion and Western
Europe's more than $10 billion for ten different
switching systems. Why can Europe not capita-
lise and commercialise what is developed in
scientific laboratories ? Is not one ofthe reasons
that there is a lack of venture capital in Europe ?
17. With regard to human resources, the esti-
mates are that Europe used three times as many
hardware and software engineers as either North
America or Japan in developing its switches.
25% of all European software engineers, the
people most in demand in the computer
business, were kept busy designing public
switches compared with l0% in Japan. There is
no doubt that the Western European states
should reconsider their telecommunications
monopolies in equipment and business services
and, if they fail to do this, the European tele-
communications industry will be in trouble.
18. Collective action and a new technological
policy will be necessary if Europe is to keep its
own telecommunications industry alive and
competitive.
19. The leading European firms, Philips and
Siemens, have gone into partnership to developjointly a new generation of chips.
20. The French and German PTTs supported
by major companies such as C[T-Alcatel and
Thomson-CSF of France are planning standardi-
sation and collaboration in their communica-
tions networks. One might wonder, however,
whether this will not be too little and too late.
21. The top European supplier of chips,
Philips, just managed to be included in the
world top ten chip suppliers, but its production
is only one-third that of Motorola from the Unit-
ed States. Western European manufacturers
account for less than 9% of world sales compared
with the United States' share of 62% and Japan's
26.3Vo.
II. Military ospects
22. In the military area, computers have
become an essential part of weapons systems.
In addition, there is defence-related information
technology.
23. Computers may be used for:
(y' logistics, supplies, planning and
maintenance of weaPons systems;
(ii) preparation of strategy and adapting
it to various types ofthreat 
- 
nuclear,
conventional or both ;
(iiil miscellaneous uses: detection, classi-
fication and guidance of weapons
systems;
(iu,) communications systems ;
(v,) simulation processes ;
(vl training staff to use weapons systems ;
(vii) rcsearch and development of military
equlpment.
24. On 29th April 1980, Mr. Brasseur submit-
ted a report (Document 840) on this subject and
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stated that communications, command, control
and intelligence (abbreviated 3 C + I) were
essential elements in the long-term NATO
defence programme.
25. The NATO-wide integrated communica-
tions system is the largest infrastructure pro-
gramme financed on a fourteen-power basis ihat
the allies have ever undertaken. The capital
cost will be some $2 billion and the programme
should be fully operational in 1995. The systemis primarily used to provide commanders-in-
chief and lower level commanders with all the
information necessary to enable them to take
decisions. The main difference with civilian
usage is the speed with which the military have
to take decisions due to the speed ofaircraft and
missiles. There is no doubt that interopera-
bility between the NATO and national systemsis essential for having effective operitional
command forces in times of emergency or war.
26. In the recommendation included in the
report by Mr. Brasseur, he regretted that Europe
had not so far exploited the fact that it was a
continental size market and had not pursued a
coherent policy and commercial strategy to cap-
ture part of the world market.
27. On 24th October 1980, the Council replied
as follows:
" 1. The Council share the concern
expressed by the Assembly that European
firms have so far failed to capture a satis-
factory share of the European and world
markets for microelectronic and associ-
ated equipment. The Council favour
practical international action which offers
the prospect of assisting European firms to
win a larger share of the international
market. They also welcome the recent
initiatives of the European Commission
but take the view that, while the main
impetus for change must come from the
industries in question themselves, new ini-
tiatives will be necessary in order to co-
ordinate national action to support these
industries in achieving a competitive posi-
tion in the world market.
2. In the defence field considerable
progress has been made in bringing
together national requirements ensuring
compatibility of national systems. The
defence world, indeed, has a particularly
acute awareness of the benefits of com-
mon standards. Considerable effort in
CNAD and in Eurogroup is being devoted
to agreeing common parameters for sys-
tems intended to be brought into service.
As the volume of such equipment destin-
ed for introduction with allied seryices
grows the need to work to agreed stan-
dards 
- 
which might also apply to the civil
sphere 
- increases in proportion. It
should be noted however that the stan-
dards which will besi contribute to the
efficiency of the alliance and those which
will help European industry in the world-
wide market are world standards rather
than exclusively European standards. For
this reason Eurogroup's work is being
channelled through scheme-wide institu:
tions. The Assembly has rightly drawn
attention to these matters, which it can be
assured the WEU govornments intend to
take into account.
3. Defence accounts for a large share
of the public purchasigrg of infoimation
equipment. Interoper4bility of the equip-
ment 
- 
especially communications equip
ment 
- 
with that used by allied forces is a
high priority for all WEU governments.
I larg. proportion of the allian@'s spend-ing on communications equipment is
indeed funded through the NATO infra-
structure budget and prpvided as a facility
which more than one nation can use. It
should not be assumed that there is
advantage in ensuring interoperability of
equipment for civil and military use.
Whilst this may be the case in most cir-
cumstances, it does not follow a general
rule. "
28. The military computet should produce
accurate results and assessmonts which should
be repeatable allowing the commander in the
field to carry out a strategy agreed upon by the
competent higher authorities. To take smart
bombs for example, these weapons are filled
with electronics and reach their goals automati-
cally once the direction has boen slotted into the
system's computer. All weapon systems have
miniaturised information stored which cannot
be jammed. They include systems which the
Americans call " fire and forget ". Ever since
space launchers and ballistic missiles have been
used there has been this built-in capacity for self-
regulation.
Requirements of a military system
29. These are:
- timing - the system must operate at a
rhythm very close to real time ;
- 
reliability 
- breakdowns are unaccept-
able;
- 
interoperability;
- security - all-round protection ;
- operating security;
- 
survivability 
- 
ability rto survive nuclear
explosions, for instanoe.
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Requirements specific to each of the armed forces
30. The army is mainly concerned with:
- 
improving tactical liaison ;
- 
protecting communications against jam-
ming, pin-pointing and interception ;
- 
miniaturising and reducing the electri-
city consumption of portable systems ;
31. The navy's main requirements are :
- 
long-distance liaison with submarines
and surface vessels ;
- 
secrecy of communications;
- 
coexistence of many transmitters and
receivers on the same vessel ;
- 
interoperability with navies of other
allied nations.
32. The air force has the following require-
ments:
- 
improving infrastructure liaison between
fixed air bases dispersed throughout
the territory ;
- 
improving air-to-air and air-to-surface
VHF links with due secrecy and Pro-
tection;
- 
improving the HF network for long-
distance tasks and interventions.
Military communications
33. There are two complementary techniques:
- 
long-distance communications techni-
ques;
- 
techniques for protecting communica-
tions.
34. Long-distance communications techniques
vary according to actual requirements :
- 
tactical communications for links between
mobile units dispersed throughout the-
territory;
- 
infrastructure communications for basic
fixed links forming the backbone of
communications at national or regional
level;
- 
communications by satellite, differing
from other types because oftheir transit
points in space.
35. Each atea requires very specific and
increasingly expensive means when one passes
from tactical requirements to space applications.
36. Much work has recently been done
on techniques for protecting communications
(safety, security) against natural or man-made
interference (amming, tapping, etc.), to which
military communications are exposed.
Computers for weapon sYstems
37. There is a great difference between com-
puters installed on board ships, aircraft, tanks,
etc. or integated in weapon systems and the
large computers used to mastermind nuclear
weapons, etc. However, contrary to the posi-
tion in the United States, computers on board
French vehicles or ships and incorporated in
weapon systems such as missiles are all derived
from computers for civil use specially modified
and reinforced to meet military requirements
but with specially developed software. The
military computer is rather more expensive than
the civil one as they are needed only in limited
series.
38. Computers to be used in weapons systems
are part of the arms systems and are normally
buili and inserted by the manufacturer of the
weapon system.
39. For detection and guidance ofweapon sys-
tems, etc. specially modified civil computers are
used or models derived from computers for civil
purposes.
40. For communications purposes between
headquarters and troops, protection has, of
course, to be extremely effrcient in order to pre-
vent leakage and breaches ofsecurity. The cha-
racteristics of this type of computer are pres-
cribed by the armed forces.
41. Civil computers are being used for simula-
tion and training personnel. The army has spe-
cial training courses and military personnel are
detached to special schools for learning to pro-
gramme and use the comPuters.
42. For military computers, the civil industry
manufactures both the hardware and the soft-
ware. Military software depends on the type of
armaments to be used as well as the require-
ments of the three services. A great effort is
now being made in the French armed forces to
standardise software.
43. In the United States, the Defence Depart-
ment has made an effort in the same direction
but has not succeeded in co-ordinating the requi-
rements of the army, the navy, the air force and
the marines. This might not be surprising as
first of all these services are much larger than
services in France and there are far more indus-
trialists in the United States than in Europe.
Computers for logistics
44. Computers used for logistic reasons -
supply, planification and maintenance of arms
systems 
- 
are civil computers with special modi-
fications to adapt them for the military as is
done for any important client. Contrary to the
United States, in France the military were the
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first important clients for computers. This was
linked with nuclear weapons eipecially and also
with space activities.
Supercomputers
45. The future of the technological evolution
lies in the fifth generation computer which will
be able to execute many different orders at the
same time and at a speed many times that of
present speeds. Computer technology is in the
sixth generation. The seventh generation is
expected in the near future: Cray III in
mid-I988, ETA-10 in late 1986.
46. 
_.T.h. 
"..y large computers needed to carryout digital simulation work, now essential foi
the design of sophisticated weapons, are of Ame-
rican origin. Japan may also be producing
them soon.
47. In the United States, many supercompu-
1g-r plogrammes are now actively under way.The Cray Company has announced its plans f6r
multicomputers which, in the second tratf of ttre
{egade, should be ten to fifty times more power-ful (depending on the process) than present
equipment.
48. Control Data is planning similar develop-
ment of Cyber 205. Finally, NASA has started
research on a very ambitious multicomputer
p.roEamme,- NASF (numerical aerodynamics
simulation facility) which should by th6 end of
the decade allow the resolution of large equation
systems with partial derivatives with a realplqer (average speed obtained on application)
of about 1,000 million floating point bperationi
per second.
4.9. 
._IBM changed its supercomputer policy
significantly at the end of the seventies bf phn-
ning to market equipment in 1986-87-wtrictr
would be competitive with that of other manu-
facturers, particularly the Japanese. Two types
of supercomputer are planned. IBM 3090-200
and 3090-400 computers, announced last month,
are considered to be Class V machines.
50. In Japan, research is also to be started inthe framework of a major fifth-generation
computer programme on parallel machines(multicomputers and vectorials) capable of car-
rying out more than 1,000 million effective floa-
ting point operations per second by the end of
the decade.
51. In view of this critically dependent situa-
tion, the Ministry of Defence is studying the pos-
sibility of developing a large scieniifiC installa-
tion on a national basis. This decision was
taken following the conclusions of a workinggroup, under the chairmanship of Professor
Lions, which showed the great similarity bet-
we€n processes carried out by potential users of
this type of machine. It was therefore possible
to consider developing specialised computers
adapted to this type ofprocessing.
52. The French Government has invited three
computer industrialists to make a collaborative
effort to meet the future computer requirements
of the armed forces. The procurement office
has invited the three services to submit their
requirements for computers and has found
acceptable characteristics for computers which
can be used by all three seryices. Similarly, the
same computer language can be used and there-
fore the same type of software.
53. To achieve the standard of performance
required by users (a processing power of about
200 million floating point operations per second
and a storage capacity of more than 100 million
64-bit words, to quote only these two figures),
the only technical solution uow possiblels theparallel link-up of basic mgchines which are
themselves already very poworfhl.
54. To meet this type of requirement, the
government has launched a large vectorial com-
puter programme whose codo name is Isis which
will be used by the military and civil depart-
qents and, if this project succeeds, it will be pos-
sible to use the same type of software every-
where. This is extremely important as the soft-
ware of computer systems represents about
80-85% of the price. The reason is that software
is still produced on a case-by-case basis and is
not an automatic production process.
55.. As your Rapporteur has already noted,
this policy of the French Government is based
on a report submitted in 1980 by a study group
under Professor Lions which describes th-e needi
of the French civil and military authorities for
the second half of the 1980s The users of large
computer systems are ministries or industries
which have to deal with the problems of aerody-
namics, hydrodynamics, detomics, nuclear ques-
tions, structural calculus, acoustics and meteo-
rology.
56. This study led to the decision to ask Bull
to build a large prototype computer called Isis.
Bull started the development of this computerin l98l and will produce the first prototypes at
the end of 1986. If successful and if thLre are
governm-ent orders, it will build four large com-
puters ofthis type each year between 1986 and
1990 with a total of twenty which would practi-
cally cover the. needs of the French market for
this type of computer by 1991.
57. In order to build the prototype, Bull has
found an associate in Siemens in ltre Federal
Republic which handles the technological aspects
whereas Bull has design leadership. The indus-
trial purpose of Bull and Siemens might be
to develop a large computer for a series after Isis.
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58. The planned prototype is jointly financed
bv the Ministries of Defence, PTT (industrial
and international affairs), and Research and
Technology, the Ministry of Defence hlving a
majority share. Industry is therefore funding
nothing.
59. One condition under which Bull would
build this large computer is that the minis-
tries needing such a computer would place
orders. These large computers generally pro-
oess a large mass of data, so the capacity of the
main memory must, for each programme, be in
the region of tens or even hundreds of millions
of bytes. The output of this memory must be
sufEcient to feed the calculating device correctly.
60. Finally, for many applications they require
a hrgh working speed particularly for vectorial
and matric cdiulations (full and hollow matri-
ces), changes of co-ordinates, etc.
61. This speed of carrying out instructions is
no longer calculated in MIPS (millign instruc-
tions per second) but in MFlops (million floating-
point operations per second) and the 
=number of
MFlopJneeded varies from 100 to 1,000 accord-
ing to the type of processing required. More-
over, the input and output must be fast so as not
to penalise operating time by unduly long delays.
62. Isis would be in advance of the American
Cray I large computer, of which one hundred
havL been installed in the world, including eight
in France.
63. The Cray II computer is six to twelve
times as fast as the Cray I and the Cyber 207
(Control Data) now corresponds to the smallest
ETA-10 (two processors).
64. Competition for the Isis computer will
come from the United States and Japan. In the
United States, the Defence Department has
earmarked large sums for developing computers
for military purposes and once the research and
development costs have been amortised by the
military user, the same tlpe of computer will be
transferred to the civil market. In Japan, the
method is the opposite. Computers are built
for the civil government market, the ministries
and state industries, but the ultimate purpose is
to conquer the world market with subsequent
systems to be offered to the general public.
65. In this sector, it will be of special impor-
tance to protect large computers of this type
aEainst leakage of their knowledge to the Soviet
Union. It is well known that the latter is very
keen to gain access to western computers, espe-
cially large ones. Military security means that
they must not be accessible to unqualified per-
sons but, if these Isis computers are also trans-
ferred to civil use or to scientific centres, how
can one ensure that the knowledge they contain
will not be tapped ?
66. As in industry, the security of the compu-
ter language has to be ensured and here again
techniques are no di{ferent from those used by
industry or for instance the banking system.
Communications between computers can of
course be intercepted and it is clear that this
security aspect of computer language between
headquarters and troops has to be solved. At
the same time computers require a certain auto-
matism and the confidential nature of communi-
cations has to be protected.
Sofiware
67. The military authorities are trying to stan-
dardise software language; the French system to
be used is LTR (langage temps rQel).
68. The military authorities of large industria-
lised countries such as the United States and
France have had to start real-time software relia-
bility programmes (ADA for the Department of
Def6nce, LtR for the French defence authori-
ties) and research on software engineering (pro-
gramme testing, optimisation, etc.).
69. Military applications have in fact now rea-
ched a stage previously reached in civil applica-
tions, i.e. software development costing more
than hardware. Investment made in LTR in
France is so high that it is more expensive to
update systems than to replace old equipment by
a new generation.
70. However, it must be realised that a stra-
tegy of evolution based on no change in_ software
has limits which should be extended after about
ten years.
71. This is the aim of the development of
ADA in the United States (available industrially
this year) and the new-version LTRV3 in
France.
72. The specific nature of military computers
necessarily implies high costs and relatively
limited performances by military computers (by
performance is also meant the central memory
capacity, the peripheral capacity, output and
operational speed). The use of software tools
and increasingly sophisticated highJevel langua-
ges makes it necessary to develop progxammes
on high-performance compatible machines
which work in normal conditions.
73. It is not possible to imagine a family of
military computers which is not compatible with
a family of commercial systems, any more than
it is possible to imagine developing a new air-
craft without computer simulation and without
developing the man-machine interface also
through computerised simulation.
74. In many cases linked with the develop-
ment of software, the impetus of military bodies
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has opened the way for civil applications and a
language such as ADA might become a standard
for industry.
75. Progressive attempts to improve security
have naturally helped commercial data-process-
ing and opened the way for civil applications
which are proving increasingly vitd foi a coun-
try's economy and health. It is easy to under-
stand that the need for reliability, security and
integrity in a computerised communications sys-
tem for banks or hospital networks is almost as
important as for defence-related systems. The
success of so-called non-stop redundant compu-
ters on the commercial market is an illustration
of this phenomen.
Uniled States
79. In his report (Document 992, paragraphs
17 and l8), Mr. Hill stated that the Defence
Department was spending $4.4 billion a year to
be increased to $6.5 billion in 1985 in oider topromote industrial research and development,
the highest priority being given to computers.
77. The Defence Advanced Research projects
Agency deals with research projects which are
carefully selected to maintain th-e United States
technological lead and avoid potential adversa-
rial.technological surprises. While the Agency's
projecls are high-risk, they have high potential
payoff in military utility and are frequently
applicable to multiservice use. Maturing tech-
nology is often taken into the field for feaiiUility
demonstration with the services, which are then
in a position to advance the technology through
the development process.
78. The Agency's research programmes cover
a broad spectrum of technologies, one of which
concerns strategic computing. This programme
is de-veloping a class of super-intelligent compu-
ters for application to advanced defence systems
by the end of the decade. These new machines
will be capable of * vision' for autonomous
vehicle navigation, " understanding natural lan-
guagg " (English), and " speech recognition " for
use in a fighter cockpit and command centre.In addition, advanced expert systems will be
developed that can store and manipulate know-
ledge in any of these fields to allow machine-
reasoning and inferencing. Small-scale feasibi-
lity demonstrations of these concepts have been
carried out in the laboratory, but they need to be
engineered for application to practical defence
systems. High performance computers will be
needed to carry out these functions to meet the
real-time demands of field operations. A new
family of computers, 1,000 times faster than
existing equipment, is being pursued using mul-
tiprocessor computer architectures and state-of-
the-art VISI (very large scale integration) com-
ponents.
79. 
- 
One other qrogramme concerns very-high-
speed integrated circuits (VHSIC). The Defence
Department wishes to increase the United Sta-
tes lead in integrated circuit technology deployed
m weapons systems by minimising the time
delay between technology development and
deployment.
80. The six contractors involved in the
_V_tIqIq technology programme are Honeywell,IBM, Texas-Instruments, Hughes Aircraft, TRW
and Westinghouse.
81. The VHSIC technology provides some
devices as the basic building-blocks, which could
be used to construct hierarchical multifunctional
systems which could be used in diflerent combi-
nations to create a wide variety ofsignal proces-
sor types of radar, image processing, electronic
warfare and communication$, spread-spectrum
and frequency agility, navigation-and id-entifica-
tion sub'systems.
82. A start has been asked for with research
and development of computer technology even
more advanced than VHSIC. This * super,
computer, still to be developed, would offer
computational speeds 1,000 times greater than
those used in military systems today.
83. The first insertion of VHSIC into an ope-
rational system will occur this year. Thirty-
seven weapons systems have been scheduled for
IrHIIC technology insertion. In addition, the
D-efence Department has begun the development
of second generation VHSIC chips, which wiflprovide another hundredfold improvement in
processing power.- These new chips will greatly
increase the war-fighting capability of weapons
systems in the 1990s.
84. Many of the United States military sys-
tems are dependent upon computers and soft-
ware for their effective openation. Over the
past two years, the Defence Department has ini-
tiated two very important tri-service program-
mes to improve United States ability to produce
and support operational software for mission-
critical systems. The first of these, the software
lgglrngl_ogy for adaptable, reliable systems(STARS) programme will create a syst-em of
computer-aided techniques and methods for the
development and support of mission-critical
software. The objective of this programme is toprovide a tenfold reduction in the cost of soft-
ware development and evolution and in the
number of latent defects in software systems.
85. The second programme involves the crea-
tion of a software engineering institute, the pur-
pose of which is to overcome the traditional field-
ing lag in maturing new technologies and to
accelerate the application of uew software tech-
nology to military systems. The institute will
combine advanced methods emerying from the
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private research community with an integrated
computer-aided software development system
and technology produced by STARS to demons-
trate their application in weapon systems pro-
grammes.
Soviet Union
86. Within the Soviet Union, all research and
development for computers has been primarily
directed to military applications. The civil line
of computers has been almost completely left
aside with the result that the Soviet forces now
have great problems in training their military
personnel who, apart from a few experts, hlve
ibsolutely no experience in the use of civil
microcomputers. Only now is the government
starting an effort to fill this lack of vulgarisation
and trying to buy material for microcomputing
material ln Europe and the United States.
However, this backwardness will not be easy to
overcome.
87. It should also be noted that ifresearch and
development laboratories work at international
level, the problems increase significantly once
production is launched on an industrial basis.
France
88. As your Rapporteur had only a limited
time in which to prepare this report, he has had
most of his contacts with the French national
authorities and industrialists. He intends to
come back to the subject of military computers
at a later date describing the developments in
other European countries and the United States.
89. For daily communications, France has a
system called Fiitz (R1seau Informatis4 Trans-
missions Automatiques,) destined for the army'
It is a fully-integrated communications system
directed by a giant computer.
90. The Rita system is a mobile, highly versa-
tile command system to be used by all levels of
command from the highest to the lowest eche-
lons and even platoons in the field.
91. In this connection and referring to the
report by Mr. Spies von Brillesheim (Document
974), mention should be made of the fact that
the French purchase of the E-3A AWACS is
being tied to the United States' purchase of the
Rita military tactical communications system
proposed by France's Thomson-CSF, with GTE
Corp. and Raytheon Corp. The United States
army is considering the communications net-
work, based on Thomson-CSFs futa. France
believes the United States is not offering suffi-
cient offset for the French purchase of the
AWACS, and a United States acquisition of the
Thomson-CSF/GTE/Raytheon communications
system would help balance the deal.
92. In France, the Pluton tactical nuclear mis-
sile, the Exocet anti-ship missile and the Crotale
and Roland ground-to-air missiles could reach
their targets without computerised direction.
Requirements for these systems are that they be
immune to countermeasures, miniaturised and
easy to maintain.
93. France, like other countries, is now at a
crossroads in computer systems and will have to
take decisions on the production of new nuclear
or conventional weapon systems with a new
range of computers which will be in service up to
the year 2000. The question is whether France
alone should bear the technological and financial
burden or whether it should be shared by all
member states of Western Europe and of WEU
in particular.
The lack of European co-operation
94. There is hardly any collaboration at all
within the European framework. It is difficult
to ensure European collaboration within NATO
because of the preponderant position of the
United States. Nevertheless, Europe has joint
requirements which could and should be met.
Thls would mean funding joint research butjoint characteristics would also have to be
defined. Moreover, a computer is only a small
part of a weapon system and it would be very
difficult to have joint research on a small part
and not procure the complete weapon system.
Here progress has to be made step by step.
There would have to be a joint strategic concept,
far greater standardisation of armaments and a
colliborative effort by European industries.
95. For European co-operation, it would be
extremely useful to study first the problems of
interoperability to find a common solution.
This ii certainly a problem which will not be
easy to solve without progress in European unifi-
cation. In the meantime, it would nevertheless
be possible to achieve a. common European
reseirch effort, especially in communications
and fifth generation computers with artificial
intelligence. Much joint research could and
should be undertaken. However, the defence
ministries should be willing to provide the
necessary funding.
96. For new weapons systems, such as the
European combat aircraft, collaboration could
lead also to joint research on computers for arms
systems for such an aircraft as well as on com-
munications between the aircraft and headquar-
ters.
97. As far as software is concerned, European
companies, such as Bull, Siemens, ICL, Nixdod
Philips and Olivetti have now announced that
they will unite to promote Unix software which
has been developed by the American frrm, ATT.
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This is directly related to competition with IBM
which still has by far the biggest civil market
share in the world.
98. Bull, Siemens and ICL have a common
research centre for software. The result will be
that with the Unix system the computers of the
different firms can be more easily interchanged
and connected with each other. Unix software
might become a worldwide software system to
be used for scientific and other applications.
III. Reply to the thirtieth annual report
of the Council
99. The Council having indicated that a
change was being made to the traditional layout
of the Council's report, your Rapporteur had
hoped that this would mean real answers to
questions and recommendations from the com-
mittees and the Assembly. Now, as in earlier
years, however, the answers are superficial and
incomplete.
100. On the harmonisation of research in civil
and military high technology, an initiative from
the Council would have been appreciated. It
recognises the shortcomings and discusses insti-
tutional frameworks but no real progress is
announced. Everyone knows that the NATO,
IEPG and WEU frameworks are not ideal for a
great variety of reasons but why not choose an
existing framework for certain activities and a
different one for others ? The WEU countries are
the most important for armaments industries in
Western Europe. If a clear choice was made,
industry would know to whom to turn. In this
way the organisation could envisage industrial
contacts with a view to promoting the establish-
ment of a European industry for advanced mili-
tary technology.
l0l. It is all very well to recognise the impor-
tance ofpreference for Europe but the technolo-
gical development of Europe should not lag too
far behind that of the United States equipment.
102. Only co-operative European efforts in
research and development can prevent the gap
widening but impetus should be given by the
Ministries of Defence. The same is true if
Europe is to keep abreast of emerying techno-
logies. In his report, your Rapporteur has
underlined this with regard to computers but the
Council's reaction to this serious situation is har-
dly more than a description of a few facts. The
Assembly should have received an answer to the
real questions and a detailed description of the
state of armaments co-operation now that WEU
is to be reactivated.
103. The situation with regard to the advanced
combat aircraft, the multiple-launch rocket sys-
tem, the third generation of anti-tank missile
programmes and the NATO frigate programme
remains very vague and ill-defined.
104. With regard to AWACS and Nimrod air-
craft, the Council's report is more precise but
does not mention the cost overruns in the Unit-
ed Kingdom on the Nimrod AEW programme.
Air Chief Marshall Sir John Rogers, controller
of aircraft in the Ministry of Defence, informed
the House of Commons Defence Committee
that the cost of this project has jumped from the
original estimate made in 1975 of approximately
$500 million to more than $1.3 billibn and thai
the aircraft, originally expected to be in servicein 1983, now will not be ready until at least
1987.
105. This example shows once again that goingit alone in high technology projects does not
strengthen the Western European defence posi-
tion.
106. The military and civil use of space will be
discussed during the colloquy which is being
organised by the committee and which will be
held in Munich on l8th-20th September 1985.
Your Rapporteur should also mention the
satisffing conference in Rome on 30th and 3lst
January 1985 and the important decision taken
at that conference on future European space pro-
grammes for scientific purpo$es, space transpor-
tation and application satellites. A special
information document will be circulated on this
development.
IY. Conclusions
l0'1. In spite of the little time available to your
Rapporteur for examining such a vast subject
and for meeting military and civil authorities
capable of providing information on European
capability in computers for military use, it emer-
ges from this first study that everything remains
to be done where co-operation is concerned.
108. Sometimes through ignorance of the com-
puter phenomenon, political leaders limit their
views on co-operation to the actual systems,
neglecting the r6le of sub-assemblies or even of
basic components. Technical and hence econo-
mic dependence is linked with the political atti-
tude towards the United States (and perhaps
tomorrow Japan), and its authorisation to export
certain equipment. For in$tance, under the
1966 McMahon Act, the United States Govern-
ment forbade France to export computers which
might be used for research and development of
nuclear weapons, and this was in General de
Gaulle's time. Although in 1976 American
policy became far more liberal, there are still a
number of restrictions which some regret.
American monopoly in a number of areas is
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declining with the emergence of Japanese com-
petition and its co-operation with European
industry (Nippon Electric with Bull, Fujitsu with
Siemens); co-operation with American indus-
tries also seems to be looking up. However, in
this, as in many other fields, Europe has com-
mon requirements which might and should be
solved. Although the problems of co-operation
on military computers are discussed in various
agencies of the Atlantic Alliance such as
the allied data system interoperability agency
(ADSIA) and the tri-service group on communi-
cations and electronic equipment, sub-group 9,
the dominating position of the United States
calls for the development of European co-
operation extending beyond bilateral relations.
This means joint funding of research and the
definition of joint specifications and clearly-
specified aims. For components, Europe must
therefore co-operate far more actively in
research and development work.
109. For basic software, in addition to the stan-
dardisation of products, to be technically compe-
titive co-operation requires joint support in
three areas :
- 
improvement of operating systems ;
- 
research on data structure ;
- 
development of software with new
methods and better instruments.
I 10. Europe has become aware of this need for
co-operation in face of the two computer giants:
the United States and Japan. However, few ini-
tiatives have been taken. While welcoming
support for the Esprit programme (a particularly
important initiative), it should be pointed out
that this will not enable European industry to
make up for lost time, particularly as it means
co-operating on military uses. Greater invest-
ment, joint strategic defence concepts and the
political will for independence are probably deci-
sive factors in ensuring Europe's future in these
matters. Then comes the joint definition of
priorities such as :
- 
training engineers and technicians ;
- 
study and development of powerful ins-
truments of computer-assisted design ;
- 
development of large-capacity integra-
ted circuits ;
- 
study and development of future super-
microcomputers;
- 
development of software engineering
technology.
I I l. When thinking of defence now and in the
future, one simple notion should be borne in
mind: without computers, no force can be truly
deterrent.
ll2. Your Rapporteur trusts he has been able
to throw some light on the stake involved in the
computer phenomenon on the basis of informa-
tion obtained mainly in France (administration
and manufacturers). He suggests that a fuller
report be prepared for a future session taking
account of the views of the other WEU member
countries and of the American authorities.
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Amendment I
The military use of computers -
reply to the thiniah annual report of the Council
AMENDMENT I I
toblod by Mrs. den Oaden-Dekkers
21st Mny 1985
t^. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out * Standing Armaments
Committee " and insert'the Agency for the development of co-operation in the field of aimaminti;.'-
Signed : den Ouden-Dekkers
l. See 4th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (amendment agreed to).
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Cyprus and Europun suurity
REPORTI
submitted on behalf of the General Alfoirs Committed
by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rappotteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DRAFr Recotrur'NplrtoN
on Cyprus and European securitY
Expulnronv MeuonlNPulr
submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur
L lntroduction
II. Cyprus before indePendence
III. The Republic of CyPrus
IV. The situation in 1985
V. Conclusions
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members olthe committee: Mr. Michel (&aiman);MM..Hardy, van der Werff(Vice{hairmen);_Mr. .Ahrens, Sir
Frederic Benneit, MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Hill (Alternate: Mrs. Knifit), 
-lohnston, Koehl,. Lagteau,L;;*r, ioiin6, M"*iaari, M*ller, fiouvist, Iird Riay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf (Alternate: Haase), van der
Sanden, Spitelle Vecchiati, Vogt, deYies.
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
oa Cypnrs and European wcurity
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that the situation in Cyprus is a serious threat to the maintenance of the cohesion of
the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean;
(ii) Considering that the association of the Republic of Cr7prus with the European Community, its
participation in the Council of Europe and that of Greece and Turkey in the Atlantic
A[iance give the member countries of WEU the right and duty to do their utmost to promote the
establishment of lasting peace on the island ;
(iii) Considering that the conclusions drawn by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the
inter-community negotiations held between 1977 and 1982 are the best possible basis for the restora-
tion of peace in Cyprus;
(iv) Welcoming the decision taken by the two Cypriot communities to pursue their negotiations in
spite of the initial setback,
RecoMIvIeNDs rrur rnB CouNcIL
Express its support for the proposals by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and use all
the influence it may have with the Greek, Turkish and both Cypriot authorities to promote the
conclusion of a final agreement on this basis.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submiued by Sir Frcdaric Bcn rett, Rapportear)
I. Introduction
l. When the General Aflairs Committee pro-
posed including a report on Cyprus in the
agenda ofthe first part ofthe thirty-first session
of the Assembly and the Presidential Committee
decided to do so at the beginning of December
1984, this matter seemed to be a serious threat
to Europe's security and the cohesion of the
Atlantic Alliance not only because of the island's
strategic importance but to a much gfeater
extent because of the extremely tense atmos-
phere which it fostered between Greece and
Turkey. Those two countries form NATO's
south-east {lank.
2. Turkey has a direct frontier with the
Soviet Union, its straits are the latter's only
maritime access to the Mediterranean and it has
for many years been subject to internal subver-
sion encouraged by the Soviet Union with the
aim of destabilising it. In other words, its
government cannot remain indifferent to a
national problem such as that raised by the
Cyprus affair.
3. Greece for its part, thanks to the fact thatit possesses almost all the Aegean islands,
Rhodes and Crete and is a peninsula, is in a
position to exercise real control over the Eastern
Mediterranean and communications between
Western Europe and Turkey. Its present
government is also being strongly contested at
home, admittedly from a legal, parliamentary
opposition, which does not encourage it to
pursue a policy of concessions in regard to
Cyprus.
4. This did not prevent the head ofthe gene-
rally accepted Cypriot Government, Mr. Kypria-
nou, holding negotiations with the head of the
r6gime set up by the Turkish Cypriot commu-
nity, Mr. Denktash, with a view to solving the
problem under the aegis of Mr. Perez de Cuellar,
Secretary-General of the United Nations. As
long as these negotiations are under way with a
chance of success, this Assembly must not inter-
fere in the internal affairs of a non-member
country of WEU nor do anything which mlght
make the negotiations between the two parties
more difficult. Your Rapporteur will therefore
simply review, as objectively and neutrally as
possible, the elements of the situation in Cyprus
and propose a draft recommendation which
takes no position on the substance of the solu-
tion of the problem but merely welcomes the
current negotiations. He makes a firm sugges-
tion that the General Affairs Committee go no
further at the present stage.
II. Cyprus before independence
5. Cyprus, which covers an area of 9,250
sq.km., is one of the largest Mediterranean
islands, slightly smaller than Sicily and Sardinia
and a little larger than Corsica and Crete. It
stretches 224 l<m from south-west to north-east,
with an average width of 70 km. But what
makes its position special is that it lies very close
to the coaits of Asia Minor: 70 km from Anato-
lia, 120 km from Iatakia (Syria) but 400 km
from Port Said and Rhodes and 800 km from
Athens.
6. Hence it is not surprising that since
ancient times it has been strongly marked by the
contact between Hellenic civilisation, domina-
ting the Eastern Mediterranean, and influences
from Asia and achieved an original synthesis of
the two, testified to by its particularly rich archi-
tecture. Eastern and Western influences then
dominated in turn: Greeks and Persians,
Romans and Byzantines, Arabs and Franks,
until in l57l it fell into the hands of the Otto-
man Empire for three centuries.
7. Cyprus is rather poor, arid and mountai-
nous and its reserves of copper, a metal to which
the country gave its name, were exhausted a long
time ago. Having no good harbours, the island
was relatively sparsely inhabited and was of only
slight economic and strategic interest until the
Suez Canal was opened in 1869. The ensuing
boom in Mediterranean trade made Cyprus rela-
tively more active again and on 4th June 1878
the Ottoman Empire signed a defensive alliance
convention with the United Kingdom which
entrusted the latter with the military occupation
and adminisration of Cyprus in exchange for its
support in the event of any Russian attempt to
lay hands on Turkish Asiatic provinces. The
Ottoman Empire had just been defeated by
Russia and the Berlin Congress was on the point
of meeting to settle the outcome of the
conflict. Cyprus nevertheless remained part of
this Empire until the end of the first world
war. The United Kingdom guaranteed the
religious freedom of the Moslems living on the
island and undertook to pay Turkey a rent
equivalent to the surplus of Cyprus's revenue.
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8. The very day it came into the war against
Turkey on 5th November 1914, the United
Kingdom annexed the island unilaterally. This
action was subsequently conlirmed by the S0vres
Treaty of l0th August 1920 and the Lausanne
Treaty of 24th July 1923, as a result of which
Turkey relinquished all rights to Cyprus which
was given the status of Crown Colony by letters
patent on 10th March 1925. It retained this
status until the Zurich and London Agreements
made it an independent republic on 16th August
1960.
9. The population of the island increased
considerably during the British period, rising
from 186,000 in l88l (when the first census was
taken) to 600,000 in 1964 which, in view of the
area of the island, gave it a moderate average
density of almost 60 inhabitants per
sq.km. The birth rate remained high (26 per
thousand in about 1965) while progress with the
health of the people guaranteed it one of the
lowest death rates in the world (6 per thousand),
i.e. an annual surplus of births over deaths of 20
per thousand, a high figure. However, this
population, like almost all those of the Ottoman
Empire's provinces, belonged to two quite sepa-
rate communities, one Greek-speaking and of
Orthodox religion, consisting of nearly four-
fifths of the population, and the other Turkish-
speaking and Moslem, which accounted for the
remaining fifth, the number of foreigners being
only about 19,000, i.e.3.7% of the total.
10. While at the end of the nineteenth century
the Greek CrTpriot majority willingly accepted
British military occupation and administration,
which protected it against any interventions by
the Turkish state, the emancipation of Greece
and the emergence of an independent Greek
nation to which all the Aegean and Ionian
islands eventually became attached, including
Rhodes and the Dodecanese in 1945, made the
Greek majority in Cyprus call for Enosis, i.e.
union with Greece.
11. The Greek population was spread through-
out the island but like many Greek communi-
ties it was firmly attached to the Orthodox
Church and first and foremost the ethnarch
elected from among the island's bishops. On
l8th October 1950, this dignity fell upon the
young Bishop of Kitium who took the name of
Makarios III, until his decession in
L977. Among Greek Cypriots, the Ethnarch's
authority was contested only by the local com-
munist party, AKEL, which never had a
country-wide majority but was strong in only a
few towns, with the exception of the capital.
12. It was AKEL which started agitating for
Enosis during the second world war but in 1950
the new Ethnarch took over the leadership ofthe
protest movement and gave it new impetus and
in 1955 an armed opposition organisation,
EOKA, was set up on the island. At its head
was a hero of the Greek resistAnce and civil war,
General Grivas, who conducted operations
against the British forces in Cyprus from 1955 to
1958. This rebellion did not become genera-
lised, although EOKA was supported by the
majority of the Greek Qrpriot population, thus
in four years 400 persons fell victim to it, divi-
ded fairly evenly between British forces and
EOKA supporters.
13. On the British side, as soon as the Greek
Cypriot population's desire for independence
became clear, an attempt was made, inter alia
through a referendum by signature organised in
1950 by the Ethnarchy, to find a statute for the
island which would guarantee both the mainte-
nance of British forces (panicularly the air force)
near the Middle East oil region where the United
Kingdom had continuing important responsibili-
ties, maximum possible indOpendence for the
population and guarantees for the Turkish
Cypriots.
14. The Turkish minority was in fact very
unfavourable to the cause df Enosis. Poorer
than the Greek population, it occupied a relati-
vely large place in the administration and police
and several of its members fell victims to EOKA
attacks. There is no doubt that it wanted the
status quo ante to be retained, as this made the
United Kingdom the arbitrator in all intercom-
munal disputes, and it was afraid of a Greek or
predominantly Greek administration, suspecting
the prospect of partiality in such disputes.
Moreover, Greek nationalism on the island
easily assumed anti-Turkish undertones which
did nothing to reassure it. Furthermore, Tur-
key and Greece each took sides for the commu-
nity with which it had aflinity and the Cypriot
conflict assumed an increasingly international
dimension.
15. The search for a solution acceptable to the
various parties concerned took a long time and
only in 1960 did it lead to the Zrurich and Lon-
don Agreements establishing the Republic of
Cyprus and making it an independent state,
although limiting several abpects of its full
sovereignty.
(i) The broad lines of the future constitution
had been the subject of prior dgreement between
Greece and Turkey which had together decided
upon the " basic structure of the Republic of
Cyprus " which was to be incorporated in the
constitution, and this in advance made any revi-
sion of the constitution subject to agreement
between the two powers.
(it) These structures included guarantees to
the Turkish Cypriot minority (supreme court
responsible for ensuring the constitutionality
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and non-discriminatory nature of laws, organisa-
tion of justice on a " communal " basis, right of
veto for the (Greek) President and Turkish Vice-
President, allotment of 30% of government posts
and seats in parliament to the Turkish commu-
nity and the requirement for certain laws to be
passed by a majority of the votes of representati-
ves from each community.
(ii, Although they included no territorial par-
tition, the Zurich and London Agreements insti-
tutionalised the existence of two separate but
equal communities, each having its own institu-
tions, including separate communes, which sadly
led to the two communities clashing even more
and hampering their merger in a Cypriot nation.
(iv) The three guarantors, the United King-
dom, Greece and Turkey, retained a continuing
right to intervene in Cypriot internal affairs,
under certain circumstances.
(v) Two British military bases remained
enclaves under United Kingdom sovereignty,
which in no way hindered the foreign policy of
the new republic which was able to insist on
refusing alignment with any alliance system.
These bases ensure the presence of a NATO
force close to the troubled Middle East regions.
16. It can therefore be seen that faced with the
need to take account of diverging positions,
those of Greece, Turkey and western security,
not to speak of those of the two communities on
the island, the london and Zurich Agreements
had the disadvantage of not establishing the
basis for a stable sovereign state. This left
Cyprus a possible area of confrontation between
the guarantee powers, and strengthened commu-
nal feelings without glving the communities a
sufficient territorial basis for them to be able to
maintain a necessarily federal structure. The
agreements bore the seeds of subsequent crises
in the Cypriot state.
III. The Republic of Cyprus
17. Under the London and Zurich Agree-
ments, a Republic of Cyprus was set up on l6th
August 1960 and Ethnarch Makarios made Pre-
sident. It was admitted to the United Nations
on 2lst September and subsequently to the
Commonwealth and the Council of Europe.
The situation was more or less satisfactory
until towards the end of 1963. However, fric-
tion very soon occurred between the two com-
munities, particularly about the apportionment
of posts in the civil service and army, which
could not be formed, each of the two communi-
ties setting up its own clandestine militia. But
the main problem stemmed from the formation
of separate communes against the wishes of the
Greek Cypriots, who feared that these fore-
shadowed partition of the island, while the
Turkish Cypriots considered them to be a gua-
rantee of their survival as a community. They
used their right of veto to prevent a fiscal law
being passed and, on 30th November 1963, Pre-
sident Makarios proposed a draft revision of the
constitution to the guaranteeing powers, which
aimed at unity and could but be refused by
Turkey.
18. Bitter clashes occurred between the two
communities on 2lst December 1963 and led on
4th March 1964 to a decision by the Security
Council, which had met at the request of the
British Government, to appoint a mediator to
promote agreement between the parties and to
send a United Nations peacekeeping force to the
island. Nevertheless, bloodshed increased and
the two communities' militias were supplied
with arms and military advisers by Greece and
Turkey respectively. The Turkish air force
intervened directly in August 1964 and on seve-
ral occasions, particularly in November 1967, it
was feared that the affair might degenerate into
an armed conflict between Greece and Turkey.
To ensure its security, the Turkish community
grouped itself in a number of enclaves which
were subject to a sort of siege by the forces of the
legal government, which no longer had any
authority there but made their supplies preca-
rious. In fact, this already amounted to parti-
tion of the island, but on a basis which paralysed
internal communications and the economy.
19. However, inter-community talks were
held between the Ethnarch's government and
Mr. Fazit Kutchuck and Mr. Raouf Denktash,
leaders of the Turkish community. The talks
were long and difficult but agreement seemed
near in summer 1974 when the Greek Govern-
ment, then in the hands of a junta of oflicers
who had taken over on 21st April 1967, attemp-
ted to overthrow the Ethnarch on l5th July.
The Ethnarch had asked for Greek officers in
the Cypriot National Guard to be recalled.
The Greek military junta probably wished to
make up for the setbacks in its internal policy by
carrying off an external success by bringing
about Enosis. On 17th July, Makarios was in
flight, and the Greek forces were in charge of the
island following an encounter which caused
several hundred victims. But Turkey retaliatedin a rapid military action which led to the
Turkish arrny occupying about 37% of the
territory of Cyprus, i.e. the north-eastern area.
The Turkish Cypriot population was brought
together there and the Greek population, about
180,000 persons, driven out, after the operations
had made many victims among both communi-
ties and considerably worsened the feelings of
insecurity of both. Nevertheless, this setback
led to the fall of the military junta in Athens and
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on 3lst July Mr. Caramanlis's democratic
government, immediately restored, signed a pro-
visional agreement on Cyprus with Turkey.
The cease-fire was not properly respected and
only in December was Ethnarch Makarios able
to resume leadership of the government in
Nicosia. The fighting in summer 1974left a total
of more than 4,000 victims from the two
communities, not including 1,600 persons who
disappeared.
20. In 1975, negotiations were resumed
between the two communities represented by
Mr. Glafkos Clerides and Mr. Raouf Denktash
respectively, under the aegis of the United
Nations. But at the same time both sides took
measures which could only make agteement
more difficult. For instance, the Ethnarch
handed the Greek Cypriot National Council a
proposal for a " cantonal federation " on 9th
February 1975, while on 13th February the Tur-
kish Cypriots proclaimed an independent state
which was to be secular and federated with
Turkey. In such cirumstances, the negotiations
could hardly succeed any more than could those
that followed between Greece and Turkey in
February 1976.
21. The sudden death of Ethnarch Makarios
on 3rd August 1977 and his replacement at the
head of the Cypriot state by Mr. Spyros Kypria-
nou and the fact that the economy of the Greek
part of Cyprus recovered sharply as it was able
to take over a number of international business
activities which had hitherto been carried on in
Lebanon did not facilitate the search for a nego-
tiated solution. However, at the beginning of
1977 the leaders of the two communities were
able to reach agreement on the bases of a future
Cypriot constitution: there was to be a federal
republic, dirrided into two independent, non-
aligned zones. In 1978, Mr. Kyprianou and
Mr. Denktash resumed their talks on this basis.
22. However, in view of the slowness of the
negotiations, the Cypriot Government, which
had in fact since 1963 been representing only the
Greek community, appealed to the United
Nations General Assembly. The Turkish com-
munity retorted by intemrpting the inter-
community negotiations and, on l5th Novem-
ber 1983, proclaimed the independence of the
federal Turkish state of Kirbis, consisting of the
part of the island occupied since 1974 by the
Turkish armed forces. To date, only Turkey
has recognised this state, the proclamation of
which was declared invalid by the United
Nations Security Council.
23. In 1980, this state had a population of
150,000 
- 
including 80,000 Turkish Cypriot
refugees from the zone which remained Greek
and 50,000 Turkish settlers who had arrived
since 1974 
- 
not to speak of 35,000 Turkish mili-
tary personnel. Only about 1,200 Greeks and
500 Maronites were left. The new state covered
a little more than 3806 of the area of the island
but contained a large proportion ofits resources,
including 50% of its industrial potential, 56% of
its mineral deposits, 83% of its harbour facilities,
65% of its tourist potential and 70% of its
pre-197 4livestock.
24. The constitution of a Turkish Cypriot
state was approved by referendum on 6th June
1975 and Raouf Denktash was made President
in 1976. A forty-member assembly is elected by
universal suffrage every five years, the last elec-
tions having been held on 28th June 1981. The
five parties represented there are all in favour of
this constitution.
IY. The situation in 1985
25. Since the beginning of 1984, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Mr. Perez de
Cuellar, has been trying to bring the representati-
ves of the two communities closer together to
allow them to resume the rtegotiations inter-
rupted in 1983. Because of the large-scale mili-
tary deployment on both sides of the demarca-
tion line, further clashes are to be feared which
will necessarily pit two well+quipped Turkish
divisions, close to their bases in Anatolia,
whence they can quickly receive reinforcements,
against a Cypriot army of 10,000 men from the
National Guard plus 1,500 Greek troops. Any
armed conflict would thus immediately involve
Greece and Turkey, and the 2,311 members of
the United Nations force, from seven different
countries, are neither numerous enough nor well
enough anhed to. be able to resist them.
Moreover, this is not their rdle. Nor is it the
r6le of the British and American NATO forces
stationed on the two British qovereign bases on
the island.
26. The present situation is not necessarily
unfavourable to such negotiations, provided
they remain solely in the hands of Mr. Kypria-
nou and Mr. Denktash. Everything indicates
that the two Cypriot communities are hoping for
a peaceful settlement to the conflict and the esta-
blishment of a Cypriot state which would protect
their communal existence and at the same time
restore peaceful coexistence on the island. The
Greek community fears Turkish military domi-
nation and the repercussions it may have on its
security. The Turkish community moreover
seems to be aware of the economic failure of the
new state which only Turkey rccognises. Where-
as, since 1976, the Greek part of Cyprus had
made great economic strides, marked above all
by the development of small industries and trade
and was hardly a{fected by fairly serious infla-
tion, the Turkish part declined very noticeably.
The value of its currency fell very quickly,
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trade deteriorated, tourism was mostly limited
to Turkish citizens and, in 1985, per capita GNP
was little more than $1,000, while it was over
$4,000 in the Greek part, in spite of Turkey's
financial efforts in the Turkish part of Cyprus.
27. In August 1984, the Secretary-General of
the United Nations proposed that the represen-
tatives of the two communities reopen negotia-
tions under his auspices with a view to drawing
up a draft agxeement based on what had been
agreed upon during the Makarios-Denktash talksin 1977 and the Kyprianou-Denktash talks in
1979. The purpose was to establish as early as
possible a federal republic which would be
independent and non-aligned, bi-communal as
regards the constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as
regards the territorial aspect. This would mean
ensuring equal political status for the two com-
munities and defining the functional require-
ments of a government capable of fulfilling effec-
tively the powers assigned to it within the
context of the country's unity.
28. The two parties accepted this basis of dis-
cussion and " proximity talks " were held in
New York from lOth to 20th September and
from l5th to 26th October 1984, and on 27th
November Mr. Perez de Cuellar submitted a
draft agreement. This was a package deal
consisting of all the elements which could give
the two communities the guarantees of security
which were essential if they were to accept the
agfeement.
29. The Turkish Cypriot Delegation accepted
the text proposed by the Secretary-General im-
mediately and without amendment. Ten days
later after Mr. Kyprianou had consulted his own
and the Greek Government, the Greek Cypriot
Delegation also gave a favourable reply but had
certain reservations which required further nego-
tiations. On l2th December, the Secretary-
General considered that points of view were
sufliciently close for him to be able to call a mee-
ting of the heads of the two communities with a
view to the final conclusion of the agreement.It was decided that they should meet on
17th January 1985.
30. According to reliable sources, the draft
agreement reaffirmed that the aim was an inde-
pendent, non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal
federal republic, as agreed upon by the represen-
tatives of the two communities in 1977, 1979
and 1982. It defined the powers of the federal
government, the constitution and responsibili-
ties of a bi-communal federal legislature, the
constitutional guarantees to be given to the fwo
communities, the equal political status of the
two communities in the federal government,
the principle of territorial adjustments at the
expense of the territory of the Turkish Cypriots
which was apparently to be reduced from 38%
to 29% of the surface of the island, the
withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the
island and the establishment of international
guarantees of the application of the new
statute. A transitional government was to be
established and two funds set up, one to faci-
litate economic equilibrium between the two
parts of the island, the other to assist the reset-
tlement of persons who had to be displaced.
Certain parts of the territory were to be placed
under interim United Nations administration
and Nicosia airport was to be reopened to both
communities. Finally, working g;roups were to
be set up to work out the details of the agree-
ment, particularly those relating to the bounda-
ries of the two zones and the time to be allowed
for implementing the agreement.
31. At the summit meeting on lTth January,
Mr. Kyprianou nevertheless appears to have
raised fundamental objections to the very nature
of the text before him which he considered to be
a basis for agreement and not the text of a fixed
agreement. He asked for a stricter definition of
the principles of " equal political status " and
" bi-zonality " and questioned the legislative,
executive and territorial aspects of the agree-
ment. He is also believed to have opposed the
establishment of a transitional federal govern-
ment and to have put forward demands with
regard to international guarantees and the with-
drawal of foreign troops from the island.
Finally, he is believed to have refused to abide
by time limits, provisionally laid down and to
have working gxoups set up.
32. In such conditions, it was impossible to
sign the agreement and the Turkish Cypriot
Delegation, not wishing to be considered unilate-
rally bound by a text which did not commit
its partner, withdrew its earlier unconditional
acceptance of the Secretary-General's text.
However, it was agreed to resume negotiations
with a view to holding a further meeting of the
heads of the two communities in spring 1985.
33. The Greek Cypriot population was far
from unanimous about the uncompromising
attitude adopted by President Kyprianou since
on 22nd, February the Cypriot Parliament
adopted, by 23 votes (conservatives and com-
munists) to 12 (democrats and socialists), a reso-
lution urgrng the head of state to sign the agree-
ment presented by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, while maintaining its reserva-
tions on points which it found insufficiently
clear. The resolution asked the President to
withdraw if he did not accept this resolution so
that the Greek Cypriot population could hold
new presidential elections. Such a clause was
however not mandatory for a President elected
directly by the people.
34. This internal crisis, when added to the
closeness of the legislative, communal and pre-
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sidential elections in the Turkish part of the
island between 15th June and 15th July 1985,
makes very unlikely the signature of an agree-
ment before summer 1985, although perhaps a
further meeting of the leaders of the two
communities is still feasible.
35. The conclusion of a lasting agreement on
the bases agreed in the inter-community negotia-
tions and included in Mr. Perez de Cuellar's pro-
posal, seems to meet the wishes of a large majo-
rity of members of both the communities on the
island. It is therefore also considered desirable
by the member countries of the EEC, of which
Greece is a member and Turkey and Cyprus
associates. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of
the Eleven, meeting in Brussels on 29th January
1985, confirmed this fact in a statement on
Cyprus which urged the parties concerned to
resume the negotiations under the good offices
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
and invited them to refrain from any action
liable to endanger a continuing positive dialo-
gue.
36. This recommendation also obviously
applies to Turkey and Greece. The former keeps
an army of 140,000 men on the shores of the
Aegean, with a marine infantry division, an air-
and helicopter-borne division and all its para-
chutists, as well as 127 landing craft. Greece for
its part is implementing a new defence doctrine
providing for most of its forces to be deployed in
the east at the expense of those formerly
deployed in the north against the Soviet Warsaw
Pact threat. This means Greece disengaging
itself from some of its commitments to NATO
and in particular the end of the integration of
Greek forces and territory, an aim which seems
to have been pursued continously since the arri-
val of Mr. Papandreou at the head of the govern-
ment. The deteriorating situation in Cyprus
can but lead those involved to disengage them-
selves further from NATO or even, in the event
of a serious crisis, clashing as they did in
1974. Such a clash would be fatal to Europe's
security in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Y. Conclusions
37. The draft agreement proposed by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations implies
a serious political reassessment of the situation
by both partners. For the Qreek Cypriots, it
must mean clear, outright and permanent renun-
ciation of Enosis. For the Tunkish Cypriots, it
would mean renouncing the guarantee afforded
by the presence of the Turkish arny, as well as
glving up more than a quarter of the territory
they now occupy. These sacrifices are accepta-
ble only if the new Cypriot state is capable of
grving the two communities guarantees of secu-
rity and promises of peace, civic equality and
economic development. Because it is based on
a federal system in a state in which each commu-
nity would have widespread rights over its own
territory, Mr. Perez de Cuellar's proposal at least
seems more viable than the situation brought
about by the Zurich and London Agreements.
The only alternative would be the maintenance
of the status quo with, in the long run, a de facto
partition of the zones now controlled by the two
communities, implying the perpetuation of ten-
sion which would be dangerous for both Europe
and the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, there is
little chance of such a development remaining
peaceful because any tension which might also
emerge between Greece and Turkey would inevi-
tably have repercussions in Cyprus and because
it is not possible to consider a United Nations
force remaining on the island indefinitely.
38. Hence, the European allies of Turkey and
Greece should use all their influence to induce
these two countries to renounce all claims to
Cyprus and the two communities to agree on the
basis proposed by the Secretary-General. The
process of returning to peace will probably still
be a long one, but if it does not start soon there
is every reason to fear that it never will.
39. These are the reasons why your Rappor-
teur, while refraining from interfering in the cur-
rent negotiations, asks the WEU Assembly to
adopt a draft recommendation appealing to all
the parties simply to endorse the view expressed
in the proposal of the Secretaly-General of the
United Nations.
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Document 1008
Amendment I 20th May l9t5
Cyprus and European security
AMENDMENT 1I
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere
l. Redraft paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:
" Considering that the conclusions drawn by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from
the.negotiations held between 1977 and, l9i]4 are the beit possible basis for the restoration oi
national unity in Cyprus;".
Signed: Cavaliere
l. See 3rd sitting, 2lst May 1985 (amendment negatived).
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Amendments 2,3 and 4
21st May 1985
Cyprus and European security
AMEIYDMENTS 2,3 and 4
tablcd by Mr. Rubbi
2. In paragraph (y' of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out * to the maintenance of
the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean " and insert * to the country's
sovereignty and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of Europe ".
3. In paragraph (iiil of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out 'the restoration of
peace in Cyprus t' and insert " re+stablishing the integrity and independence of a neutral, non-aligned
Cyprus ".
4. Redraft paragraph (iv/ of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:
" (iv,) Wishing the two Cypriot communities to pursue their negotiations in spite of the initial
setback, ".
Signed: Rubbi
1. See 3rd sitting 2lst May 1985 (amendments negatived).
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Amendment 5
21st May t9t5
Cyprus and European security
AMENDMENT 51
tabW by MM. Beix and Pignion
5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out * the Greek, Turkish and both Cypriot
authorities " and insert'the parties concerned ".
Signed: Beix, Pignion
l. See 3rd sitting,2lst May 1985 (amendment negatived).
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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 411 to 416
RECOMMENDATION 411 
'
on deterrence and thc will of the people2
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling its Recommendations 383 and 388 and welcoming the positive replies received from
the Council ;(ii) Considering that fear of the devastatilg effects of any armed conflict in Europe is still a pro-
minent and justified concern of the peoples of Europe ;
(iit) Recalling that, until more progress has been made in disarmament, the security of Western
Europe will be ensured only by detelrence ;
(iv) Underlining however that while nuclear weapons ale an essential means of deterrence-, a-mljgr
contribution is al-so made by governments and nations showing their determination to defend their
freedom;
(v) Regretting that the failure of the Geneva conference and the Soviet Union's continued deploy-
hr.ot oilnt .midiate-rarrge nuclear weapons together with its refusal to_hold-negotiations on these
weapons on a reasonable 6asis have compelled the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to start
aepfl,Virg-iisites of similar range in Western Europe in application of the twofold decision of Decem-br 1979;
(vi) Noting that the need to apply this twofold decision has been recognised by all the democratically-
ippointed governments of the WEU member countries;
(vil Hoping that constructive proposals will soon be made to allow negotiations to be opened on the
limitation of nuclear weapons of all kinds ;
(vily' Noting that the security of Western Europe forms an inseparable whole ;
(ix) Deploring that this de facto solidarity is not expressed in more intensive consultations on exter-
nal and defence policies ;
(x) Considering that the improvement of relations between the countries of Western and of Eastern
iiorope in the con-text of the CSCE can be a significant help to negotiations on disarmament;
(xt) Considering that while effective deterrence is still, as matters now stand, essential for the West's
ii6uriti, tfris caniot in the longer term be ensured without a radical transformation in the standard of
living in the developing countries,
Recoulrasxos rn tr rHe Col.JNcIL
1. Continue to keep European public opinion informed of the dangers to which the world is
exposed, of the measurts avaiiable to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance for countering
them and ofthe type and level ofweapons deployed in Europe;
2. Show the cohesion of the alliance and of its European members by making optimum use of the
organs of WEU and of the Atlantic Alliance;
3. Concert its views inter alia on the implications of the modifred Brussels Treaty for the defence
policy of each member and for working out-a joint position on the limitation of armaments or disar-
mament;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1984 during the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session (7th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. tagorce on behalf of the General Affairs committee (Document
988).
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4. Continue to^apply the NATO twofold decision of 1979 while seeking, with the Soviet Union,
ways and, means for negotiating balanced and controlled disarmament, pafticularly in intermediate-
range nuclear weapons ;
5. 
- - 
In the approp4ate fraEreworks-, seek.to rleve_lop exchanges of all kinds between Western Europe
and the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union ;
6. Do its utmost to Dromote the success of current negotiations on disarmament, to encourage the
opening of further negotiations on the limitation of nucleir missiles of all ranges and on banniig the
use of space for military purposes and to develop the North-south dialogue.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 3
to Recommendation 411
l. The Council has noted with great interest Recommendation 411 on deterrence and the will of the
people. It shares the Assembly's concern to ensure that European opinion is inform.ed as completely as
irosiiUte about the threats to our continent and about the security and defence policy adopted by the
member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance to counter these threats.
2. This effort is essentially the responsibility of each member state which provides regular informa-
tion using the methods that it considers the most appropriate.
3. Parallel to this effort, in the context ofjoint reflection on this matter, the Council, which me,t ?t
ministerial level in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April, approved a document entitled * WEU and public
awareness -. This document is annexed to the present reply.
4. As the Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty. to discuss
security and defence questions, the Council attaches particular importance to the reflections on the
preoccupations of Eurbpean public opinion which the Assembly can convey-lo the Council. The
entranced dialogue between the Assembly and the Council should enable_pub.Iic opinion to be even
better informedlf the basis of the defencC poficy of WEU member states. Whilst assuring the security
interests of the member states and maintaining closer co-operation between them, this policy makes it
possible to preserve peace and to seek genuini dialogue 14th the countries of Eastern Euro_pe. Tttp
position hai been approved by all the member states of the alliance and freq-uently reaffirmed, in
particular in the Washington declaration of 3lst May 1984 wlrigh demonstrates the full agreement and
unity of the WEU member states with their allies on the principles underlying their security.
5. Inspired directly by these principles, the members of the integated military structure 1d_opted the
dual-tracli decision oi DecembCr 1979. It aimed at restoring a balance in Europe which had been
distorted by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles.
At the same time the dual-track decision again demonstrated the alliance's readiness for dialogue
with the countries of the East. This decision advocated negotiations between the Soviet Union and
the United States aimed at achieving balance at the lowest possible level of forces and stressed that
western deployment could be reversed, halted or modified if the talks succeeded.
Hence the allies regretted the breaking-offof talks by the Soviet Union in November 1983 and
the WEU Council can bui welcome the openlng of a new round of talks between the United States and
the Soviet Union in Geneva on 12th March 1985.
6. The member states maintain regular in-depth consultations - multilaterally in the appropriate
fora, but also bilaterally - on all the pioblems relating to the various arms control questions. In this
connection, the member states of the integrated military structure hold ree_ular consultations with the
United States on the negotiations in Gentva. Furthermore, the United States regularly inform the
NATO Council about these negotiations.
7. At its meeting in Bonn, the Council of Ministers requested the Permanent Council to implement
rapidly their decisions on restructuring the Paris agencies and to submit to the next tl-1eetilg of the
C6uniit of Ministers a report on the progress achieved by then and on the new tasks attributed to these
agencies, which include, inter alia, studias in the field of disarmament and arms control. The Council
tikes the view that these studies should provide a useful contribution to its reflections in this field.
8. The continuation of the North-South dialogue clearly goes beyond the competence of
WEU. The Council wishes to point out, however, that the seven member states have already made
substantial efforts to expand their co-operation with the developing countries at both bilateral and
multilateral level and sptcifically at European level within the framework of the Lome Convention,
recently renewed for a second time.
3. Communicated to the Assembly on 2oth May 1985.
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WEU and public awareness
Introduction
l. (!)-. WPU. Foreis+ and Defence Ministers at Rome agreed that a study should be made of WEUpublic relations activities and a report submitted by the Permanent Couircil for the next ministerialqegtltg. 
-The Chairman-in-Oflice of WEU referred to this in his speech to the WEU AssemUtv on29th October:
* The Ministers commissioned the Permanent Council to prepare reports that are to be
deliberated at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. Thb Pirmanent Council will submitproposals... on ways of improving WEU public relations activities. "
lt(ii).ln co_nsidering-how best-to develop WEU public relations actiyities, thought should be given to
the themes WEU wishes to address in presenting its activities, and to the means 5'y which this piesenta-
tion is to be made. This paper aims to address these points.
Themes
II. (y' Ministgrs a! Rome stressed the importance of the modified Brussels Treaty and their attachment
to its goals of maintainin_g peace and security,-of promoting unity, and of encouraging the progressive
integration of Europe and-closer_co-operation both among its member states and iittiottrei Eiropean
organisations. They emphasised :
- 
the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty arca;
- the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies;
- 
their conviction that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of
Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries ofthe
Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members.
lI. (it) Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their
views_.on the. specific conditions of security in Europe. They agreed on six main areas for discussion,
as indicated in paragraph 8 of the Rome de-claration.
l!. (iii) Dr?yn1r8 on this mandate, the themes which the WEU mrght address in its public relations, with
the 
.aim 
-of informing public opinion on security and defence policies, became clearer. The following
could fulfil the expectations set at Rome :
(a) to explain the need to maintain adequate defences, that security has to be won, and that it
should never be taken for granted ;
(b) to explun that the need for security and defence measures is gxeater than hitherto in view of
force imbalances and the present threat ;
(c) to.r.eiterate that the members of WEU are determined to ensure their defence and solidarity
whilst seeking more stable relationships with the countries of the East through constructivL
dialogue and co-operation ;
(d) tod-emonstrate the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty as the foundatiron of our security,
while underlining the defensive nature of its policies; and'to highlight the importance of tlie
European contribution to the alliance and to western security ;
(e) to 
-draw attentio{r_to the proposals of western countries, includ"ing the Europeans, to seekbalanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements ai the lowesi possible level
offorces, explaining that allied unity increases the chances for progress ;
(fl to dtaw attention to the importance of developing European co-operation in the field of
armaments;
(g) to draw attention to the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world;
(h) ingeneral, to encourage a better-informed public debate about defence and security policy.
!. /iv/In_view of the continuing- qr,antilative and qualitative development of Soviet militaryforces, European governments should focus the aitention of theif publics on the central
importance of deterrence in maintaining peace and security. The WEU mrust also aim to
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develop public understanding of the transatlantic relationship as fundamental to the alliance,
and of the irreplaceable nature of the United States commitment to Europe and the American
nuclear guarantee.
ll. (v) lt will be especially important for WEU to demonstrate the well+stablished commitment of the
alliiice (cf. Harmll rep6rt) tb work for constructive and stable East-West relations and-a productive
dialogue. In the coming months, it may also be important to explain the complexities of arms control
negotiations in order to help increase public understanding of why early results cannot always be
achieved.
Means
III. (y'There are three avenues through which WEU public relations activity could be channelled :
- 
WEU Assembly;
- 
WEU Council/Secretary-General/Agencies ;
- 
WEU member governments.
Assembly
llt. (ii) The Rome declaration and document on institutional reform indicate the importance
Uiniiti:rs attach to the Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU and to the r6le it might play in
striving * to consolidate the consensus among public opinion " on the security and defence
needs 1f the member states. In this context, Ministers at Rome express the hope that the
Asscmbly might play a part in achieving greater public under_standing.-of the defence and
security 'optio=ns 6pen to the Council which expresses the 
_political will. of the individual
governhents in itJ potcy statements. To help in this, the Rome institution document calls
i-nter alia for the development of informal contacts between government representatives and
representatives of the Assembly, and for better means of keeping the Assembly informed 
.ofthi work of the Council so that the two bodies can operate together in an even more comple-
mentary fashion.
1II. (iii) The Assembly is the only European parliamentary b,oqy empowered by tleaty. to
discuis'defence and slcurity issues.- It attracts considerable public attention during its bien-
nial scssions.
lll. (iv) Individual Assembly sessions are addressed by Ministers from various member states
on subjects of topical interest. This provides an opportunity to put across-to a wider audience
the coinmonly aEreed themes. Other speeches which provide a platform for the discussion of
defence and se-curity issues (see paragraph III. (.r/ below) might also incorporate these ideas.
lll. (v) It will be important to give maximum publicity to such speeches. 
_ 
This will to a large
extent be a national- task; but WEU institutions can also play a r6le by helping to spread
information from Assembly sessions and disseminating the texts or extracts of speeches by
Ministers of member staies. Consideration should be given to the arangement of press
briefings, the production of broadsheets, information on Assembly 
. 
debates, and the distribu-
tion of reports suitable for use by the press. It would be helpful in this respect if- in future
Ministers making speeches at WEU Assembly sessions could include a press conference in
their itinerary. Between Assembly sessions, the press section should try to alrange Etreater
contact between members of parliament of member states and the media.
C ouncil / S ecr et ary- G eneral /A g e nc i e s
lll. (vi) Ministerial sessions provide an opportunity to further develop good 
.and comqrehensive
relations with the press. This task is primarily the responsibility of the presidency and national
governments. Delegations should include officials responsible solely for this function. They should
aim also to assist in promoting the image of a revitalised WEU.
lll. (vii) There may also be scope for using the office of the Secretary-General to promote
WEU, to explain its purpose and functions within the framework of European security, and
to press themes agreed by the Council. The Council could also charge the Secretary-General
to iehy information to the press through independent briefings to journalists or, if appro-
priate, speeches.
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lll. (viii) There is probably a r6le for a public relations and information unit within the Secre-
tariat-General. This could take responsibility for developing contacts with the press and
disseminating information about WEU. It could arrange briefing sessions for the press before
the major sessions of the Council and Assembly and as necessary in between them. It would
be for the Permanent Council to decide on the substance and nature of any material distri-
buted by the unit.
Agencies
lll. (ix) The Council may commission the Paris agencies of WEU to contribute to informa-
tion activity in the following ways :
(i) prepaing material specifrcally for public relations use; such material could be
distributed as directed by the Permanent Council through the secretariat unit in
London. If budgetary resources permitted, the Council might roquest preparation
of small publications about the work of WEU in pamphlet or brochure form for
distribution;
(ii) prepaing material of topical interest for publication and dissemination to the press. A list
of press contacts should be drawn up and kept with the new unit in the Secretariat-General in
London.
National governments
lll. (x) As previously indicated, the most elfective way of authoritatively reaching a wide audience is
through the public statements of politicians and Ministers in the national governments of member
states. Considerable attention is regularly given to them by the media. Use should be made of the
major ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and media appearances of WEU Ministers to put
across the agreed themes.
lll. (xi) Government Ministers and oflicials in all WEU member countries regularly discuss defence
and security issues with members of parliament, journalists, church leaders, non-governmental organi-
sations, research institutes, academic bodies, and others. These contacts should be used to explain the
ageed themes and the r6le of WEU in the context of European security.
lll. (xii) Other national information channels should also be used more effectively to generate gtreater
public awareness of policies which the alliance and WEU members follow. The Permanent Council
will be instructed to look at this problem periodicially during its regular sessions. When the
Permanent Council considers it appropriate, such national information activities cor,rld be co-ordinated
in order to enhance their effect. The overall aim of this work by the Permanent Council will be to
improve the image of the WEU member countries in the field of defence and security questions.
Conclusion
lY. (i) Success in achieving the objectives of the Rome declaration will depend on many factors, a
major one of which will be the stimulation of public interest in WEU and the generation of greater
public awareness of policies which WEU members follow. Maintenance of the higher political profile
of WEU will enable the organisation to play a part in helping the cause of European security and
transatlantic unity.
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RECOMMENDATION 412 4
on the conseqaeilces of the Gulf war s
The Assembly,
O Considering that the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to peace throughout the
Middle East;
(iil Considering that a decisive victory by one or other of the belligerents would involve serious dan-
gers for the stability of the area ;
(iiil Noting that no individual power outside the area seems in a position to exert decisive influence
in favour ofpeace ;
(iv) Considering however that the supply of arms to the belligerents by some of these powers is liable
to prolong the war;
(v) Noting that both belligerents have already gravely violated the laws of war several times ;
(vil Fearing that the war may be accompanied or followed by renewed and aggravated international
terrorism;
(viil Considering that while Europe's supplies are not yet seriously threatened by the war, an intensifi-
cation of hostilities might disturb the oil market and hence the security of Western Europe, as would
the internationalisation of the conflict,
RecouueNos rnnr rnr CoLJNCIL
1. Afford its full support to any initiative by the United Nations, by Middle Eastern countries or by
other countries to restore peace between Iran and Iraq and instruct its Chairman-in-Oflice to do all in
his power to foster such an initiative ;
2. Seek agreement between member countries and all other arms-exporting countries on curtailing
arms supplies to the belligerents ;
3. AfIord its support to all humanitarian organisations concerned with the conditions of prisoners
of war, particularly the ICRC ;
4. Gather the maximum information on possible violations of the laws of war by the belligerents
and object in the strongest terms whenever such violations are proved;
5. Plan the measures to be taken jointly by member countries in the event of an extension of
terrorist operations in the Middle East or Western Europe ;
6. Have a study made of the lessons which Europe might draw for its own security from the Gulf
war;
7. Encourage member countries to keep large stocks of oil and continue the efforts they started in
1973 to diversifu their sources ofenergy.
4. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1984 during the second part ofthe thirtieth ordinary session (8th sitting).
5. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document
994).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 6
to Recommendation 412
The policy pursued by the WEU member states with regard to the Iraq-Irart conflict, whether
individually.on a national-basis or jointly in the context of European political co-operation, is largely
consistent with the spirit of Recommendation 412 of the WEU Assembly.
It should be recalled, in particular, that the member states have been unanimous in backing the
various United Nations initiatives taken with a view to achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict or,
at leas!1 mitigation of its tragic consequences in human terms, and in supporting the Secretary-
General's efforts to obtain a commitment on the part of both sides to suspend bombing of civilian
targets. For this purpose, the Security Council has adopted a number of resolutiong which have been
supported by the member states of WEU.
Similarly, the governments of the member states have not failed to censure the infringements of
the law of war committed during the conflict, whilst giving their full support to the Iniernational
Committee of the Red Cross in its endeavours to protect prisoners of war.
They also supported the United Nations Secretary-General's initiative to send to Baghdad and
Tehran a mission to look into the treatment of prisoners of war. The members of the Assembly are
undoubtedllaware of the report which the experts have drawn up on the position of prisoners in Iraq
and Iran. The experts have also submitted unanimously-agreed recommendations, in particular: the
abolition of corporal punishment, the improvement of living conditions in the camps, respect for free-
dom of thought, religion and conscience for all prisoners and the advisability of governments of the
belligerent countries examining seriously the possibility of freeing their reipective prisoners on ajointly-agreed basis or by unilateral measures.
The Council endorses the appeal by the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council to the belligerents to uphold the international obligations which they undertook on l2th JunL
1984 and thus safeguard the agxeement to refrain from attacks on civilian population centres in Iran
and Iraq.
The possibility of achieving an agreement between all countries exporting armaments to reduce
the supply of weapons to the two sides is a complex question. For their part, WEU member countries
continue to follow with concern the development of a conflict which, if it were to spread, would further
endanger the security of the whole region.
The member countries of WEU are very conscious of the gravity of the problem created by the
acts of terrorism, which are increasing and taking on new and varied forms. They take this- into
account in their approach to this problem.
The Council will consider carefully the suggestion of the Assembly for a specific study on the
diverse implications of the Gulf conflict in relation to European security, with particular reference to
the link between security and oil supply.
The member states of WEU are aware of the risks that the escalation and extension of the Gulf
conflict would entail with regard to the oil supply to Western Europe and the possible consequences for
her security. Therefore, they are guided by the above consideration in keeping the energy situation
under close scrutiny and in updating their policies in this field.
The Council deems it appropriate to draw the attention of the Assembly to the progress so far
accomplished in the member countries in order to safeguard themselves in case of emergencies in the
oil supply and to increase the diversification of supply sources. In the framework of thelnternational
Energy Agency and the European Community arangements have been made with regard to the mainte-
nance of adequate oil stocks so as to enable the nations concerned to cope with emergency situations.
6. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th March 1985.
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RECOMMENDATION 413 7
on the military use of space
Part II8
The Assembly,
(, Determined to pursue its consistent interests in the strategic implications for Western Europe of
present and future applications of space technology ;
(iil Eager to exploit the specialist expertise of the revitalised organs of WEU, namely the Standing
Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, to concert industrial collabora-
tion in the military space field and to evolve a Western European policy on arms control that takes into
account current and projected developments in military space technology ;
(iiil Welcoming the announcement made on 22nd November 1984 in a joint communiqu6 issued by
Tass and the United States Department of State of the probable opening of negotiations on all problems
relating to nuclear and space weapons ;(iv) Welcoming the steady progress of the European space effort under the aegis of the European
Space Agency and in particular the validation of Spacelab and the Ariane launcher and success in the
fields of telecommunications and remote sensing;
(v) Appreciating the French Government's commitment as expressed by President Mitterrand to a
full realisation of Europe's strategic potential in space and its publicly stated concern that the conse-
quent deductions for European security policy should be drawn and acted upon ;
(vil Confident that WEU can offer the best forum for parliamentary debate and analysis about the
United States Government's strategic defence initiative and the prospects for an effective space-based
defence against ballistic missiles ;
(viil Supporting efforts through the European Space Agency and through national governments to
obtain, in the framework of possible co-operation on the proposed NASA space station, full guarantees
regarding the conditions of this co-operation, thus leaving open the possibility of developing an inde-
pendent European space station,
Rrcouusxos rnlr rne Co[rNcIL
l. Act as the primary political instrument for intergovernmental concertation of a unified Western
European policy towards the military use of space ;
2. Commission the restructured and more appropriately staffed Standing Armaments Committee
and Agency for the Control of Armaments to provide expert advice on the defence and industrial
aspects and implications, for arms control and confidence-building measures between states, of current
developments in military space technology;
3. Maintain the closest liaison with the United States Government to prevent divergencies of view
between the American and Western European partners of the Atlantic Alliance ;
4. Support for industrial, technological and strategic reasons an expanded European space
programme and promote enhanced dialogue on related policies and objectives both with the European
Space Agency and national governments ;
5. Give impetus to a joint European response to the NASA space station proposals which builds on
existing European capabilities, is complementary to the modules, elements and systems of the space
station as a whole and enhances Europe's technical capacity for autonomous developments in this field
including manned space missions;
6. Provide a clear lead and direction to parliamentary and public opinion in favour of a major
European effort to meet the challenge of the space age in the fullest sense through increased scientific
space experimentation, commercial applications and security+nhancing space developments ;
7. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1984 during the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session (8th sitting).
8. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological
and Aerospace Questions (Document 993).
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7. Ensure that the reorganised office of the Council of Ministers of WEU can draw on adequate spe-
cialist space expertise to inform its consideration of the increasingly important implications for
Western European security policy of developments in space technology ;
8. Take into account the proposal made by France at the disarmament conference held in Geneva
in June 1984 that negotiations be held on the military use of space leading to commitments which are
limited with regard to anti-satellite systems, progressive with regard to a test ban and verifiable with
regard to improving the existing system for notifuing the launching of objects into space.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 9
to Recommendation 413
l. The Council agrees with the Assembly that concertation among WFU qgmbJr countries on mili-
tary space matters and their implications foi Eu-ropean security-is desirable. The Council considers the
d#.I;;;.r,tr *itt regard to thi military use of outer space to be a subject *lti..t T-eII analysis withintt. t"'-.tnork of the-revitalised WEU.- How discussions on the subject within WEU could be struc-
i"i.O a"p.nds on the outcome of the current institutional reform. The Council itself will give its
attention to this important subject.
Z. As stated in the Rome Declaration, the Ministers of the Seven are convinced that a better utilisa-
tion of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement
in ifr. common defence of ail the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to a greater solidarity among its
members. The most substantial consultations possible between allies on problems affecting their
security are therefore important. Consultations on these questions arealready taking_place in NATO;
they arl designed to foster unity of views between the members of the alliance and can but contribute to
their cohesioir. The Council believes that the discussions within WEU on the impact of military space
matters on European defence and security would make a positive contribution to these consultations.
3. The Council welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have begun global
negotiations, i.e. dealing with strategic weapons, INF missiles and defence an-d space weapons. It hope-s
ttiat ttrese negotiations-will achievJsecuriiy at the lowest possible level of forces through substantial,
UaianceO andverifrable reductions of nuclear weapons. fhe Council notes that the strategic defence
iniiiati"e (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a scientific research programme and
hence doei not contravene tlie provisions of the 1972 LBIII treaty. The Council also takes the view
that laboratory research does not lend itself to arms control measures. On the other hand, relevalt
tests or deployments will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In
view of ttr6 contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its
erosion.
The discussions the western countries have proposed in the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva on the question of the prevention of an arms race in space may be of assistance to the bilateral
negotiations between the Unitea States and the Soviet Union. "
4. The member countries of WEU are fully aware of the need to pool their efforts in space projects
in order to confirm Europe's place in this field and keep abreast of developments. In its reply to-
n.Co*."odation 4l0last November, the Council stated that it considered co-operation in the field of
ip".. teinnology with the United Siates " mutually profitable ". The European S_pace Agency, of
*trict all WEd countries as well as a number of other European countries are members, is the focal
point for European co-operation on the use of space-for. peaceful Ptrposes. A number of important
irojects are alieady being carried out in this organisation. 
- 
Within this framework the Ministerial
boincil of ESA reiognised at its meeting in January that the presenl scope of the overall Agency's
programmes has to bd enlarged with a cohirent, complete and-balanced long-term European space plan
to c-ope with the challenges of the next decade and beyond. The text of the resolution on the long+erm
European space plan, aiunanimously adopted by the ESA Council on 3lst January 1985, is attached.
In addition, the Ministerial Council of ESA decided to adopt at its meeting on 3lst January.l985
the text of the reiolution on participation in the space station programme (also attached) in which it
responded positively to the United States offer to participate in the development of a manned s-pace
staiion. tt witt be up to ESA and its American counterpart, NASA, to work out the modalities of this
participation.
9. Communicated to the Assembly on I lth April 1985.
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Council resolation ot the long-term European space plan
(adopted on 3lst January /985)
The Council, meeting at ministerial level,
CoNsIoenrNc that the Agency's activities and programmes have proved to be valuable to its
members and associated states and have contributed to satisfu the objectives assigned to the Agency by
its convention,
CoNslpsRrNc the evolution in space activities and their fast expansion both in scope and
volume throughout the world,
RrcocNlsrNc that-the present scope of the overall Agency's programmes has to be enlarged
within a coher€nt, complete and balanced long-term European space plan to cope with the challengel of
the next decade and beyond,
CoNsroenrNc the offer made to Europe by
the space station programme,
Hnvn{c REcARD to the Director General's proposal on the long-term European space plan(ESA/C-M(85)2),
H,6vrNc REGARD t9 !he- Rlonosgd level of resources to be made available to the Agency for
the coming five-year period 1985-1989,
CHAPTER I
(Objectives)
Reernnvs its commitment to maintain and develop European independent capabilities in
space,
AcnrEs to orient the European space programme:
- 
towards a coherelt whote, in which the spending on the tools needed for space activities, and
on the activities themselves, such as science and applications, are appropriately balanced; and
- 
in a direction so that all sectors utilising space techniques are adequately covened, ensuring that
they are developed in such a way that advances in-one field cin be-taken advantage-of by
others.
Appnoves the objectives set out below as-guidelines for the Agency's activities during the next
decade_; these objectives are based on the need for Europe to maintai-n anO UuitO on the achievements
of the first two decades of Europeal space co-operation, ind to expand Europe's autonomous capability
and Europe's competitiveness in all sectors of space activity.
These objectives are in particular:
- 
to enable the European scientific community, via an expansion of the scientiiic programme, to
remain in the vanguard of space research;
- to develop further the potential of space in the areas of telecommunications and meteorology ;
- 
to prepare a substantial contribution of space and ground techniques to earth observation
science and applications and prepare for the setting-up of operational systems and of user-
oriented organisations to operate them, as required ; 
-
- to improve the competitiveness of European industry in applications aroas by means of
advanced developments of space systems and technology ;
- 
to pave the way, 'ria a substantial research programme (materials and life sciences), for prac-
tical application of microgravity in space ;
- 
to strengthen European space transportation capacity, meeting foreseeable future user require-
ments within as well as outside Europe, and remaining competitive with spape transportation
systems that exist or are planned elsewhere ;
the President of the United State$ to participate in
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- 
to prepare autonomous European facilities for the support of man in space, for the transport of
equipment and crews and for making use of low earth orbits ;
- 
to enhance international co-operation and in particular aim at a partnership with the United
States through a significant participation in an international space station.
CHAPTER II
(Programmes)
Taking into account the abovementioned objectives,
II. l. AcnrEs to a balanced long-term European space plan for the next decade along the.lines
proposed by the Director General leading to a comprehensive autonomous European capability in
space and Containing the following major elements: in-orbit infrastructurq prog;ramme, space trans-
pbrtation systems piogramme and programmes for earth observation, telecommunications, micro-
gravity, space science and technology.
II. 2. Werrolres and ENponsrs the proposal to undertake, as an optional programme in the field
of in-orbit infrastructure, the Columbui programme, as a significant part of an international space
station programme, as proposed by the United States of America ; the Columbus programme, whose
detailedcontent will be defined in ihe course of its preparatory phase and will also depend on the terms
and conditions of the partnership agreement to be concluded with the United States, is at present
estimated to cost 2,600 MAU* until 1995 including a three-year period of operation and initial
utilisation ; and Er.oonsEs the agreement to undertake the Columbus preparatory programme.
II. 3. Wrlrours and ENoonsrs the proposal to undertake, as an optional programme in the field
of space transportation systems, the development of the Ariane 5 launcher, equipped- with. the large
cryogenic engine HM-60; with a view to completing it by 1995 and at a cost currently estimated at
Z,6O0 UaU-; and Euoonsrs the agreement to undertake the larye cryogenic engine preparatory
programme.
II. 4. Tnxrs Nore with interest of the French decision to undertake the Hermes manned spaceplane
programme and the proposal by France to associate her European partners interested in this pro-
gramme in the detailed studies and h.rvnEs France and associated partners to kee^p t!9_Aggncy informed
6f progress of these studies with a view to including this programme, as soon as feasible, in the optional
programmes of the Agency.
II. 5. Wercours the proposal to bring forward and incorporate in the Agency's optional pro-
grammes, in due time; additional elements of a European autonomous capability in automatic and
iranned brbital operations comprising in particular a manned space transportation capability, a fully
independent Columbus complex including polar orbiting platforms, an operational data relay system,
and 
-the 
development of the necessary technology along with its in-orbit demonstration ; to prepare for
these future activities, a funding of some 50 MAU per year is envisaged.
Tlxrs Nore of the studies underway in the United Kingdom of the future generation HOTOL
project and following Annex IV of the convention invites the United Kingdom 19 keen !!e {Seqcy
inf6rmed. A similar invitation is also extended to other member states undertaking studies in this
area.
II. 6. Welcours and ENoonsrs the proposal to pursue vigorously the Agency's activities in the
fields of earth observation, space telecommunications and microgrcvity, to maintain its activities in
space transportation through an Ariane 3 and 4 support progfamme and to complement its activities in
space technology by an in-orbit technology demonstration programme, and ReQursrs the Director
General to proc6ed with the execution of already agreed optional programmes and the preparation of
new ones for:
(i) earth observation, centred around the ERS-I project already agreed and around future
elements, i.e. the ERS-I follow-on missions on oceanographic and meteorological applica-
tions, a land applications project, participation in the development of the second generation
meteorological satellite and studies aiming at solid earth, atmospheric and climatology
missions. The funding level for the earth observation activities would rise from 150 MAU
in 1985 to a level corresponding to a yearly average of 190 MAU over the period 1985-95 ;
* All figures are expressed in I 984 economic conditions.
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(ii) space telecommunications, building on the achievements reached and oentred around the
development and the in-orbit testing of advanced payload systems. The funding level for
the telecommunications activities would move from 180 MAU in 1985 to around 150 MAU
over 1988-95, corresponding to a yearly ayerage of 170 MAU ;
(iii) micrognvity, centred around an enhanced utilisation programme of Spacelab and Eureka
leading- to the utilisation of Columbus and the internatlonal space stati-on for microgravity
research and development. The funding level for microgravity activities would increase
from about 30 MAU in 1985 to 80 MAU per year over the period 1988-92, the funding for
the following years being included in the Columbus programme.
II.-7. Aonrrs, in order to reinforce in the next decade space science activities in Europe, progressi-
vely to increase the level of funding of the mandatory scientific programme to redch I-OZ-MAU* Uy
t?!2 ; and RrQuesrs the Director General to submit to Council the level of resources for the period
1985-89 accordingly.
IlrvnEs the Director General to study a possible extension of the scope of the mandatory scien-
tific activities to other scientific disciplines without reducing the effort on the scientific discipliies pre-
sently covered, as well as the possible inclusion into the mandatory scientific programme oi financial
support to groups of experimenters.
II. 8. Texrs uorr that the execution of this long-term European space plan will require a substantial
increase in the-Agency's resources and that in particular the oveiall funding level-will progressively
increase to reach about 1,650 MAU per year by 1990.
AcneEs that the rise in the general budget included in the above amount and expected to
accompany this expansion in the volume of the Agency's activities, will lead to a level of contributions
of 90 MAU per year by 1989; this increase will be aisigned, by priority, to technolbgy research pro-
gramme and investments; and Rreuesrs the Director General to submit to Council the level of resouices
1985-89 accordingly, to be followed by proposals for the possible improvement of the finan-
cial system of the Agencynot later than mid-1985, so that the Cbuncil may decide oD them in parallel
with the approval ofthe 1986 budget.
CHAPTER III
(Industrial policy)
III.I. Requesrs the Director General actively to pursue an industrial policy in line with the objec-
tives defined in the convention and its Annex V, and in particular:
- 
to study how the present imbalances in the geographical distribution of contracts have
developed and to propose to Council before mid-1985 remedies for the future ;
- to study what is the degree of specialisation desirable in industry and the .itt ods of achieving
it, as well as the industrial structures capable of meeting European needs, of improving the
cost-effectiveness of ESA programmes, and of being competitive on the worild markets, while
striving to a sufficient complementarity between the space firms of the major contributors and
the others ; and to make proposals to the Council in the near future.
III. 2. REAFFInrras that the objective in the distribution of contracts is to reach an overall return
coefficient as near as possible to the ideal value of I for all countries; and Reqursrs the Director
General to take the necessary measures to achieve a substantial reduction by the end of the next three-
year period (1985-1987) in the current imbalances of the geographical distribution of @ntracts, with the
aim of bringing, by the end of 1987, the cumulative return coefficients of all states apove 0.95, on the
understanding that the appropriate additional measures will be taken from 1988 onwhrds if this objec-
tive is not achieved by the end of 1987.
Rreunsrs that correction measures be aimed in the first place at increasing the industrial parti-
cipation, in particular in the mandatory programmes, of the countries whose overall return coefficient
is below the ideal target of 1.
III. 3. Decprs that for the following three-year period (1988-1990) the lower limit for the cumulative
return coefficient below which special measures are to be taken to redress the situation and referred to
in Article IV, paragraph 6, of the Annex V to the convention, is fixed at 0.90.
* The 162 MAU figure corresponds to a yearly increase of 5%.
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Drclors that for the next three-year period (1985-1987) the preference clause for the states
participating in optional programmes (Article II of Annex V to the convention) will be waived in
favoufof the non-participating states whose overall return is below 0.90.
III.4. Accrgrs, in order to enable the Director General to redress the current situation and thereafter
to maintain a balanced geographical distribution of contracts, and when all possibilities for reallocation
of work in the optional as well as in the mandatory programmes have been exhauste4 the principle of
applylng to opti-onal programmes financial compensation measures, such_ as decreasing for a limited
1i111s-peiiod the contributions of states whose cumulative return is below 0.90.
III. 5. Norrs that, to this end, states, when participants in optional programmes, will include appro-
priate provisions in relevant declarations for such measures to be applied for limited time-periods,
according to a procedure to be defined.
Council resolution on participation in the spoce station programme
(adopted on 31st January 1985)
The Council, meeting at ministerial level,
CoNsroeRrNc the offer made by the President of the United States in January 1984 to the
friends and allies of the United States of America to participate in the space station programme which
he has instructed NASA to carry out within the next decade,
CoNsroeRrNc that the availability of an orbital station represents a decisive phase in the
exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes,
Rrcru:-wc the implementation of the Spacelab programme and the first Spacelab flight which
took place in 1983,
RecAurNG that a number of member states have undertaken, within the framework of the
Agency, a Spacelab follow-on development programme and a long-term space transportation systems
preparatory programme (ESA/C/LIV/RES. I (Final)),
H.rvntc REGARD to Resolution ESA/C/LXIV/Res. 4 (Final) of 28th June 1984 on the execu-
tion of a space-station-related Columbus preparatory proglamme and the corresponding declaration,
CoNsDeR.brc that participation in the space station programme constitutes one of the
elements of the long-term plan of the Agency (ESA/C-M/LXUI Res. I (Final)),
CoNsrornrNc that the object of participation in this programme is to expand the horizon for
space research and exploitation, to master the new technology needed for carrying out manned and
unmanned orbital operations in low earth orbit and thus to permit the future development of a
European in-orbit inft:astructure,
NorrNc the drawing up by NASA and the Agency of a memorandum of understanding deter-
mining the modalities of their co-operation with a view to harmonised conduct of their respective
detailed definition activities for the space station,
Hlvmcnecenp to the document on negotiations with the United States (ESA/C-M(85)3),
I. WBrrours the offer by the President of the United States of America ;
IL Accrms that offer 
- 
with a view to continuing and strengthening a genuine partnership in the
space field with the United States of America and within the framework of the European long-term
space programme and the objectives defined in it - subject to the achievement of the following funda-
mental objectives:
- 
to seek an appropriate European participation by the Agency in the space station programme ;
- 
to give Europe responsibility for the design, development, exploitation and evolution of one or
several identifiable elements of the space station together with the responsibility for their
management with the aim of increasing overall capability of the space station ;
- 
to ensure that Europe may have access to and use, on a non-discriminatory basis, all elements
of the space station system on terms that are as favourable as those granted to the most-
favoured users and on a reciprocal basis ;
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- to reach a satisfactory agreement on the share of the operation costs of the station ;
- 
to reach a satisfactory agreement on the level and on the conditions for the 4ppropriate trans-
fers oftechnologies;
- to ensure that supplies and services provided by the United States industry and NASA for
European requirements are offset by European supplies and services ;
- to ensure maximum legal security and an identical level of the commitments entered into by
the European governments and the United States Government ;
- to guarantee the availability of the American transportation and communication facilities
reqgired for the programme and the possibility of using the European facilities as they become
available for the programme.
UI. Iuurrs the member states and the Director General to set up suinable machinery
under Council authority for drawing up and negotiating the legal instruments with the United
States Government and with NASA for the development and utilisation phases of the space
station.
ry. Acnrrs that the ESA Council will review the progress of the negotiations in order to
reach a decision with regard to the undertaking of the development, productioh and utilisation
phases of the space station programme before the end of 1986.
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RECOMMET{DATION 4I4IO
on (Inited Stotes- Europun co-operation
in advanced technology tl
The Assembly,
(t) Considering this report to be a follow-up of earlier reports- on- U-nited States-European
co-operation in idvanced- technology and especially Documents 773 of May 1978 and 889 of
October l98l ;(ii) Considering that the Council, in its reply to the Assembly on 7th April 1982 to Recom-
mendation 376 itated that the WEU member governments were well aware of the need to
contain equipment costs and that the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) is the
central foiuj for multinational European equipment co-operation and is actively engaged in
identiffing opportunities of this type;
(iii) Aware that, in 1985, the United States will order the development 9f a new advanced
taitical fighter aircraft and that five countries in Europe - plus the Netherlands which has
applied to join - are co-operating in a new European fighter aircraft project with an estimated
development cost of $4 billion ;
(iv) Considering American willingness to share its
European countries ;(v) Considering that the space station was one of the
summit conference in London in June 1984 but that
tion in the United States space station was given ;
(vt) Considering that an international co-operative space station programme is in the interests of both
the United Statetand Europe and would strenglhen Atlantic ties considerably during the research and
development phase as well as during the operational activities of the station ;
(vii) Conscious of the need to inject new life into American-European collaboration in many
fields of high technology,
RrcouueNos rnnr rne CouNcIL
I. Inform the Assembly of the achievements of the Independent European Programme
Group since 1978 in multinational European equipment co-operation, specifoing which oppor-
tunitiis for savings in weapon supplies have been identified and which two-way street pro-
grammes with the United States have been concluded or might be concluded in the near
future;
II. Use more actively the Standing Armaments Committee as a technical body of WEU to
harmonise the positions of the seven member states in matters concerning the European arrna-
ments industry ind to co-ordinate their efforts in order to improve the efficiency of co-operative work
in the various multilateral forums;
UI. Invite member governments :
l. To submit a plan to the United States Government for discussion on how to collaborate in new
mititary programmes such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, other weapon,system platforms and under
water weapon systems about to be developed so as to stop the spiral of ever-increasing costs within
military budgets ;
10. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1984 during the second pq1 of the thirtieth ordinary.session (9th sitting).
I l. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mi. HiU on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and
Aerospace Questions (Document 992).
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2. To promote a common policy on the first space station project, taking into account the need for
Europe to receive definite guarantees, such as :
(a) information access to the entire space station system ;
(b) equality between European and American companies exploiting the research and manufac-
turing facilities on the space station ;
(c,) access of European crews in order to operate the space station and not just to visit it;
(d) European industrial and operational responsibility for a primary item of space station
hardware;
3. To foster a common European programme for exchanging information with the United States on
future nuclear energy plants, drawing on individual up-to-date experience in Europe and the United
States;
4. To invite the United States and other governments to reconsider their attitude with regard to the
draft convention on the law ofthe sea.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'2
to Recommendation 414
L The Council fully recognises the importance of collaborative activities in the framework of the
Independent European Programme Group and the progress in the so-called transatlantic dialogue on
equipment co-operation with the United States.
However, the Council cannot provide detailed information on current or planned actiyities of the
IEPG as this information involves a number of non-WEU members. The Chairman of the IEPG has
addressed the Assembly directly and will probably continue to do so in the future. Members of the
Assembly wishing to receive additional-information should direct their request either to the Chairman
of the IEPG or to their national government.
II. The Council appreciates the rdle which the Standing Armaments Committee can fulfil in matters
concerning the European armaments industry. As the Assembly is aware, the Council is at present
working out more detailed proposals as to the future structure of the existing institutions of
WEU. The subjects mentioned in the Assembly's recommendation will certainly be taken into
account when these proposals are considered.
III. l. The dialogue between Europe and the United States on how to collaborate in new military pro-
grammes embraces inter alia the report of the United States Defence Science Board on transatlantic
industry-to-industry co-operation and the proposals by Secretary Weinberger on emerging technologies.
The IEPG has concerted the responses of member states to both the Defence Science Board report and
Mr. Weinberger's initiative ; further discussions are taking place within the framework of the Confe-
rence of National Armaments Directors. IEPG ministers have decided to intensifr the transatlantic
dialogue at the political level and have underlined the need for Europe to speak with one voice.
One of the main purposes of these discussions is to work towards the establishment of a balanced
two-way street in arms procurement between the United States and Europe.
III.2. A common European policy with regard to the space station has been initiated within the Euro-
pean Space Agency. As is mentioned in the reply to Recommendation 413, ESA has decided to
respond positively to the United States offer to participate in the space station project and is discussing
the terms with NASA. Individual WEU countries played an important r6le in reaching this decision
and will in fact be carrying the bulk of the costs involved. Subject to further discussions with NASA,
ESA would be willing to carry responsibility for the design, development, exploitation and evolution of
one or several identifrable elements of the space station together with the responsibility for their
management with the aim of increasing the overall capability of the space station.
Naturally ESA will seek access to and use of other elements of the space station and will try to
secure as much participation by European industry in the various aspects of the project as possible. The
text of the resolution on participation in the space station programme as adopted unanimously by the
ESA Council on 3lst January 1985 is attached.
III. 3. The Council notes the Assembly's recommendation that wider co-operation between Europe and
the United States in the field of nuclear energy be established. As the Assembly is aware, Europeans
have acquired considerable experience and skills in this field. Co-operation and an exchange ofinfor-
mation already exist in the framework of the agreement between Euratom and the United States and
also in the framework of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD.
III.4. The WEU member countries view the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea as a major
accomplishment in the development of international law relating to the oceans. However, certain
provisions lead to reservations on the part of certain WEU member countries which question, for
example, their impact on free trade and cost-effectiveness of possible deep-sea mining by their
companies. For these very reasons two member countries decided not to sign the convention.
The WEU member countries are aware of the position of the United States. They consider it
desirable that a satisfactory and universally-acceptable deep-sea mining regime be established.
12. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1985.
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RECOMMENDATION 415 13
on the control of armaments and disarmament ta
The Assembly,
(i) Endorsing the Council's view expressed in the Rome Declaration that increased co-operation in
WEU will also contribute to the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity and,
on that basis, to the pursuit of a more stable relationship between the countries of East and West by
fostering dialogue and co-operation ;(ii) Believing that negotiations on arms control and disarmament, such as those conducted in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, are too important for the security of Europe and the Atlantic
Alliance to be made dependent entirely on the state of relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union;
(iii) Welcoming, therefore, the inclusion of arms control and disarmament among the specific condi-
tions of security in Europe on which the Council of Ministers will hold comprehenslve discussions and
seek to harmonise their views ;
(ivl 
_Reiterating its view that it is impracticable, and indeed undesirable, to seek to establish a sepa-
rate East-West balance in different categories of nuclear weapons 
- 
strategic, intetmediate- or short-
range 
- 
and that any such nuclear balance can be assessed only globally ;(v) Believing, however, that actual negotiations on reducing present levels of nuclear weapons may
best be pursued by such categories,
RrcouurNos tnlr rHs CouNCIL
l. Seek agteement on the extent of verification measures necessary to provide adequate assurance
of compliance with arms control agreements, in particular a chemical weapons ban, a comprehensive
test ban, and MBFR reductions ;
2. Agree common instructions to the representatives of those WEU countries participating in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva with a view to securing the early conclusion of agreements on a
chemical weapons ban ; a ban on space weapons, including anti-satellite systems or new ABM systems ;
and a comprehensive test ban ;
3. Call simultaneously on the United States to ratifr the threshold test ban treaty and the peaceful
nuclear explosions treaty, and with the United Kingdom to resume the tripartito negotiations on a
comprehensive test ban treaty ;
4. Examine any constructive proposals from the Soviet Union linked with the qgick resumption of
INF and START negotiations, not excluding a possible mutual temporary freeze on further deploy-
ments of INF and short-range nuclear weapons, and further aim its efforts to achieve intensive consul-
tations between the United States and the European allies during new United States-soviet negotia-
tions;
5. Remind the Warsaw Pact states that WEU during the thirty years of its existence has never
prepared or taken any aggressive and hostile measures against the Warsaw Pact but on the contrary has
paved the way for the policy of dEtente and aims at peaceful interaction and reduction of tension
among the European peoples; and call upon the states of the Warsaw Pact to take into account this po-
sition of WEU, which is also in conformity with the position of the United States and Canada as well as
of the NATO member states, when taking a decision on the confirmation of their treaty beyond June
1985 and to draw consequences from this position for the continuation or shaping of the Warsaw Pact ;
6. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out specific studios to assist it in the
foregoing tasks, and those identified in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and
Armaments.
13. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1984 during the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session (9th sitting).
14. Explanatory memorandum: see report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments (Document 998).
87
DOCUMENT IOO9
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'5
to Retommendation 415
l. The Council strongly endorses the Assembly's emphasis on the need for proper verification of
arms control agreements in order to ensure compliance. There is already wide agreement on the
extent of verification required to achieve this, although there can be no single universal verification
scheme applicable to all arms control agreements irrespective of content. With regard to the United
States-Soviet arms control negotiations, the Council recalls President Reagan's statement on 9th
January that, while absolute verification might be impossible, adequate verification is a very necessary
feature. The Council notes that the mandate for the Stockholm conference provides that all confidence-
and security-building measures should be verifiable.
2. As is the case with negotiations in other arms control fora in which joint efforts by western coun-
tries are made to seek agreement with the Soviet Union, verification is the most sensitive aspect of a
global chemical weapon ban. Without adequate on-site verification, there can be no guarantee of
adherence to the provisions of a possible treaty. And without that assurance, a treaty banning chemical
weapons could diminish rather than enhance international security.
3. In the case of MBFR the western participants tabled a comprehensive package of associated
measures as part of a 1982 draft treaty. The allied countries participating are currently discussing how
this should be enhanced in the context of the flexibility on prior data agreement in the West's variation
of its 1982 treaty tabled in April 1984. Those WEU member governments and their Atlantic Alliance
allies participating in the MBFR agree that the basic provisions of an adequate verification regime for
an MBFR agreement should include on-site inspection, permanent exit/entry points, detailed exchanges
of information on force levels and non-interference with national technical means. Notification of
movements into the zone and notification and observation of military exercises are also necessary.
The Warsaw Pact made some steps towards the western position in 1983, particularly in accepting in
principle the possibility of on-site inspection, but their corresponding proposals are still very faulty and
inadequate. The western delegations proposed on several occasions that the two sides should conduct
a detailed examination of their respective positions on verification, but without result. On 14th
February, the eastern countries tabled a new initiative, largely made up of elements of existing
proposals. The western countries are now considering this.
4. The WEU countries represented at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament attach great impor-
tance to close consultation on key issues under discussion :
(y' on chemical weapons, this has resulted in a series of detailed proposals on which we await a
proper response from the Soviet Union ;
(ii) on the military use of outer space, the Council favours the achievement of either multilateral
or bilateral constraints which would truly enhance international security and stability ;
The Council supports the objective agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union
of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an anns race in space and
welcomes the opening of United States-Soviet negotiations on this subject. The Council
also believes that the existence of, and adherence to, the 1972 ABIud treaty by the two
signatory parties constitutes an important element in the present strategic context. In the
circumstances, the Council believes that any measures that might be taken by one party or
the other, lying outside the provisions of this treaty, such as ballistic missile defence
deployment, would have to be the subject of negotiations.
(iii) on the comprehensive test ban, the Council notes the view of several govern-
ments that outstanding problems of verification will need to be resolved, hopefully at the
Geneva Conference on Disarmament, with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject.
5. The Council is aware of the wish of the United States to discuss with the Soviet Union ways of
improving the verification provisions of the United States-Soviet treaties on nuclear testing. The
Council hopes that the Soviet Union will consider favourably the United States proposal for exchanges
15. Communicated to the Assembly on l4th May 1985.
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of test-site observers. This would represent a step towards progress in achieving the aforesaid treaties'
aim of formally constraining nuclear testing.
6. With regard to START and INF, WEU member governments have in the past urged that all
constructive and mutually acceptable proposals in this area be taken into account in negotiations.
These should, however, be aimed at increasing the chances of progress in negotiations. A moratorium
on deployment of long- and short-range INF weapons would alter the context of the negotiations. It
would perpetuate the Soviet Union's superiority in long-range INF and could act as a disincentive to
the Soviet Union to negotiate reductions.
7. The policy on INF, as regards their deployment as well as their limitation, rests upon the 1979
dual-track decision. In this connection, the countries concerned have repeatedly made clear their
readiness to halt, reverse or modifu their deployments of cruise and Pershing missiles, including the
removal and dismantling of missiles already deployed in Europe, in accordance with the terms of a
balanced and verifiable agreement. The United States have given firm assurances that they will
consult the countries concerned on the course of future negotiations. This process has already begun.
INF issues, which particularly affect the European allies concerned, are handled through the Special
Consultative Group.
8. The Council recalls that, like the Atlantic Alliance, WEU is a defence organisation and that its
policy and that of its member countries is designed to contribute 
- 
as noted by the Assembly - to their
security whilst attempting to reduce tensions on the European mainland.
9. At their meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April, the Ministers agreed to establish the following
new structures under the collective title " Agencies for Security Questions " : an agency for the study of
arms control and disarmament questions ; an agency for the study of security and defence questions,
and an agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments. As advocated in the
recommendation, these agencies will carry out specific studies to assist the Council in the accomplish-
ment of its tasks.
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RECOMMENDATION 416 
'6
on WEa, European union and the Atlantic AlliancetT
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling Recommendations 406 and 407 ;
(i, Endorsing the initiative taken by its President when he handed a memorandum to the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council on 20th September 1984;
(iii) Considering that a concerted approach by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to
matters relating inter alia to the alliance's defence policy and the action those countries pursued outside
the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is essential for Europe's security ;
(iv) Welcoming therefore the decision of the Ministers to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek
to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular on the six points
listed in paragraph 8 of the Rome Declaration ;
(v) Welcoming the wish expressed by the Council to give new life to WEU so as to adapt it to the
present requirements of European security and the maintenance of international peace and to develop
the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly for these purposes ;
(vt) Considering that giving WEU a new and wider rdle first implies that the Council eflectively
assume its obligations under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
(vit) Noting that the increase in informal procedure may help the Council's work but might diminish
the commitments of member countries in intergovernmental consultations and relations between the
Council and the Assembly;
(viii) Welcoming the deletion of the list of armaments in Annex III to Protocol No. III;
(ix) Noting that giving the Council a new and wider rdle means that it must obtain different means of
information from those afforded so far by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, in particular to
allow it to tackle questions of disarmament and the balance of forces ;
(x) Considering that the joint production of armaments by WEU member countries is progressing
only slowly;
(xil Considering that the Assembly's activities can be based only on a continuing dialogue with the
Council;
(xii) Welcoming the decisions taken or guidelines adopted by the Council and communicated to the
Assembly on 27th October 1984 and the fruitful exchanges of views in Rome on 29th October, but
recalling the urgency of reorganising the structure of WEU to allow it to meet the new requirements ;
(xiii) Welcoming the fact that the Rome Declaration introduced the question of disarmament into the
Council's work,
RrcouueNos rrmr rnn CouNCrL
l. Abide by its decision to convene the Ministers of Defence and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs
of member countries at least twice a year, particularly prior to meetings of the North Atlantic Council ;
2. Give the Permanent Council the means to act in application of Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty, and to this end :
(a) ask member countries to appoint a pennanent representation to the Council in the frame-
work of the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
I 6. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December I 984 during the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session ( I I th sitting).
17. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Masciadri on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document
990).
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(b) gtvg the Secretary__-_General powers of initiative allowing him to assume responsibility for
applying Article VIII;
3. Ensure the existence and o-peration of the WEU technical bodies in order to obtain the necessary
assistance and information to allow it to examine matters relating to the security of Europe in th6
framework of the Atlantic Alliance, events concerning Europe's sec-urity which occur outside the area
covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, problems relating to disarmameniand the control of armaments,
the prospects of European arnaments co-operation and an active policy for improving relations
between East and West ;
\ Progressively adapt the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing ArmamentsCommittee to these new requirements ;
5. 
^ 
While develo-ping an informal dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, as proposed by
the council, retain formal procedure for exchanges between the two wEU organs ;
6. Follow closely the expected resumption of international negotiations on disarmament and
prepare the necessary measures to allow Europe to play an active part therein ;
7. Develop co-operation between WEU and the European member countribs of the Atlantic
Alliance, particularly in the joint production of armaments, bearing in mind that the aim is their acces-
sion to WEU as soon as circumstances permit.
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l. The Council considers the Assembly's Recommendation 416 on WEU, European union and the
Atlantic Alliance as support for its Rome decisions to reactivate WEU.
2. The Council proposes to translate the Rome decisions into action without d.luy. This. also
applies to the decisibn that the Council will in future normallV mee.t twice-a year.at ministerial level.
The next meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers will be held on 22nd and 23rd April 1985.
3. The Council of Ministers decided in Rome, in line with its increased activities, to intensiry the
work of the Permanent Council. The Permanent Council, which prepares ministerial meetings and is
mandated to discuss in greater detail the views expressed by the Ministers and to follow up their
decisions, will, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article VIII of the modified Brussels-Treaty make
the necessary arrangements for this purpose, including as appropriate the setting up of working groups.
With a view to giving effect to the extensive decisions of Rome, the Permanent Council has
increased the frequency of its meetings.
Member countries are represented on the Permanent Council by their ambassadors in London
and a representative of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offrce. The r6le of the presidency^as empha-
sised in ^the Rome documents, the participation of capitals and the assistance of members of embassies
in London will ensure the efficiency of the work of the Permanent Council in pursuit of the aims set out
in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.
It was decided in Rome that the Secretariat-General should be adapted to take account of the
enhanced activities of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council. The Ministers asked the
Secretariat-General to submit, as soon as possible, a report on the work done by the secretariat and to
consider what measures might be necessary to strengthen its activities.
4. The Ministers instructed the Permanent Council in Rome to define, in consultation with the
directors of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee, the
precise modalities-of an overall reorganisation aflecting both_the Agency for th.e Control of Armaments,
the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Standing Armaments
Committee, which could be structured in such a way as to fulfil a threefold task:
- 
to study questions relating to arms control and disarmament whilst carrying out the remaining
control functions;
- 
to undertake the function of studying security and defence problems ;
- 
to contribute actively to the development of European armaments co-operation.
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
to Recommcndation 116
The Permanent Council appointed a working group to
out the reorganisation mandate, the Permanent Council also
bly's views.
5. In the document on the institutional reform of WEU (Section II,l), the Ministers made
concrete proposals for improving contacts between the Council and the Assembly-. This section
of the miniiterial decisions contains proposals both for the development of informal contacts
and for the establishment of formal consultations.
6. In the Rome Declaration the Ministers decided to hold comprehensive discussions and
to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe. Among other
topics, this applies also to arms control and disarmament.
Addressing the Assembly on 5th December 1984 in his capacity-as Chairman-in-Office
of the Council, Hans-Dietrictr Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic
of Germany, reiterated that the Foreign and Defence Ministers would be discussing current
problems in detail at their next meeting.
study these questions. In carrying
takes careful note of the Assem-
18. Communicated to the Assembly on I 3th March 1985.
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7. Another of the topics referred to in paragraph 6 above is " the development of European
co-operation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impe-
tus ". The pooling of technological, economic, industrial and financial resourceC will also -be
conducive to the joint production of armaments. Equipment interoperability and standardisation of
procedures are guiding principles for the European members of the North Atlantic Alliance also.
The revitalisation of WEU will also have an impact on European co-operation in the field of
armaments. In this respect, WEU support for the work of existing institutions such as the IEPG is to
be intensified. Another purpose of closer European co-operation is to promote balanced co-operation
between Europe and the United States ofAmerica in this field.
In the spirit of the Rome discussions and declaration, the Council will continue to examine atten-
tively any suggestions which the Assembly may make concerning better use of WEU.
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Information Report
(submitted by Mr. Giast, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The purpose of the present report is to
inform parliamentarians about the committee's
general activities between November 1984 and
May 1985 and to give an initial summary of
debates in the parliaments of member countries
on the evolution of WEU following the Rome
Declaration. A first sign of the reactivation of
WEU is to be found in an intensification of the
discussion at national level. An analysis of this
discussion is essential if the Assembly is to be
able to draw appropriate conclusions in regard to
subsequent procedure.
7. In his answer, Mr. Poos, Minister for
Forergn AIfairs, was rather vague about the next
meeting of the Council in April 1985. On the
harmonisation of the views of WEU countries
participating in the Geneva Disarmament
Conference, the Minister said:
" As a logical follow-up to the Rome
Declaration, the Seven will certainly also
endeavour to harmonise their views on
the matters being discussed at the Geneva
Disarmament Conference. "
8. On 23rd January 1985, Mr. Masciadri and
Mr. Hengel put questions on Recommendation
416 but only the Luxembourg Government's
answer is known. On the future r6le of the
Secretary-General, Mr. Hengel asked whether, in
the Council, his government would advocate
giving the Secretary-General powers of initiative
allowing him to assume responsibility for
applying Article VIII of the modified Brussels
Treaty, providing for consultations on any situa-
tion which might constitute a threat to inter-
national peace. In his answer Mr. Poos, Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs, said :
* With regard to the r6le of the Secretary-
Geheral, a special working group of
experts from the capitals is in the process
of preparing firm, detailed proposals on
the overall operation of WEU and its spe-
cialised agencies. These proposals will
also take account of the future r6le of the
Secretary-General. "
9. In accordance with Rule 42Dis, paragraph
4, of the Rules of Procedure, the Committee for
Relations with Parliaments is empowered to
" make all necessary arrangements with a view
to calling the parliaments' attention to the work
of the Assembly and inviting them to follow up
this work ".
10. It is clear that the importance of this task
can but be enhanced in the context ofthe reacti-
vation of WEU. At its meetings on 6th
November and 5th December 1984, the commit-
tee considered the consequencos of reactivation
for its future activities and for the preparation of
its programme of work.
I l. As a first step, it thereforre decided to take
special action to organise a series of information
meetings in member countries attended, in each
country, by representatives of the national par-
liament and the press. Committee members
would make brief five- to ten-minute statements
II. Activities of the committee
2. The Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments met in Paris on 5th November and 6th
December 1984. In accordance with Rule
42bis, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedure, it
selected from the texts adopted by the Assembly
at the second part of its thirtieth ordinary ses-
sion those which, in its opinion, should be
debated in the parliaments, i.e. :
- 
Recommendation 413 on the military
use of space 
- 
Part II ;
- 
Recommendation 415 on the control of
armaments and disarmament ; and
- 
Recommendation 416 on WEU, Euro-
pean union and the Atlantic Alliance.
3. These recommendations were transmitted
officially by the President of the Assembly to the
presidents of member parliaments in the hope
that they would be of interest and provide sub-ject matter for speeches or questions to minis-
ters.
4. At the committee meeting on 7th Decem-
ber 1984, the Chairman urged all members to
put questions as soon as possible on the basis of
the model questions prepared by the Office of
the Clerk.
5. So far, the secretariat has recorded two
questions put by Mr. Frasca on 4th February
1985 on Recommendations 411 and 413 and
two put by Mr. Masciadri on 23rd January 1985
on Recommendations 414 and,415. The Italian
Government's answers are not yet known.
6. On 23rd January 1985, Mrs. Hennicot-
Schoepges put a question in the Luxembourg
Chamber of Deputies on Recommendation 415.
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informing parliamentarians of the r6le and work
of WEU. There would then be a working
luncheon for the participating parliamentarians
and journalists.
12. The first information meeting was held at
the French Senate, Paris, on lTth April 1985,
when the committee met representatives of both
chambers of the French Parliament and of the
press. At this meeting, briefings were given by
members of the committee as follows:
- 
the revival of Western European Union
(by Mr. Enders);
- 
the WEU organs and their duties (by
Mr. Giust);
- 
the Assembly: its activities and how
they are followed up in parliaments (by
Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges) ;
- 
the present activities of the Assembly
(by Mr.Noerens);
- 
relations between Western European
Union, NATO and other Western Euro-
pean organisations and countries (by
Mr. Stoffelen).
There then followed a discussion in which the
importance of the reactivation of WEU for the
entire western world was strongly emphasised by
all speakers. Mr. Poher, President of the
Senate, Mr. Caro, President of the WEU Assem-
bly, and Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the French
Delegation to the WEU Assembly, took part in
the discussion. Similar meetings are to be held
in Italy in June 1985 and in Germany in
November 1985.
13. On the future evolution of WEU, the
Council and the Assembly are now at the discus-
sion and reflection stage. The Council and
governments have been given lhe memorandum
prepared by the President of the Assembly on
20th September 1984 setting out a few specific
proposals for the future operation of the Council
and its organs.
14. As for the Council, the Rome Declaration
issued on 27th October 1984 remains the basis
on which the Assembly and all its members will
have to adopt a position. To be able to exa-
mine the Council's intentions in depth, it is
essential for each representative to be fully
cognisant of the contents of this text. On the
initiative of the Committee for Relations with
Parliaments, a copy of the Rome Declaration
was sent to all members of the WEU Assembly.
At the meeting on 6th November 1984, the
Chairman asked all committee members to put
questions on this declaration in their national
parliaments.
15. To obtain a more complete picture, the
Assembly must be informed of the explanations
and comments of the governments in member
countries and of views expressed by represen-
tatives in their national parliaments. The Com-
mittee for Relations with Parliaments is also
responsible for keeping the Assembly informed
of current discussions at national level on the
future r6le of WEU. The next chapter therefore
analyses this national debate in member coun-
tries.
III. Analysis of parliamentary debates on
the evolution of WEU
16. The manner in which governments infor-
med parliaments about the Rome decisions is of
particular signifi cance.
17. In the Netherlands, a written report in the
form of a letter was sent by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs to the Second Chamber of the
States-General on l6th November 1984. The
text was published by the States-General.
Moreover, the Ministers of Defence and Foreign
Affairs took the opportunity of informing the
Second Chamber of the States-General of their
position on l2th December 1984, 3lst January
1985 and 5th and 6th March 1985 following the
tabling of motions on Netherlands membership
of WEU, establishing a joint WEU naval patrol
and a joint European position towards the
strategic defence initiative.
18. In Germany, the Federal Minister for
Forergn Affairs made an oral report to the
Bundestag on 8th November 1984 which was
followed by speeches by Mr. Gansel, Mr. Redde-
mann, Mr. Vogt and Mr. Rumpf, all members of
the WEU Assembly.
19. In the Uniled Kingdom, Baroness Young,
Minister of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs, gave an oral report in the House
of Iords in answer to a question put by Lord
Gladwyn and a speech by Lord Mulley. The
debate in the House of Lords was resumed on
7th November 1984 with Baroness Young and
speeches by Lord Reay and Lord Ardwick. On
6th and 9th November 1984, Sir Geoftey Howe,
Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Alfairs, addressed the House of Com-
mons during a debate on WEU in which
speakers included Sir Frederic Bennett and
Mr. Wilkinson. In addition, the United King-
dom Government answered fourteen oral and
written questions put by Sir John Biggs-Davison,
Sir Anthony Meyer, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Hill,
Mr. Johnston, Mr. Stokes, Mr. Denzil Davies,
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Deakins, Mr.
Dykes, Mr. McNair-Wilson and Mr. O'Neill.
20. ln Belgium, the main debate was in the
Chamber of Representatives on 20th November
1984 when the 1985 budget was discussed.
Speakers included Mr. Dejardin and Mr. De
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Decker. In the Senate, Mr. Adriaensens spoke
about WEU on 20th December 1984. Mr. Tin-
demans, Minister for External Relations, answe-
red questions for the government.
21. ln France, the debate in the National
Assembly on the 1985 budget also provided an
Qpplrtunlty for considering matters relating toWEU. On 8th and 9th November 1984, there
were speeches by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for
External Relations, Mr. Hernu, Minister of
Defence, and, among the parliamentarians, Mr.
Couve de Murville, Mr. Daillet and Mr.
Lagorce. On 3lst October 1984, the govern-
ment answered a question put by Mr. Fourre on
the extraordinary session in Rome.
22. ln ltaly, considerable actiyity has been
recorded, particularly among parliamentarians.
On 24th October 1984, i.e. on the eve of the
ministerial meeting in Rome, the Defence Com-
mittee of the Chamber of Deputies adopted a
resolution urgrng the Italian Government to
promote, among the other members of wEU,
several specific steps in security policy, the
content of which will be examined later in this
report. On 23rd January 1985, Mr. Masciadri
put a question on the reactivation of WEU.
23. ln Luxembourg, the government answered
three questions put by Mrs. Flesch, Mrs. Henni-
cot-Schoepges and Mr. Hengel.
24. As for the substance of the debate, it is
interesting to compare the principal points stres-
sed in member states, which were not always the
same.
25. It was mainly in France and the United
Kingdom that the governments gave a few signi-
ficant details on the prospects and future r6le of
the organisation in general.
26. Answering a question put by Mr. Fourre,
the French Government expressed the wish that
the institutional machinery of WEU be better
used for a debate by the Seven on their specific
security concerns.
27. During the debate on the 1985 budget, Mr.
Daillet asked: " Why has consideration not also
been given to holding meetings of chiefs-of-
staff? " In his answer, Mr. Cheysson, Minister
for External Relations, said :
" However, this does not allow us to have
stragegic discussions, conclusive discus-
sions in WEU. Why ? Because our stra-
tegy cannot be limited to conventional
and must necessarily include nuclear
means. The very reasons why France
does not belong to the integrated system
of the Atlantic Alliance apply to WEU and
prevent us from attending meetings of
chiefs-of-staff Furthermore, WEU could
not discuss global strategy since the Fede-
ral Republic of Germany cannot and does
not at present wish to have responsibilities
in this area.
This also means that bilateral Franco-
German strategic meetings are of conside-
rable importance. "
28. On 9th November 1984, Mr. Hernu told
the National Assembly that: " WEU cannot be a
forum for military decisions'. On 4th Decem-
ber 1984, he told the Senate: 'The development
of this European co-operation is the r6le that
must be played by WEU, which is not a forum
for decision-making nor a body for defence plan-
ning or co-ordination. "
29. In the United Kingdom, government
representatives stressed that :
" Reactivation (of WEU) does not change
two essential realities : our national
defence can be assured only through
NATO, and European co-operation in
defence equipment is best pursued
through Eurogroup and the IEPG:
Our objective in supporting the rebirth of
WEU is to strengthen and explain the
European pillar of the alliance and to
improve European defence co-operation.
WEU has a function to act as a ginger
group.
NATO remains the foundation of our
security, the treaty organisation responsi-
ble for defence, with appropriate military
staff and forces. WEU can play none of
these rdles and does not wish to. Indeed,
it is expressly stated in the Brussels Treaty
that WEU will not have such functions,
and that it should work in close co-
operation with NATO. What it can do
- 
promote deeper consultation among
ministers on politico-security issues 
- 
is
complementary to NATO, and open to
NATO.
WEU has three particularly valuable fea-
tures for the United Kingdom, First, it is
bound to the North Atlantic Alliance
Treaty. Second, ... it grovides the legal
basis for our commitmdnt of substantial
land and air forces to the mainland of
Europe 
- 
a vital element both in our com-
mon defence and in our relations with the
Federal Republic of Germany, to which I
attach so much importance. Third, the
WEU Assembly is the only European par-
liamentary forum empo*ered by treaty to
discuss security and defence questions. '
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30. On relations between WEU and NATO,
the German Government stated on 8th Novem-
ber 1984: " The treaty instituting WEU sti-
pulates that close relations shall be established
with NATO. The Federal Government consi-
ders this close link between WEU and NATO to
be essential. "
31. On l2th December 1984, Mr. De Ruiter,
Netherlands Minister of Defence, said :
* All European frameworks should be
taken at their own value, we should use
each of them according to their own possi-
bilities. This is true for European politi-
cal co-operation as well as for the Euro-
group of NATO. They all have their own
limits. For that reason, I consider it a
good thing to use WEU for discussions on
European defence and security policy.
For the practical side of co-operation in
defence equipment, we should use the
IEPG. Of course, there may be overlap-
ping, but we should consider it in a practi-
cal manner and avoid having different
organisations dealing with the same pro-
blems...
I want to outline that it is a misunder-
standing to think that WEU should deal
especially with matters outside Europe or
outside the NATO area. This is surely
not the case. The only question to be dis-
cussed is what will be the repercussions, if
men and material are used outside the
WEU or NATO area, on tasks within this
area. There is, however, no discussion
on how one or more WEU member states
should act outside the treaty areas... "
32. The Luxembourg Government underlined
the importance of strengthening the link between
WEU and the other NATO member countries.
33. Because of the special situation of Ger-
many, the consequences of the removal of the
last controls on conventional weapons played an
important r6le in the debate in the Bundestag.
On 8th November 1984, the Federal Minister for
Forergn Affairs clearly recalled that the Council's
decision had no connection with any firm arma-
ments programmes the Federal Republic mlght
have. The Federal Government had no inten-
tion of producing or exporting long-range missi-
les or strategic bombers.
34. The Federal Government repeated its pro-
posal for setting up a European research institute
to study security policy. This proposal was cri-
ticised by Mr. Vogt, who called for the creation
of a European disarmament agency.
35. In Italy, the Defence Committee of the
Chamber of Deputies advocated, in the resolu-
tion already mentioned, setting up " a European
agency responsible for security and defence
industrial policy which, acting in accordance
with directives from the Council of Ministers
and in consultation with the WEU Assembly,
would promote the co-ordination of the policies
of WEU governments in research, development
and production of defence means and in procu-
rement and sales, possibly in relation with other
similar European or NATO bodies ".
36. With regard to the new tasks of the
Agency for the Control of Armaments, Mr.
Cheysson, then French Minister for External
Relations, said in November 1984:
" Since the Agency for the Control of
Armaments has lost its initial task, that of
controlling our own armaments, we think
there is room here for joint reflection on
the major problems of the limitation and
control of armaments. "
37. In Germany, Mr. Rumpf suggested that
the Agency deal with disarmament and restric-
tions on the export of armaments. Mr. Gansel
raised the question of future controls of A, B and
C weapons in member countries, these controls
being provided for in the modified Brussels
Treaty. He also asked how WEU could contri-
bute to ending the division of Europe.
38. Mr. Dejardin tackled the question of the
future of FINABEL during a debate in the Bel-
gran Chamber of Representatives on 20th
November 1984, when he said:
" Not much is said about it, but the mem-
bers of the WEU Assembly, who are
accustomed to the intricacies and myste-
ries of WEU, know the rdle sometimes
played by this forum of private arma-
ments manufacturers called FINABEL.
What is its position in the context of the
Rome Declaration ? "
39. Answering the question about whether he
knew the FINABEL Broup, Mr. Tindemans,
Minister for External Relations, said : " I know it
by name, but no more. I am not in touch with
that group. "r
40. Among those who raised the question of
relations between the Council and the Assembly
were Mr. Genscher, Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs, who reminded the Bundestag of the
Council's proposals on this matter, and Mr.
Reddemann, who asked the Assembly and the
Council to meet again to discuss WEU's new
tasks. The question was also raised in the reso-
lution of the Defence Committee of the Italian
l. In the context of their examination of the future tasks
of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the
Standing Armaments Committee, the Ministers said in the
document appended to the Rome Declaration that " the
Permanent Council will also take into account the existence
of the FINABEL framework ".
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Chamber of Deputies which recommended esta-
blishing " closer co-operation between the parlia-
mentary Assembly and the Council ".
41. Four representatives raised the question
of the status of the Secretary-General, i.e.
Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Daillet, Mr. Hengel andMr. Adriaensens. The governments did not
give very detailed answers.
42. The question of the seat of the organisa-
tion was raised by Mr. Reddemann.
43. In the House of Lords, Lord Mulley raised
the question of dual representation in the Coun-
cil of Europe and the WEU Assembly.
44. Three governments 
- 
in Germany, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
- 
referred
to the importance of improving public under-
standing of the r6le of European defence in the
alliance.
45. Enlargement of the organisation was a
factor in the resolution adopted by the Defence
Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies.
This resolution asked the government " to
promote 
... initiatives which seek to promote the
accession to WEU of all the other Community
countries or European members of NATO, or at
least an appropriate form of co-operation ".
Speaking in the House of Lords on 7th Novem-
ber 1984, Lord Reay adopted a different posi-
tion, saying " that member states should think
very carefully before they issue any invitations
to accede to the treaty ". In France, Mr. Hernu,
Minister of Defence, said it was " perhaps not
desirable for the time being to extend the WEU
circle without taking certain precautions ".
46. Finally, it is worth noting the following
proposal by the Defence Committee of the Ita-
lian Chamber of Deputies, which advocates sub-
mitting * to WEU countries for study the idea
of setting up military combat units with an inte-
grated command ".
47. It is interesting to note that ministers of
defence still play little part in these national
debates.
48. The participation of representatives varies
from country to country. In some parliaments,
interest in the evolution of WEU is not confined
to members of national delegations.
49. In the United Kingdom, for instance, it
may be noted that eleven of fourteen parliamen-
tarians who spoke on this subject between Octo-
ber 1984 and January 1985 were not members of
the WEU Assembly. In Italy, the resolution
which has been quoted was signed by thirty-eight
members of parliament, five of whom were
members of the Italian Delegation to the WEU
Assembly. In France, two out of four speeches
were by non-members of the Assembly.
50. Conversely, in Germany, the attribution
of responsibilities in parliarrrent seems to be
regulated far more strictly. Consequently, only
very infrequently does a parliamentarian not on
the delegation adopt a position or put a question
on WEU in a plenary sitting of the Bundestag.
The debate on the report by Mr. Genschei,
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the
Rome meeting was entirely between members of
the delegation. On the same day, the Bundestag
considered a motion tabled by the majority on a
total ban on chemical weapons and a motion
tabled by the SPD Group on a rreaty to limit the
military use of space. The debate on the latter
motion was opened by Mr. Scheer, a member of
the WEU Assembly, and three parliamentarians,
including one member of the delegation (Mrs.
Kelly) then spoke. None of the speakers men-
tioned the work of the WEU Assembly on thisquestion. No members of ttie delegation spoke
in the debate on chemical weapons and WEU
was not mentioned, although the Federal Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs annou,nced in his report
that the Council would be dflscussing chemical
weapons and the military use of space at its mee-
ting in April 1985.
IY. Conclusions
51. Discussion at national level of matters
relating to the evolution of WEU has increa-
sed significantly in the past year, which is most
welcome. Several governments presented
detailed reports and gave useful explanations of
their interpretation of events in Rome.
52. Nevertheless, the information govern-
ments have given parliaments hardly helps one
to obtain a clearer idea of the future r6le of
WEU and its organs, and this is not at all surpri-
sing in view of the fact that the results of the stu-
dies conducted by the working groups set up fol-
lowing the Rome Declaration are not yet known
or have not yet been assessed Qy the Council.
53. However, it seems th|t in general the
methods and intensity of information policy
vary from one member country to anothei.
Consideration should be given to ways of
improving this information.
54. Governments should rather be asked to
report regularly to parliaments on the activities
of the Council and its agencies. It would also
be desirable for such reports to indicate the atti-
tudes and positions of the governments towards
WEU's present problems. These reports should
be made available to all parliamentarians.
55. At present, the German Government is
the only one to submit a half-yearly report to the
Bundestag on the activities of WEU and its
organs, which may be discussed by the appro-
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priate committee. This is a very useful practice
and your Rapporteur suggests that each delega-
tion be asked to recommend that its government
follow suit.
56. As regards the extent to which members
and non-members of the Assembly participate in
national debates on matters relating to WEU,
our committee's meetings with parliamentarians
from member countries will provide an opportu-
nity for encouraging non-members to increase
their participation. Moreover, members of
each delegation should see how far they can
improve the information they give their collea-
gues and enhance the latters' interest. Four
delegations already submit half-yearly reports on
the work of the Assembly, i.e. the delegations of
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy
and the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom,
information on the work of the Assembly is
transmitted regularly to non-members in the
political groups. In Luxembourg, after each
part-session the President of the Chamber of
Deputies makes a statement in public sitting on
the work of the Assembly. This statement is
published in the verbatim report of debates in
public sitting.
57. The resolution adopted by the Defence
Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies
on 24th October 1984 is a unique example of the
participation of a number of parliamentarians in
action relating to WEU. If other member coun-
tries could take similar joint initiatives, they
would provide proof of the greater importance of
WEU. But the increase in the number of ques-
tions put, most noticeable in the case of the
United Kingdom, is also an encouraging sign.
58. Every opportunity should be taken of sus-
taining public interest in the evolution of
WEU. Each member is asked to continue to
speak and put questions on the basis of the
Rome Declaration in connection with the com-
ments of government. It is therefore essential
to follow attentively all statements and explana-
tions by governments and to examine whether
they concord with the Assembly's intentions. It
is recommended that all members concentrate
on putting questions such as the following :
- 
Does Article VII.I of the modified
Brussels Treaty not allow * strategic dis-
cussions or conclusive discussions " ?
- 
Are nuclear questions excluded ?
- 
How can it be ensured that the Coun-
cil's discussions will finally give poli-
tical impetus to the alliance or that
WEU will give the lead if the Council
takes no decisions ?
- 
How is it possible to avoid Council
meetings consisting only of exchanges
of views involving no commitments ?
59. Your Rapporteur considers that some of
the ideas and proposals put fonvard in parlia-
ments are worthy of examination by the appro-
priate Assembly committees if they can be incor-
porated in recommendations, particularly the
proposals by the Defence Committee of the Ita-
lian Chamber of Deputies:
- 
to submit to WEU countries for study
the idea of setting up military combat
units with an integrated command ;
- 
to set up a European agency responsiblefor security and defence industrial
policy.
60. In regard to the latter proposal, it would
be useful for the appropriate committee to
consider whether it could be harmonised with
the German proposal for a European research
institute to study security policy. Perhaps the
Assembly could propose some means of com-
bining them.
61. For the future activities of the Commit-
tee for Relations with Parliaments, the impor-
tance of making European public opinion
aware of European security problems means
the committee being given appropriate powers
for fulfilling its new tasks in the context of the
revival of WEU. An outward sign might be
to change its name to " Committee for Rela-
tions with Parliaments and the Public" and
make it officially responsible for submitting
appropriate proposals for drawing the atten-
tion of public and press in member countries
to the work of the Assembly.
62. For it to be able to carry out its new
duties, the Committee for Relations with Par-
liaments must always be kept immediately
and fully informed of developments in
WEU. One member therefore underlined thatit would be desirable for the Chairman of
this committee to be a perrnanent member of the
Committee for Relations with the Council set up
by the Presidential Committee on l9th February
1985 to maintain regular contacts with the
Council.
63. Finally, it must be borne in mind that in
the context of a possible enlargement of WEU
and in view of the need to inform parliaments
and public 
- 
in non-member countries too 
- 
of
the work of the Assembly, the committee should
be authorised to organise information meetings
in other European countries and elsewhere in the
world, possibly in conjunction with other WEU
Assembly committees.
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l. Foreign and Defence Ministers of the
Western European Union met in Bonn on 22nd
and 23rd April 1985.
2. The Ministers recalled the importance
of the decisions taken at their extraordinary
meeting in Rome in October 1984 to permit
better use to be made of the framework and
institutions of WEU and harmonise their views
on the specific conditions of security in Europe.
They reaffirmed their determination to streng-
then their solidarity and that which links them
with their allies of the Atlantic Alliance,
which remains the only body for implementing
common defence and the expression of the
fundamental bond between the security of
Europe and that of North America.
3. Reviewing questions relating to security in
Europe, the Ministers noted that their countries
are confronted with a continuing quantitative
and qualitative development of Soviet military
forces which cannot be justified solely by
security interests. They emphasised the indis-
pensable nature of deterrence based on credible
nuclear and conventional forces. The Ministers
reaffrrmed the determination of each of their
countries to pursue the efforts necessary,
whether nationally or within the integrated
military structure of the Atlantic Alliance, to
strengthen their joint security.
4. In this context, the Ministers underlined
the substantial defence effort of the European
countries of the alliance. Their contribution in
this respect, whatever form it may take, is funda-
mental to the strength of the alliance as a whole,
and to the defence ofEuropean interests. They
recalled the contribution that WEU can make in
particular to achieve wider consensus among
public opinion on these questions.
5. On the question of East-West relations,
the Ministers welcomed the resumption of the
United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva 
- 
an
important event for the security of the Atlantic
Alliance in general and for that of Europe in
particular. They reaffirmed their firm support
for, and their confidence in, their American ally
in its efforts to achieve a more stable strategic
relationship at the lowest possible balanced level
of forces and called on the Soviet Union to
display a positive attitude.
6. The Ministers expressed the hope that the
negotiations between the United States and the
Soviet Union will make possible radical reduc-
24th April 1985
tions in their strategic and medium-range
nuclear armaments and agrcements aimed at
ending the arms race on earth and preventing-an
arrns race in space. They underlined in this
regard the importance which they attach to
respect for existing treaty obligations.
7. The Ministers also examined questions
associated with research efforts concerning stra-
tegic defence. They agreed to continue their
collective consideration in order to achieve as
far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their
governments to the invitation of the United
States to participate in the research programme
and instructed the pennanqnt Council accor-
dingly. In this context they underlined the
importance of the continuing bilateral consulta-
tions with their partners in the Atlantic Alliance
as an essential element of allied cohesion.
8. The Ministers reaflirmed their countries'
determination to continue to work for better
East-West relations on a realistic and long-term
basis, and for the full realisation of the CSCE
commitments established at Helsinki and
Madrid. They also recalled the multilateral
negotiations in the field of confidence-building
measures and conventional disarmament and
underscored the significance of these negotia-
tions for Europe. The Ministers reaflirmed
their determination to continue contributing
towards progress in the negotiations on a
comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical
weapons being conducted at the Geneva Confe-
rence on Disarmament.
9. The Ministers also held a detailed
exchange of views on questions relating to
afinaments co-operation and research and
agreed that closer co-operation and the harmoni-
sation of their efforts are fundamental in
maintaining in the longer terrn a competitive
and advanced defence industrial base in Europe
and in achieving a more cost-effective defence.
The Ministers instructed the Permanent Council
to present proposals in time for the next meeting
to help provide the necessary political impetus
for, and practical contributions to, the various
efforts undertaken in this field, including those
carried out by bodies such as the IEPG and the
CNAD.
10. Noting the increasing importance of tech-
nology, the Ministers also afErmed the member
states' determination to take the necessary
measures within the European Communities to
CommuniquA issued at the close of the ministerial meeting
of the Council of Western European Union
Boan, 22ad-2 ird April 1985
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strengthen Europe's own technological capacity
and thus achieve the creation ofa technological
community.
11. As regards the reorganisation of WEU
institutions, the principle of which was agreed at
the Ministerial Council in Rome, the Ministers
decided that the Agency for the Control of
Armaments, the international secretariat of the
Standing Armaments Committee, and the Stand-
ing Armaments Committee would be compre-
hensively reorganised. They agreed to establish
the following new structures under the collective
title " Agencies for Security Questions " :
- an agency for the study of arms control
and disarmament questions ;
- 
an agency for the study of security and
defence questions; and
- 
an agency for the develoPment of
co-operation in the field of armaments.
The Ministers endorsed the recommendations of
the Permanent Council on this subject. They
requested the Permanent Council to implement
rapidly their decisions and to submit to the next
meeting of the Council of Ministers a report on
the progtress achieved by then and on the new
tasks attributed to these agencies.
12. The Ministers also considered suggestions
made by the Secretary-General on the streng-
thening of the WEU Secretariat-General in
London. They also discussed ways and means
of improving WEU's public relations activities.
The Ministers underlined the important r6le of
the WEU Assembly and paid tribute to its active
contribution to the revitalisation of WEU.
13. The Ministers recalled the importance
which they attach to their non-member allies
being informed as fully as possible of their work.
In this context, they considered that the special
interest expressed by certain states is an appre-
ciable encouragement to the efforts which they
have undertaken within WEU.
14. The Ministers decided to appoint Mr.
Alfred Cahen as the new Secretary-General of
WEU. They expressed their warm appreciation
for the services rendered by the retiring Secre-
tary-General, Mr. Edouard Longerstaey.
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The new outlookfor WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual rcport of the Council
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the General Alfairs Committed
by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur
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on the new outlook for WEU 
- 
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council
Explexarony Mrr"ron a.r.roulra
submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Activation of the Council
III. Relations between the Council and the Assembly
IV. The WEU ministerial organs
V. Contacts with non-member states
VI. The seat of WEU
VII. The thirtieth annual report of the Council and the reply to Recommenda-
tion 416
VIII. Conclusions
l. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with I abstention.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werf (Yie-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic
Bennett (Alternate: Atkinson), Il.{M. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger (Alternate: Hengel), Hill, Johnston, Mrs. Kelly (Alternate:
Horacek), MM. Koehl, Lagneau, Lagorce, Martino, Masciadri, Mrtller,Frorost, Lord Reay,MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf,, van
der Sanden, Spitella (Ntemate: Amadei), Vecchietl1, de Vries.
N.B. Ifte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
103
DOCI.IMENI IO12
Draft Recommendation
oa the ncw outloo*lor WEA -
reply to the thifiicrh annual report ofthe Coancil
The Assembly,
(t) Taking cognisance of the thirtieth annual report of the Council, the Rome Declaration of
27th October 1984 and the Bonn communiqu6 of 23rd April 1985 ;(it) Noting that the information the Council has thus given to the Assembly regarding its activities is
incomplete and inadequate ;(iiil Noting that the activities organised by the presidency of the Council have been developed signifi-
cantly, that the treaty makes it incumbent on the Council to inform the Assembly but that present pro-
cedure is inadequate;
(iv) Underlining that the Assembly's activities make a major contribution to the cohesion of the
European peoples for theirjoint security and therefore help to deter destabilising operations against the
western defence system ;(v) Recalling that the Assembly can play the r6le assigned to it in the Rome Declaration only if it has
precise information and satisfactory co-operation from the Council, the material means it needs for its
work and if it remains totally independent from the Council, particularly when involving public
opinion;
(vil Welcoming the initiative taken by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments for making the
consequences of the reactivation of WEU better known in the parliaments of member countries ;
(vir) Recalling that only the national delegations are in a position to give this work the necessary
continuity;
(viii) Welcoming the fact that the Council for its part has decided to inform the public about its activi-
ties but recalling that the Assembly alone is responsible for information about its own work ;(ix) Welcoming the endeavours to reactivate WEU because they promise to provide a forum for
European countries to discuss among themselves matters affecting their own security and defence ;(x) Welcoming the decisions taken by the Council to support the efforts of the United States to reach
agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of armaments, to pursue its own efforts to give the
United States a co-ordinated answer from the seven governments on the strategic defence initiative and
to stress the importance it attaches to respect for commitments set out in the treaties in force ;
(xil Recalling that Portugal's application for membership of WEU is in complete conformity with thejoint interest of the Western European countries and the guidelines decided by WEU in the Rome
Declaration,
Rrcouurxos rHrtr rHe CoLINCTL
l. Continue its work until it obtains a collective answer from the seven governments to the Ameri-
can invitation to take part in the United States research programme relating to the strategic defence
initiative;
2. Ensure the full participation of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council throughout the parliamen-
tary debate on the Assembly's reply to the annual report of the Council so that he may, in particular,
make known his opinion on the report of the General Affairs Committee examined by the Assembly;
3. Submit to the Assembly a report by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on the activities of the
presidency at the same time as the report on the organisation adopted by the Permanent Council ;
4. Ensure that the Assembly is effectively informed of all joint activities by the Seven, including
meetings of Ministers of Defence and meetings organised by the presidency of the Council ;
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5. Inform the public and press about its own activities ;
6. Define without delay the attributions of the three agencies which it has decided to set up, particu-larly so as to allow the Assembly to act accordingly ;
7. Take a favourable decision as soon as possible on Portugal's application for membership of WEUin application of Article XI of the modified Erussels Treaty.
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Draft Order
rep ty t o,tr :##;r";:Yi 2;#',f a c o u nc i t
The Assembly,
Anxious to show its support for Portugal's application for membership of WEU,
INsrnugrs ns Pnrspexr
l. To invite the Portuguese Parliament to send its delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe to the Assembly of WEU as observers ;
2. To have this delegation attend all plenary sessions ;
3. To invite this delegation to send observers to meetings of the Committee on Defence Queslions
and Armaments, the Geieral Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and
Aerospace Questions.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapponeur)
L Introduction
l. The annual report ofthe Council for 1984
reached the Offrce of the Clerk of the Assembly
on lst March 1985. However, before finalising
his report, your Rapporteur preferred to awaii
the results of the WEU Council's ministerial
meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985
since he wished to be able to assess the action
taken so far on the decisions reached bythe ministers and included in the RomL
Declaration.
2. Generally speaking, your Rapporteur
thinks it of great importance for WEU to pay
due attention to the European dimension of bui
security, without weakening the political solida-
rity of the Atlantic Alliance. This would help to
make the general defence policy of the WEU
member countries more widely accepted by
public opinion. But your Rapporteur wishes t6
underline once more that he considers western
security to be indivisible. He welcomes the fact
that the Rome Declaration and the Bonn
communiqu6 concord with this opinion, and any
anxiety he may have about the action taken, or
above all, not taken by the Council, is about the
implementation of the principles defined in
Rome rather than the aims the governments
intend to attribute to WEU.
II. Activation of the Council
3. According to the Rome Declaration, acti-
vation of the Council is " a central element in
the efforts to make greater use of Western Euro-
pean lJnion ". For this purpose, it includes five
decisions :
(i) To hold two ministerial meetings
each year. The meeting of ministers
in Bonn on22nd, and 23rd April 1985
conforms to this decision. Accord-
ing to the Rome decisions, the Minis-
ters of Defence took part together
with the Ministers for Foreign
Affairs. However, the communique
gives no clear indication of the r6le
the Ministers of Defence played at
this meeting.
out the thirty years' existence of the
treaty until the meeting held in Romein October 1984. The modified
Brussels Treaty itself establishes a
direct link between individual and
collective defence and Protocol
No. II relates entirely to the forces
of WEU. While acknowledging that
the aim of peace should be achieved
by political means and not by the use
of force, WEU wor,rld have no mean-ing without the determination of
member countries to defend them-
selves, if necessary, by all the military
means at their disposal. Your Rap-
porteur does not deny that important
military questions have been or will
be discussed at mirristerial meetings,
so he cannot see why meetings like
the one in Rome should be exceptio-
nal. However, active participation
by Ministers of Defence in the WEU
Council means keeping the Assembly
informed of the specific activities of
the Ministers of Defence and the
representatives of their ministries in
WEU.
(ii) To give the presidency of the Council
to each member state for a one-year
term. In fact, the German presi-
dency has been prolonged until June
1985 so as to last ayear. Moreover,
when addressing the Assembly on
6th December 1984, Mr. Genscher
announced that he intended to invite
disarmament experts of member
governments to a meeting in Bonn to
examine the possible repercussionsfor European security of current
negotiations on the limitation of
armaments. This meeting was held
on I lth February under the chair-
manship of a German civil servant.
As far as your Rapporteur knows, the
Secretary-General and the Agency for
the Control of Arnraments did not
take part.
This meeting was an innovation in
several respects. It was the first time
such an initiative had been taken in
exactly to what the Assembly wished
the Council to do. However, the fact
that the meeting wa$ organised by the
country holding the presidency of the
Council of Ministers and with a
Your Rapporteur wishes to stress the
fact that the Ministers of Defence of
the WEU member countries had
never met in this framework through-
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representative of that country in the
chair makes one wonder about the
respective r6les the Council intends
its presidency and Secretariat-General
to -have. It is quite Possible for
WEU tb adopt a form of organisation
more closely linked with its presi-
dency, thus facilitating certain initia-
tives such as that of Mr. Genscher.
But this would raise the question of
the r6le of the Secretariat-General,
the continuity of action not emanat-
ing from the Permanent Council and
the way in which the AssemblY would
be informed of the results of such
talks. This can but grve greater
weight to Order 58 adoPted bY the
Assembly on 5th December 1984 on
a report submitted by Lord ReaY on
behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee calling for the creation of an
Assembly body specialising in rela-
tions with the Council of Ministers.
In any event, no information has
been communicated to the AssemblY
about the meeting on l lth February
since it v/as announced by Mr. Gen-
scher. All your Rapporteur has been
able to learn about it has come from
rumours which could not be confirm'
ed at the meeting between certain
members of the AssemblY and the
Council at the close of the ministerial
meeting in Bonn on 23rd APril.
According to one of these rumours,
little time was devoted to questions
raised by current or future negotia-
tions on the limitation of armaments
and disarmament but the oflicials
meeting in Bonn concentrated on
matters relating to the structure of
WEU. If these rumours are confir-
med, they would make one wonder
about two passages in the annual
report.
(a) ln Part One, ChaPter I.A, the
report quotes the following passage
from Mr. Genscher's address to the
Assembly on 29th October 1984:
" Changes in the balance between
East and West directlY affect Eu-
rope. Europe's specific securitY
situation calls for a specifically
European contribution to the dia-
logue between East and West.
The states of Western EuroPean
IJnion, together with the other
European members of NATO,
make a substantial contribution
to defence within the Atlantic
Alliance. We are prePared to
accept the resPonsibilitY this
entails. But we also want to be
heard. Europe's voice will be
duly heard in the transatlantic dia-
logue if the Seven adopt a common
stance. WEU is the aPProPriate
forum for the alignment of their
positions on security issues. "
Does the de facto renunciation of an
exchange of views on disarmament
and the control of armaments at the
Bonn meeting on I lth February
conform to this declaration ? Does
it conform to Part One, ChaPter B.l,
in which the Council recalls " the
need to put across the European posi-
tion on security and defence in an
appropriate and more effective way
in-the United States"? Or does it
consider that matters relating to
disarmament do not concern security
and defence ?
In this connection, according to
Atlantic News of 19th APril 1985,
Mr. Burt, United States Under-
Secretary ofstate, is reported to have
said at a press conference on 17th
April that he had sent a letter to the
members of WEU asking them not to
take separate decisions on arrns
control policy since such decisions
should be taken by NATO' This
point ofview cannot be gainsaid,!!!
ihe question is how far the WEU
Council is prepared to examine such
matters in preparation for Euro-
American discussions in the NATO
framework. Mr. Burt seems to have
accepted this interpretation since he
emphasised that his country backed
efforts at EuroPean level to co-
ordinate security policy in WEU in
order to strengthen the Atlantic link.
(b) Part Two of the annual repo{,t
says that " the Permanent Council
was instructed to prepare reports...
for submission to the ministers at
their next meeting ", i.e. on 22nd
April 1985, with a view to making
proposals on a number of Points
ielating to the structure of WEU.
How does the Council see the rela-
tionship between the Permanent
Council and intergovernmental mee-
tings such as the one on llth Feb-
ruary ? Are these two Parallel Proce-
dures ? How are theY connected ?
(iii) To intensiff the work of the Perma-
nent Council. As far as your RaP-
porteur knows, the only sign as yet is
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to be found in the actiyities of the
working group on the reactivation of
WEU. So far, the Permanent Coun-
cil has taken only one step to " dis-
cuss in greater detail the views
expressed by the ministers " or " to
follow up their decisions " apart from
what concerns WEU itself : it raised
" certain aspects of the Mediterra-
nean situation which lack of time pre-
vented the ministers from discussing
in Paris ".
(iv) To adapt the Secretariat-General to
the enhanced activities of the Coun-
cil. The Assembly has indicated
several times that it considered the
best way to adapt it to this r6le would
be to appoint a political personality to
theSecretariat-General. TheCouncil
had to take a decision in this connec-
tion since the present Secretary-
General had reached retiring age and
would soon be leaving. This could
have provided an opportunity for the
Council to show that it really intend-
ed to give the Secretariat-General the
means of exercising the new duties
which the Council says it should have.
In several countries, there have been
press reports that steps were being
taken in this connection, and that
consideration had been given to the
candidature of a former minister of
defence from a member country.
But this was not to be so and finally
the appointment of Mr. Alfred Cahen,
a Yery senior Belgian diplomat, was
announced in the Council's commu-
niqu6 of 23rd April. The Assembly
must be told why the Council dismiss-
ed its yiews on the need, in the inter-
ests of the true reactivation of WEU,to appoint a politician Secretary-
General. It is entitled to wonder
whether, in view of the need confirm-
ed in the Rome Declaration and the
annual report of the Council to give
" political impetus " to certain WEU
activities, the Council's refusal to
appoint a politician to this post, as the
governments have done in the case of
a number of international organisa-
tions, is not in fact tantamount to
renouncing the wish to make WEU
really active.
However, it has obtained some encou-
raging explanations in this connection
and welcomes the initiative taken by
Mr. Cahen before taking up his duties
when he described in a long article in
the French newspaper Le Monde of
24th April 1985 how he intended to
exercise these dutios. Such action is
unusual in WEU, thus showing that
the new Secretary-General intends to
give real impetus to WEU.
(v) To examine a new structure for the
Secretariat-General. Your Rappor-
teur has no information about action
taken on this decision, and the annual
report contains little. Nevertheless,
assigning duties to it which relate
more closely to defence policy and
disarmament would mean the Secre-
tariat-General recruiting offrcials with
experience in such matters.
III. Relations between the Council
and the Assemhly
4. Contrary to what is said in this connectionin the Rome Declaration, Article IX of the
modified Brussels Treaty setting up the WEU
Assembly does not limit the reports which the
Council 
- 
and the treaty does not stipulate that
they should be submitted only by the Council of
Ministers as stated in the Rome Declaration 
-
has to submit to the Assembly to " matters
concerning the security and defence of the mem-
ber states " but says they shall concern " in parti-
cular... the control of armaments ". In view
of the now very limited amount of control work
carried out, the latter indication, which is in no
way limitative, now has little significance.
However, because of the very wide responsibili-
ties the treaty accords to WEU, the Assembly
has always considered that they cover many
matters well outside the defonce and security
area and the Council has fully accepted this, par-
ticularly by agreeing to answer Assembly recom-
mendations on matters for which the organisa-
tion is responsible even if they are actually
handled in another framework. Your Rappor-
teur notes with pleasure that in his article in Le
Monde the new Secretary-General specifically
pays tribute to the r6le played by the Assembly
in not sharing the Council's somnolence and
taking initiatives which largely prompted the
reactivation of WEU.
5. This being so, your Rapporteur wonders
why the Assembly should continue to work on
reports on subjects extending well outside the
defence and security areas. The direct political
influence of the Assembly wor.rrld be enhanced if
it produced less recommendations and otherwise
worked harder to reactivate WEU as an organi-
sation oriented towards defence policy.
6. Apart from this reservatiron, the Assembly
can but take due note of the fact that the minis-
ters wish it to play " an incieasing r6le ". It
also takes account of the fact that Part One,
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Chapter I.B, indicates that " the Council
pointed out that the Assembly should play ?
vital r6le in putting across to the European and
American puUtic the scale and effectiveness of
both the European defence effort and transatlan-
tic co-operation ". But it goes without saying
that the Council cannot anticipate the course the
Assembly will follow and that * associating
public opinion in the member states with the
policy statements of the Council, which expres-
ies the political will of the individual govern-
ments " also means accepting the fact that the
Council must take account of guidelines defined
by the Assembly which represents this public
opinion vis-i-vis the governments. There can
be no question of trying to turn the Assembly
into a sound box for the Council which, more-
over, does not keep it properly informed of its
own work.
7. The most important factors are found in
the proposals adopted by the Council. In this
connection, the great novelty in the Rome
Declaration is the place attributed to the presi-
dency in replies to recommendations and ques-
tions, possible meetings with committees, kee,p-
ing thb Assembly informed or arranging for
representatives of the presidency to take part in
committee meetings. These are entirely new
procedures since hitherto it has been the Secreta-
riat-General that has served as an intermediary
between the Council and the Assembly and in
most cases the Permanent Council has been the
Assembly's interlocutor. This was one of the
reasons why the Assembly, dissatisfied with its
exchanges with the Council, had said several
times that it wished a politician able to assume
responsibilities in the dialogue with the Assem-
bly to be appointed Secretary-General.
8. The Council proposes another solution by
giving the presidency a decisive rdle in this dia-
logue. The Assembly can but note this decision
with satisfaction and, in Order 58, it has made
arrangements which allow it to maintain the
necesiary contact with the Council during the
reorganisation of the institution. On l9th
February, the Presidential Committee of the
Assembly set up a Committee for Liaison with
the Council, consisting of the members of the
Bureau of the Assembly and representatives of
political groups not represented in the Bureau.
It is this group, accompanied by the Rappor-
teurs of the Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee
and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and
Administration, that met the Council in Bonn at
the close of its meeting on 23rd April 1985.
9. What the dialogue with the presidency will
produce in practice remains to be seen. But it
must already be noted that since the Council
decided to hold its spring 1985 ministerial
meeting on 22nd and 23rd April, i.e. during the
session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe which all members of the
WEU Assembly are, under the treaty, to attend,
contacts between the Council and Assembly
bodies would this time have been reduced to a
minimum if the authorities of the Federal
Republic of Germany had not arranged for the
parliamentarians concerned to be transported
rapidly from Strasbourg to Bonn and back.
Moreover, the Council cannot be unaware that
the development of its dialogue with the Assem-
bly, like that of " a dialogue between the Assem-
bly and other parliaments or parliamentary insti-
tutions " which it advocates, will have budgetary
repercussions which in fact it is not authorising
the Assembly to meet. In 1984, the Assembly
had to give up some of its activities in order to
cover the additional expenditure involved in its
dialogue with the Council. In 1985, it is being
forced to take even more drastic steps to reduce
its activities.
10. Logically speaking, it is diflicult to see
why the Permanent Council should henceforth
be responsible for submitting an annual report
on the activities of the Council when the presi-
dency will be responsible for relations between
the Council and the Assembly and for the opera-
tion of WEU. Since the presidency is hence-
forth to rotate on an annual basis, would it not
be desirable for each Chairman to report to the
Assembly on his year in oflice at the end of this
period ? Two reports should then be presented to
ihe Assembly, one mainly administrative like
the one already prepared by the Permanent
Council on the activities of the Permanent
Council and its dependent organs, the other
more political prepared under the responsibility
of the Chairman-in-Office who, unable to shelter
behind a possible absence of effective consulta-
tions, should be able to speak on behalf of the
Council as a whole. This would moreover
conform fully to Article IX of the modified
Brussels Treaty, which provides for the Council
to sumbit an annual report to the Assembly.
The emphasis laid by the Rome Declaration on
the r6le which should be played by the presi-
dency is contrary neither to the treaty nor to
current procedure and the Permanent Council
has only a subsidiary r6le compared with the
Council composed of ministers. A report by
the presidency would be a partial remedy for the
disadvantages inherent in the Council's refusal
to appoint a politician as Secretary-General.
11. The Rome Declaration gives the Assem-
bly a number of pointers of which it must take
account, particularly in regard to the direction in
which the governments intend WEU as a whole
to move and also the relationship they wish to
be developed between the Assembly and the
European Parliament. The Assembly should
concentrate its activities on matters relating to
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every aspect ofsecurity policy and the defence of
Europe. But this means that the Council too
must adapt itself to this change, inter alia by
developing more intensive direct contacts with
the Assembly, especially on these matters. In
this connection, more frequent participation by
ministers of defence in Assembly sessions and
their inclusion in the dialogue between the
committees and the Council would be both posi-
tive and necessary since, as the Assembly has
continually claimed, there cannot be active par-
liamentarianism or interest by the press and the
public in the work of a parliamentary assembly
if the latter has no true dialogue with the execu-
tive. While in autumn 1984 this dialogue
seemed to be starting in connection with the
reactivation of WEU, it is to be feared that since
the Rome Declaration the Council has stopped
listening to the Assembly and the thirtieth
annual report of the Council gives little indica-
tion of a real desire for dialogue. This appliesin particular to the r6le which the Council
wishes the Assembly to play in accordance with
the account given in the annual report of the
reply to Recommendation 396 when, after des-
cribing the growing part played by Western
Europe in its own security in the framework of
NATO, it adds:
" The Council pointed out that the Assem-
bly should play a vital r6le in putting
across to the European and American
public the scale and effectiveness of both
the European defence effort and trans-
atlantic co-operation. The North Atlantic
Assembly, for its part, could contribute to
this work of explanation and presen-
tation. "
12. It is clear that the Assembly cannot play
this r6le unless the Council does so too. But
the Council should not consider the Assembly as
a sound box designed to echo governmental
schemes which the Council has neither the cou-
rage nor the authority to make known itself.
While the Assembly may play a constructive
rdle, particularly when the purpose is to give
political impetus to an undertaking for which it
obtains a majority which decides it to act, as in
the case of the colloquies it organises insofar as
the Council allows it the necessary material
means, its r6le with regard to the Council is one
of criticism rather than of execution. It must be
careful to remain entirely independent of the
Council and can but express its astonishment
when the Council tries to give it such directives.
13. The Assembly welcomes the Permanent
Council's intention to provide itself with the
wherewithal to publicise its work. It will also
be happy that the future Secretary-General has
told the press about his views on his r6le,
asserting in particular that he will have to make
sure that the movement which has just been
launched does not slow down, set up the neces-
sary structures for this purpose and guide them
in the desired direction. This should imply the
creation of a Council information and press
service. By saying that his task is undoubtedly
above all to be the loyal servant of member
states and their Council, the future Secretary-
General makes his r6le perfectly clear and
demonstrates that there is no question of he
himself or the services dependent upon him
being confused with those serving the Assembly.
14. Finally, the Assembly pays tribute to the
departing Secretary-General, Ambassador Lon-
gerstaey, who had the diflicult task of presiding
over the Permanent Council at a time when the
governments were most undocided about using
WEU. The Assembly has often been irritated
by this attitude of member countries but has
always had understanding contacts with the
Secretary-General. In spite of the differences
between the Council and the Assembly, it
records that relations between the two WEU
organs improved considerably during his term of
office.
IY. The WEU ministerial organs
15. The Rome Declaration was not very expli-
cit about what the Council intends to do with
the Agency for the Control of Armaments and
the Standing Armaments Committee and its
international secretariat. The Permanent
Council was instructed to prepare an overall
reorganisation programme with the assistance of
the two secretariats for submission at the minis-
terial meeting in Bonn. Your Rapporteur has
learned that the two organs were asked to give
the Council their views on the matter at the
beginning of 1985 and that they have effectively
done so.
16. With regard to the SAC and its internatio-
nal secretariat, relatively clear indications were
given in the Rome Declaration following the
lines of its past work and thus involving nd fun-
damental change of course. It had already been
decided before the Rome meeting that it should
continue its work on updating a WEU agreement
on trials methods for military vehicles as
requested by NATO, updating its study on Euro-
pean armaments industries, conducting the
study which the Council had asked it to make on
the problems for European industries arising
from the development of miliUry production in
Japan and, with the agreemertt of the Council,
having members of the international secretariat
assist the Assembly in some of its work. At the
Rome meeting, the work of the SAC was not
questioned and it was even deoided to expand it,
if we are to believe Mr. Genscher's address on
29th October, quoted in the annual report:
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" The ministers spent some time discus-
sing ways of improving armaments co-
operation within WEU. They took the
view that the development of today's
advanced technologies imposes a fresh
and extremely costly burden on the arma-
ments industries of all the member states.
The Europeans must accept this techno-
logical challenge together, or they will lag
behind in international competition.
They must therefore pool their resour-
ces and co-operate more closely in the
armaments sector.
WEU will provide the necessary political
impetus. It is also the appropriate body
for the co-ordination ofEuropean interests
in the spheres of defence technology and
associated basic research. "
17. The question raised by this declaration of
principle is merely from which WEU oryan this
" political impetus " will come: from the Coun-
cil of Ministers, perhaps, thanks to the presence,
at least once a yea\ of the ministers of
defence. Your Rapporteur has every reason to
fear that neither the Permanent Council nor the
members of the SAC can be relied on for this
and the Council has just shown that it was no
more anxious for the Secretary-General, and
hence the WEU offrcials under him, to be empo-
wered to inject political impetus, whereas * the
co-ordination of European interests in the sphe-
res of defence technology and associated basic
research " is clearly within the terms of reference
of the SAC. However, its secretariat should be
adapted to this requirement, particularly where
basic research is concerned.
18. According to the Bonn communiqud, the
WEU technical organs will be reorganised as
three " agencies for security questions ", includ-
ing " an agency for the development of co-
operation in the field of armaments " which will
clearly take over from the present SAC. How-
ever, little idea is given of its duties or, above all,
of the part to be played by the SAC proper,
which groups representatives of national arma-
ments directors, alongside the international
secretariat of the SAC, which depends on the
WEU Secretariat-General.
19. Half of the Agency's duties came to an end
on lst January 1985, with the prospect of the
other half being taken away at the beginning of
1986, apart from the verification of A, B and C
weapons, which the annual report shows to be
very limited. The Rome Declaration is not
very precise about how the governments intend
to use this body for studying disarmament, the
limitation of armaments, security and defence
matters. The Bonn communiqu6 announces
the establishment of " an agency for the study of
arms control and disarmament questions " and
" an agency for the study ofsecurity and defence
questions ", but gives no idea of how these
bodies are to operate.
20. Your Rapporteur merely wishes to set out
here a few of the questions which seem to be
raised by the Rome Declaration and to which
the Council should give a clear answer before the
WEU technical organs can be asked to plan their
future activities :
O Is continuation of the traditional work of
supervising A, B and C weapons compatible
with using the Agency for other tasks which
would make it subordinate to the Council or
even to the Assembly ? The conditions of inde-
pendence and secrecy implied by the former
obviously do not apply to the latter.
(iil A complete overhaul of WEU structures is
therefore essential, but it is hard to see why the
Council began by defining organs before grving
any real idea of what they are intended to do,
particularly in the case of the new agency for the
study of defence questions. Nor is it very clear
what the Council means by arms * control ":
does it mean the remaining controls within
WEU or the limitation of armaments in the
sense now accepted for the negotiations and
agreements between the United States and the
Soviet Union ?
(iiil The ministers speciff that these organs
will be required to work for the Assembly as well
as for the Council. How this can be done
remains to be defined. One possibility is for
the Council, at the request of the Assembly, to
ask the ministerial organs to finalise studies
which it would examine before transmitting
them to the Assembly in a declassified form.
This was done for the SAC's study on European
armaments industries. It is a logical procedure
which respects the governmental nature of the
ministerial organs but has the disadvantage of
being slow and cumbersome. A second possibi-
lity is to instruct a member of the international
secretariat of the SAC to assist the Oflice of the
Clerk of the Assembly in the preparation of
reports. A disadvantage here is to create confu-
sion of responsibilities and powers within the
oryanisation. For instance, in connection with
the preparation of a report, the Council recently
insisted that the Assembly pay the expenses of
members of the international secretariat of the
SAC travelling on its behalf, which was not
unreasonable, but it means limiting, for budge-
tary reasons, the assistance which the Assembly
may request. Without being radically opposed
to such procedure, your Rapporteur notes that it
can be used in only a few very specific cases.(iv) The Permanent Council has been instruct-
ed * to propose a precise organisation table
which will make it possible to define and give a
breakdown of the posts required for carrying out
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the three functions " assigned to the ministerial
organs (disarmament, security and defence
matters, co-operation in armaments) while
remaining * within the present limits in terms of
staff and the organisation's budget ". This is
obviously a very wise measure but means that
one needs to know exactly what is meant by
"present limits". Since 1982, certain vacant
posts have not been filled, the purpose being to
retain grcater flexibility for the expected reorga-
nisation. Is it to be considered that the limlts
set for the Council are the staff and, consequen-
fly, the WEU budget prior to these provisional
measures or that the ministers consider the
number of staff of the organisation in October
1984 to be a maximum not to be exceeded?
Here too it is difficult to express a wish until
there is more information about the tasks really
attributed to the ministerial organs.
21. It is in regard to the definition of the r6le
and structure of the WEU ministerial organs
that the Council seems to be finding the greatest
difficulty in taking decisions. The RomeDecla-
ration was not very explicit on this point, the
annual report goes no further and the Bonn com-
munique gives the titles of three agencies but no
details of their r6le or how they are to operate.
The impression is that, after referring to the
course to be followed in a European security
policy in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance,
the Council is in fact refusing to say how to act
in order to implement such a policy. It seems
to be haunted by structures inherited from a past
which it wished to abolish, particularly that of
the Agency for the Control of Armaments. At
the same time it is unable to translate what was
outlined in Rome into a policy and cannot
remodel its dependent institutions. If confir-
med, the failure of the meeting in Bonn on I lth
February would be most disturbing.
22. The Assembly has on several occasions
made recommendations intended to strengthen
the political r6le of the Council, as shown in the
collection of documents published by Mr. Mas-
ciadri, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Com-
mittee, in December 1984. The Council does
not seem very ready to follow them, but what is
it offering instead ?
Y. Contacts with non-member states
23. The Rome Declaration refers to the
importance of contacts with states of the Atlan-
tic Alliance which are not members of WEU and
once again the presidency is to be responsible.
However, the declaration does not tackle the
question of the possible enlargement of WEU
which has now arisen with Portugal's application
for membership. The Permanent Council has
been asked to examine the answer to be given to
this application and, according to what the
General Affairs Committee learned during its
visit to Lisbon on 7th and 8th March 1985, it
apparently gave the Portuguese Government
a fairly negative answer. The joint answer
announced in the Bonn communiqu6 apparently
postpones the decision. It may seem normal to
postpone an answer until the ministers have
decided on the organisation's new structure, but
it would be equally normal to examine the reor-
ganisation of the institution with the applicant
country. It is difficult to find justification for a
negative answer in view of the resolutely politi-
cal character the Rome Declaration grves
WEU. It was difficult to admit new members
to the system of declaration and control of arma-
ments which existed in the past, but this obstacle
has now been removed.
24. On the Portuguese side, the question is in
no way seen to be one of enlarging WEU to all
the European member countries of the Atlantic
Alliance, but it was obviously from this angle
that the Council tackled the matter. It is evi-
dent that the accession to the modified Brussels
Treaty and its Article V of countries, even if
members of NATO, whose external disputes are
not confined to the threats which the Atlantic
Alliance has to face is rather undesirable, and
here Turkey and Greece come to mind. It is
also clear that accession to WEU must not result
in certain countries being dispensed from remai-
ning in NATO by offering them a sort of alterna-
tive solution, which mlght be the case of Spain
whose continued membership of NATO is to be
the subject of a referendum.
25. But these considerations do not apply in
the case of polrrgal, whose Minister for
Forergn Alfairs, Mr. Jaime Gama, summed up
the reasons for his country's application for
membership in an address to the General Affairs
Committee on 7th March:
* Portugal fully shares the concern of the
WEU member countries about the need to
increase the defence aspects of European
co-operation 
- 
particularly in research,
technology and defence-related industries
- 
and also European solidarity, this being
moreover only one way of underlining the
vitality of the Atlantic Alliance in our
country. There is no reason why Portu-
gal should be refused the right to join
WEU. We therefore rely on your under-
standing, support and even encourage-
ment. We hope your governments will
examine our claims attentively and take a
positive decision in regard to the reorgani-
sation and enlargement of WEU. "
26. Your Rapporteur thinks he is right in
sayrng that the members of the committee pre-
sent in Lisbon expressed a most favourable opi-
nion on this point of view.
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27. It is clear that, insofar as WEU must, as
the Rome Declaration says, form the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, it is logical for it
to aim at grouping all the European member
countries of the alliance when the time comes.
It is also logical that the wish of the ten mem-
ber countries of the European Community to
found a European union should lead them to
seek the accession ofall ofthese ten countries to
the European security organisation. That some
wish enlargement to be accomplished in one go
is probably a rational view but it is to be feared
that, here as elsewhere, to allow the right time to
pass for each of the countries whose candidature
would be acceptable may lead to the indefinite
postponement of an enlargement which there is
no reason to oppose.
28. The resolutely political and non-military
character accorded to WEU by the Rome Decla-
ration, moreover, precludes the idea sometimes
expressed in the past, inter alia by Mr. Cheysson,
then French Minister for External Relations,
that WEU should correspond to NATO's central
zone of deployment to the exclusion of the
northern and southern flanks. This concept,
while valid from a strategic standpoint, is not at
all so politically.
29. For these reasons, your Rapporteur pro-
poses a draft order which clearly informs the
Council and the Portuguese authorities of the
Assembly's attitude towards Portugal's applica-
tion for membership.
YI. The seat oIWEU
30. In December 1984, Mr. Cavaliere tabled
an amendment to the draft recommendation
presented to the Assembly by Mr. Masciadri on
behalf of the General Affairs Committee, under-
lining * the need to have a single seat for all the
WEU organs in the same city in order to facili-
tate the development of the dialogue between
the Council, the Secretariat-General and the
Assembly and to ensure that the WEU technical
organs are able to carry out their duties of
assisting and informing the Council and the
Assembly more efficiently ". This amendment
was negatived.
31. It is clear that Mr. Cavaliere is absolutely
right and it would be both logical and economi-
cal to bring the various parts of WEU together.
There are valid reasons for thinking that this
aspect has not eluded the Council which never-
theless did not feel it had to be mentioned in the
Rome Declaration. The Chairman of the Gene-
ral Affairs Committee received confirmation of
this when he met the Chairman-in-Office of the
Council in 1982. The latter warned him of the
danger of stressing this problem of the seat
which mlCht clash with national interests and
susceptibilities before the fundamental problems
had been settled. While fully sharing the views
expressed by Mr. Cavaliere, your Rapporteur
therefore suggests leaving the question of the
seat to the ministers when the time comes to
take a decision, bearing in mind the interests at
stake, which the Assembly cannot do in its
stead. But he recalls that from both the stand-
point of the proper financial management of
WEU and the smooth running of the organisa-
tion, including the rational use of the ministerial
organs and the development of relations between
the Council and the Assembly, this is an aim
which should not be lost from sight.
Yil. The thir-tieth annual report of the Council
and the reply to Recommendation 416
32. In the thirtieth annual report of the Coun-
cil, some changes have been made to the layout
* in order to highlight, in a separate section, the
future prospects for the organisation ". Your
Rapporteur would have every reason to welcome
this if the future prospects were in fact high-
lighted. Unfortunately, he has to note that
these changes concern only the layout of the
report and in no way its content which, as the
first communication from the Council to the
Assembly since the December 1984 session,
hardly forms an instrument of dialogue between
the two WEU organs but merely a convenient
reminder of what happened in 1984. Reading
such a text can but confirm your Rapporteur's
idea that, in view of the r6le exercised by the
presidency, it should report on the ministerial
activities of WEU in addition to the administra-
tive report communicated by the Permanent
Council.
33. Your Rapporteur has also received the
Council's reply to Recommendation 416 on
WEU, European union and the Atlantic
Alliance, adopted by the Assembly in December
1984, on a report by Mr. Masciadri on behalf of
the General Affairs Committee. He wishes to
thank the Council for having communicated this
reply early enough for the Assembly to be able to
prepare its own reaction in time for a debate at
the May 1985 session. This is in fact an essen-
tial condition for the pursuit of a dialogue bet-
ween the Council and the Assembly, which is
not materially able to examine replies to recom-
mendations when they are received just before
sessions, as is usually the case.
34. Moreover, it is grati&ing that " the Coun-
cil proposes to translate the Rome decisions into
action without delay " and your Rapporteur duly
notes the action referred to by the Council :(il meetings to be held " at ministerial
level" " normally" twice ayear. He
trusts this twofold standard will effec-
tively be respected ;
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(ii) * the necessary arrangements " for
the preparation of ministerial meet-
ings to be made by the Permanent
Council, the views expressed at these
meetings to be discussed in g;reater
detail and their decisions to be
followed up and to this end the
frequency of its meetings to be
increased;
(iii) " the r6le of the presidency as
emphasised in the Rome documents,
the participation of capitals and the
assistance of members of embassies
in London " in pursuit of the aims
of Article VIII of the treaty;
(iv) the Secretariat-General to be adapt-
ed " to take account ofthe enhanced
activities of the Council of Ministers
and the Permanent Council ";
(v) the ministerial organs to be reor-
ganised as they " could be structured
in such a way as to fulfil a threefold
task:
- 
to study questions relating to arms
control and disarmament whilst
carrying out the remaining control
functions;
- to undertake the function of stu-
dying security and defence prob-
lems;
- 
to contribute actively to the deve-
lopment of European armaments
co-operation. "
It should be noted, however, that the
working group set up by the Councilis not studying these matters in
depth, as the reply indicates, but is
dealing only with the reorganisation
of the ministerial organs;
(vi) contacts between the Council and
the Assembly to be improved. The
Assembly for its part has taken the
necessary steps to assist such an
lmprovement;
(vii) holding " comprehensive discus-
sions " and seeking * to harmonise
ministerial rriews on the specific
conditions of security in Europe "
which include anns control and
disarmament;
(viii) confirmation that the ministers areto discuss " current problems in
detail " at their meeting on 22nd and
23rd April 1985 ;
(ix) pohtical impetus to be given to
European co-operation in a[na-
ments, including * the pooling of
technological, eoonomic, industrial
and financial resources " and
" equipment interoperability and
standardisation of procedures ".
These two indioations would give
an excellent idea of the Council's
guiding principles for the activities
of the SAC and its international
secretariat if these injunctions were
in fact given to it, which is not clear
from the text of the Council's reply.
Similarly, the Council does not
speciff how WEU support for the
work of the IEPG and the promo-
tion of balanced co-operation bet-
' ween Europe and the United States
in these matters can be carried out
in the framework of WEU.
35. In short, the reply to Recommendation
416 takes up the Rome Decl4ration in the main
but gives no further information about the
Council's intentions. The most that can be said
is that this reaffrrmation is welcome at a time
when doubt is emerging about its intentions.
36. However, the reply to Recommendation
416, while indicating that the Council considers
the recommendation " as support for its Rome
decisions to reactivate WEU " does not in fact
answer any specific points in the recommenda-
tion, including those asking that :
(a) the Council meet prior to meetings of
the North Atlantic Council;
(b) member countries appoint a perrna-
nent representation to the Council;
(c) the Secretary-General be given new
powers of initiative;
(d) the Council prepare the necessary
measures to allow Europe to play an
active part in disarmament negotia-
tions;
(e) the Council seek the accession to WEU
of the European countries members of
the Atlantic Allianoe * as soon as cir-
cumstances permit ".
37. Your Rapporteur fears that the Council,
while asserting its intention tq pursue the aims it
set itself in Rome, is in fact doing nothing to
attain them. He notes that ih 1984 the Council
was less strict than in the pa$t about answering
Assembly recommendations and written ques-
tions point by point. Its answers were often
vague and imprecise when it did not simply
shirk its obligations by denying them. Thus, in
answer to Written Question 250 put by Mr. Wil-
kinson, who asked whether the passing of a
Soviet attack submarine through the Straits of
Gibraltar under water conformed to the 1958
Geneva Convention, the Council wrote: " It is
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not for the Council to take decisions about the
interpretation and application of the four
Geneva conventions on the law of the sea in
such circumstances ". How can the Council
reconcile this answer with Article VIII, which
makes it responsible in the case of any threat to
international peace ? Does violation of a law not
imply such a threat ? Your Rapporteur for his
part considers that such matters are the very
reason for the Council's existence.
38. Moreover, having had an opportunity to
note that the proposal referred to by Mr. Gen-
scher in his address to the Assembly on
5th December 1984 on establishing" a research
institute for security and defence matters " had
aroused considerable interest in both military
and university circles, your Rapporteur is surpri-
sed that the annual report makes no reference to
the action the Council intends to take on this
proposal. He wished to add a suggestion that
this institute also be made responsible for orga-
nising courses for persons from member coun-
tries exercising various defence responsibilities
so as to promote understanding of the European
dimension of security and defence questions in
all our countries.
YIII. Conclusions
39. While the Rome Declaration certainly
transformed WEU as it was before that date,
your Rapporteur fears the Bonn communiqu6
did not show what the new WEU will be. In
any event, it is a long way from proving
unfounded the fears arising from the thirtieth
annual report of the Council, the reply to
Recommendation 416 and rumours which have
reached his ears about the progress of discus-
sions in the Permanent Council and the
meetings organised by the presidency in recent
months, particularly the meeting of experts on
llth February.
40. In this respect, the way paragraph 7 ofthe
Bonn communiqu6, i.e. the nature of the co-
ordinated reaction to the United States invita-
tion to participate in the strategic defence initia-
tive and the preparation ofa European position
on disarmament in NATO, is applied will throw
light on the true intentions and possibilities of
WEU, which are already limited by the very
understandable decision to handle the civil
aspects of" Eureka " technology in the European
Community.
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Amendment I
21st May 1985
The new outlookfor WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENT 1 
'
tablcd by Mr. Cavaliere
l. In paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, after " collective " insert * and positive ".
Signed: Cavaliere
l. See 5th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (amendment withdrawn).
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Amendment 2
21st May 19t5
The new oatlookfor WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual rcport of the Council
AMENDMENT 2I
tabled by Mr, Bloauw
2. In the draft order, leave out paragraph 3 and insert:
" REquEsrs
The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to consider inviting observers
from this delegation to attend their meetings. "
Signed: Blaauw
l. See 5th sitting 22nd May 1985 (amendment agreed to).
118
Document 1012
Amendments 31 41 51 61 7 and 8
21st May 1985
The new outlookfor WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENTS 3,4,5,6,7 and 8 t
tabled by MM. De Dechcr, Blaauw and lAikinson
3. After paragraph (iit) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new
paragraph:
* (iv/ Noting that the United States invitation to the European states to take part in the research
progmmme relating to the strategic defence initiative is raising many questions in Europe ; ".
4. After paragraph (iiil of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new
paragraph:
" (v,) Stressing that Europe must make every effort to ensure its technological independence
whilst safeguarding its strategic interests; ".
5. After paragraph (iit) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new
paragraph:
" (vl) Stressing that only by collaborating in the research stage of the SDI can Europe influence
this programme whilst ensuring that account is taken of the specifically European aspects and
requirements of its security ; ".
6. After paragraph (iit) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new
paragraph:
" (vir/ Stressing that it is essential for the European states to respond collectively as a political
entity to the American SDI proposals;".
7. After paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph :
" 2. Make every effort to protect Europe's strategic interests while maintaining its technological
independence, in particular by developing a European space defence programme in conjunction
with the SDI;".
8. After paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph :
" 3. In co-operation with the United States Government, study every aspect of the consequences
for Europe's security of the deployment of an SDI system ; ".
Signed: De Decker, Blaauw, Wilkinson
l. See 5th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (amendment 3 agreed to ; amendments 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 negatived).
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Amendment 9
22nd May 1985
The new outloohlor WEA -
reply to the thirtieth annual ruport of the Council
AMENDMENT 9I
tabltd by Mr. Yerdon
9. I*ave out paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :
'7. Consid.t psrtrrgal becoming a member of WEU once the latter has effectively embarked
upon the proc€ss of revitalisation. "
Signed: Verdon
r20
l. See 5th sitting 22nd May 1985 (amendment withdrawn).
Document 1013 3rd May 1985
East-West rebtions ten years after
the Helsinkifinal act
REPORT I
submitted on behalf of the General Alfairs Committed
by Mr. Haose, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DRAIr RecouuruoarroN
on East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act
Expr.ryerony MeuoneNoutr,r
submitted by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Negotiations on the limitation of armaments
m. Economic relations
ry. Political aspects of East-West relations
V. Conclusions
l. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to O with g abstentions.
--2. Members of the committe.e:-Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, varyder Weff(yie-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens (Alternate:Haase), Sk Frederic BenDett (lt!.-p-utg, Atkiitson), uvi. serrier, Boir"o,_p.t"9.ts, Burger (Alternate: Henget), Hill, Johnston,Mrs. Kellv (Alternate: Horacek), \,IM:K.og!I, radiau, raeo.c€, aaiiii,'uifrp,fi, uitii,'*iiio;i Lorii;;y:'rtn i;il;_mann, Rlret, Rumpf, van der Sanden, spitella (N6mate: A-maaiil, ieccniizui, a. vri...
N.B. Ile names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on East-West relttions
ten yean after the Helsinki final act
The AssemblY,
(i) considerine that close co-operation between the American and European members of theKr"nti."lliii;;;ir;il6ir of *.r^t.- European security and the maintenance of peace;
(i, Considering that Western Europe's security means protecting it against local or global attacks ;
(ii, Considering that i4 many cases in Eastern Europe human rights have not been respected and that
this has not facilitated eflorts for peace ;
(iv) Welcoming the meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to reaching
agreements to terminate the armaments race ;
(v) Considering that the development of exchanges between East and West is likely to contribute to
the reduction of tension;
(v0 Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, signed in
Helsinki on lst arg,ii i9?5;fth..sirii"iCtrarter for the reduction of tension in Europe, but that the
il;6G,li Oinrii ii" itli fu. fro. being applied everywhere, particularly where human rights are
concerned;
(vit) considering that the tenrh anniversary o[ the Helsinki final act provides an opportunity toi.fr.* itt.ffectiv-eness as a contribution to peaceful coexistence in Europe ;
(viil Considering that WEU's r6le is to take the necessary steP! to.make]he voice of the European
;ilft 
"1tilariur".. 
h;d;; 
-"iten relating to security, as-specified in the Rome Declaration ;(ix) considering that a dialogue with members of the united states congress is essential for the
ffLr-;i";irit8.riGi"tions oime-bers of the WEU Assembly on matters of this kind'
RrcouusNos rger rne CouNcIL
1. Regularly examine the state of all negotiatiols on disarmament and the limitation of armaments
*itt, u viiw inter alia to achieving through joint action :
(a) agreement with the eastern countries to speciff the implications of the principles set out in
' ' tf,e final act of the Helsinki conference ;
(b) moreconfidence-building measures, particularly throughrhe-p.re*ncg ofobservers at military
-"o..urrr.q in tt i ioot.it of the negbtiations now being held in Stockholm ;
(c) the definition of a joint position on matters discussed U1 ttre-.Unr11{S-tates and the Soviet
Union at ili Cenei" *rr-f.r.n." *itt a view to agreement on the conditions for limiting the
armaments race ;
Z. Make use of the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki conference to obtain confirmation by all the
.ig""t6.v ri"*ii. 
"riiriit oliermi"ation 
io apply effectively all the principles contained in the final act'
particularly those relating to :
(a) resFct for human rights ;
(b) the inviolability of frontiers;
(c) the territorial integrity of states;
(d) non-interference in the internal affairs of another state;
(e) equayty of treatment between nations and their right to selfdetermination ;
fi co-oPration between states ;
G) the establishment of confidence-building measures;
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3. In the appropriate forums, actively promote :
(a) the development of trade between eastern and western countries ;
(b) the adaptatiol--of-Cocom practice and lists to an increase in trade which does notjeopardise the West's security ;
@ \n 3er_:9yent with the United States, the participation of Europe in space research ofa screntrfic nature ;
(d) ?Y^":!::!-between Western and Eastern European countries on improving protection oftne envrronment;
4' On the occasion of the renewal of the W_arsaw Pact, seek agreement between the Atlantic Allianceand WEU countries on the one hand and the Warsaw pait couniries on ttri'ottrerl" oroer to define theprinciple of non-recourse to the threat or use of force u. setoriin the Hefiinki nra 
".t.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(wbmitted by Mr. Haasq Rapporteur)
L Intoduction
1. Three reasons induced the WEU Assem-
bly to pay particular attention this y-ear to East-
Wist retations which, in any event, have been a
central theme of its activities and of those of the
Council ever since WEU has existed:
2. (a) The will to give WEU new and broader
activities, shared by tne seven governments and
e*pressed in the Rome Declaration, directs it
more towards security and defence policy, which
itself is very largely governed by the state of
East-West relations.
3. (b) Ten years ago on lst August, all the
euiopean countries,-including the Soviet Union,
its aillies and the neutral countries' adopted a
final act in conclusion to the conference on
security and co-operation in Europe-held in
Helsiniti which was supposed, for the first time
since the second world war, to organise a
peaceful order in Europe. Many events have
iince aroused fears that this order might again be
disrupted and that the Helsinki final act is
destined to remain an expression of good inten-
tions to no eflect. To mark this anniversary,
the Assembly wished to study the outcome of
this conference ten years later and, through it,
the state of relations between the two blocs.
4. (c) The Warsaw Pact is to expire on 4th June
lgtii and it u/ill most certainly be extended.
The question is whether the text will then be
rene',r-ed as it now stands or whether it will be
changed. This is perhaps the time to exert some
influ6nce in this matter' It might at least be
possible to spark off public debate 
-which mightlalne t"p"tcuisions on both sides. In the case of
the Soviet Union and its allies, which, a priori,
do not seem to be of the same mind about the
wording of the treaty, a proposal might help
some oT these countries, even if not made by a
member of the pact provided it corresponded to
their own intentlons and particularly if it appear-
ed to consolidate peace in Europe. A condition
would be for the West, for its part, to agree to
equivalent wording in the North Atlantic Trealy
arid the modified Brussels Treaty, which would
therefore have be rectified, at least in the
preambles, or completed by a declara4on. I[
bn the other hand, the proposal to draft the
preambles of the three treaties together, or at
ieast to make a joint declaration in this sense,
were to fail, the responsibility of each party
would be evident and western opinion would see
clearly that the Soviet Union is not really pre-
pared to face up to d6tente.
5. It should also be emphasised that the
change at the head of the Soviet Communist
Partf offers some hope ,of a new.basis^for peace
wtriitr the President of the United States has
endorsed. This probably applies more to the
application of the Helsinki final act than to the
dis-armament negotiations, in which both the
Soviet and the United States Governments are
expected to adhere to interests which are un-
likely to change very much. The WEU Assem-
bly witt have io follow very closely any move by
thl Soviet Union towards greater respect for
human rights including liberalisation 9f pena!
law. Anf such move would be revealing and
mean thit respect for human rights in the
context of the- Helsinki final act had made
decisive progress.
6. In the past decade, it might admittedly
have seemed that d6tente was soon to take over
from the arms race and tension in East-West
relations. It could have been thought that such
a trend, thanks to the application of the Helsinki
final act of July 1975, would lead to a libera-
lisation of the Eastern European r6gimes, a
growth in exchanges of all kinds between East
ind West and the restoration of mutual confi-
dence which could but help progress towards
disarmament.
7. Since then, a series ofevents has seriously
ieopardised past gains. The various negotia-
tions on the limitation of armaments were
broken off between 1980 and 1983, or at least
were held in abeyance. The invasion of Aflha-
nistan in December 1979 and then the establish-
ment of a state of emergency in Poland'in l98l
raised doubts about the will of the Soviets to
apply the Helsinki final act. The results of the
iSb'e meetings in Belgrade in 1977'78 and
Madrid in 1983 were disappointing, apart from
the decision taken in Belgrade to open a confe-
rence on disarmament in Europe in Stockholm
in 1984, a meeting on security in the Mediterra-
nean in Venice and two meetings on human
rights in Ottawa in 1985 and Bern in 1986. The
S6viet Union's deployment of SS-20 continen-
tal-range missiles in Eastern Europe, fo,llowe{-b;t
NATO;s twofold decision in December 1979,
Soviet refusal of the zero option proposed by
President Reagan in November l98l and the
rejection by the two great powers-oflhe-compro-
mise proposals made in July 198-2 by Mr. Paul
Nitze-and Mr. Yuri Kvitsinsky following their
'walk in the woods " started off the anns race
again, to which President Reagan was to glve l
new dimension by announcing in March 1983
that he had decided to carry out a far-reaching
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prqgiramme for promoting the use of space for
defending the United States against Soviet
nuclear missiles.
8. In the last months of 1984 there was
admittedly some hope that it would be possible
to make further progress towards d6tente thanks
to the agreement reached by Mr. Shultz and Mr.
Gromyko in Geneva on 7th January 1985 to
reopen negotiations on the limitation of arma-
ments in the coming months. Signs of a return
to a lawful situation in Poland with the end of
the state of emergency and the freeing of most
political- prisoners then gave hope of greater
respect for the Helsinki final act, while contacts
were established between Americans and Soviets
early in January 1985 to pave the way for the
resumption of trade between the two countries.
9. However, the results achieved to date in
these various areas are still too slender and it
may be wondered whether it is not too soon to
speak of an effective return to d6tente. Expe-
rience in the last ten years already allows certain
conclusions to be drawn. First, East-West rela-
tions form a whole and it is impossible to expect
any real progress for instance in any of the
sectors covered by the Helsinki final act if the
nuclear arms race continues. Nor is meaningful
progress possible in the limitation of armaments
without renewed confidence, increased exchan-
ges and respect for certain principles in external
relations and in the internal policies of all sides.
But this does not mean global bargaining is
either possible or desirable. Certain faciors
such as those relating to security and human
rights cannot be called in question to offset
advantages in other areas.
10. However, although generally speaking Eu-
rope and the United States are equally interes-
ted in d6tente it is natural that there should be
differences in their approach to this interest.
For instance, the United States, because of its
worldwide responsibilities, has a global view
of international relations and peace, whereas
Europe tends to have a more regional view of its
se-curity, although it cannot separate the security
of the area from the maintenance of peace
which, to date, has been ensured mainly by reci-
procal deterrence. It is not at all surprising that
Europeans are anxious to take every opportunity
to build up exchanges of all kinds within their
own continent whereas the Americans look
rather for direct agreement with the Soviets on
strategic questions. It is gratiffing that the
seven WEU member countries indicated in the
Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984 that
they considered East-West relations should
remain permanently on the agenda for their
consultations in WEU.
I l. In taking note of this joint decision by the
Seven, the aim ofthe present report is to try to
examine what might be the content and results
of talks in WEU on East-West relations. In
view of the priority all our countries give to joint
security and the close link between security and
disarmament policy your Rapporteur wili first
examine the limitation of armaments before
turning to other questions raised by a policy of
dCtente.
12. But he must first recalll Europe's guide-
lines in this respect :
13. (i) Europe cannot consider subjecting its
security to the risks of a war which would very
probably be nuclear. First and foremost, it
must therefore avert any threat of war. So far,
deterrence, mainly in the form of the American
strategic nuclear force, has been the sole basis for
its security. There are many reasons for think-
ing that it will not be able to enjoy this advan-
tage indefinitely and the European members of
the alliance should now start examining what the
ratio of forces should be between East and West
ifthey are to continue to ensure their security if
the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is called
in question.
14. (i, Nor can Europe separate its defence from
that of the United States which alone is capable
of guaranteeing Europe's security in faCe of
Soviet military strength. It cannot therefore
have a policy towards Eastern Europe which is
not concerted with that of its American allies.
15. (iiil Although there is at present no question
of the reunification of Europe, divided for forty
years by the iron curtain, the Western European
countries cannot ignore the fate of Eastern
Europe and this gives Western Europe a naturalgoal of endeavouring to develop relations
between the two parts of the European conti-
nent.
16. The Rome Declaration on 27th October
1984 not only confirmed WEU's long-standing
r6le of developing relations between Eastern and
Western Europe, it also showed the govern-
ments' determination to give priority to this
course. While, at the outset, controls on the
armaments of member countries were an essen-
tial part of the modified Brusseils Treaty because
they guaranteed mutual assistance among Euro-
pean countries nine years after the end of the
second world war, the main part is now the
security of Europe from every angle. This
admittedly includes defence but also disarma-
ment and all matters covered by the Helsinki
final act. But while, where defence proper is
concerned, NATO is responsible for Europe's
security through the integration of forces of the
European and American members of the alliance
which ensures that Western Europe has an
American guarantee, more truly European cohe-
sion is possible and desirable oq the political but
not the military level so that Europeans may
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make their voice heard when their American
allies have to take direct action, as in the case of
negotiations on the limitation of armaments,
and when the Western European countries them-
selves play a direct part, as in the CSCE. It
should be recalled that the modified Brussels
Treaty has a very broad concept of European
security and that its Article YIII explicitly
includes economic matters.
17. It therefore seems both natural and
desirable for the Assembly to make a political
and critical contribution to the tenth anniversary
of the Helsinki final act on lst August
1985. This contribution will carry even greater
werght in that it will have followed the majo.r
Warsaw Pact meeting at which its members took
important measures regarding the future of the
organisation. These measures will obviously
de-pend on the state of East-West relations and
poisible future prospects, which explain the
importance the positions the Assembly adopts
may have.
il. Negotiations on the limitation of atmaments
18. Limitation of armaments is a vital ele-
ment in any policy of detente whatever other
aims there may be. In spite of the inevitable
difficulties encountered in negotiations to this
end, there are certain positive aspects for the
superpowers, other countries and non-aligned
couniries as well as those of the Atlantic Alliance
and the Warsaw Pact.
19. However, it is most important that any
political or military measures the West 4ight
take to reduce armaments or the risk of war
should not upset any part of the bdance or leave
open the possibility of Soviet military inter-
vention. They must not be unilateral conces-
sions made in the hope of pacirying the Soviet
Union. Nor must they seek to stir up opposi-
tion to the organisation of society lest the Soviet
Union find this intolerable and thus increasing
tension. Your Rapporteur therefore considers
that the negotiations on the limitation of
armaments should conform to a number of
principles:
20. (il The limitation of armaments is destined
to end the armaments race, quantitatively at
least, and, consequently, free the budgets ofthe
countries concerned ofa fairly heavy unproduc-
tive burden. This is no small thing, be it for the
United States, which has a large budget deficit,
or the Soviet Union, whose productive invest-
ments are steadily diminishing since the state's
investment possibilities are increasingly strained
by expenditure on defence. Any guarantee that
neither superpower will take advantage of a
reduction in the military expenditure of the
other to try to gain dominance in an important
sector of defence can but redirect investment
towards areas more profitable for its economy
and people. Other states too would be encou-
raged to restrict their defence efforts in favour of
other activities.
21. (it) lnsofar as limitations extend to nuclear
armaments, they would promote application of
the non-proliferation treaty which includes an
undertaking by the nuclear powers to offset
other powers' renunciation of nuclear weapons
by reducing their own nuclear capability. It is
recalled that new members of the nuclear clubjustifu their decision on the grounds that the
huclear powers do not respect the non-prolife-
ration treaty and already have an advantage with
their acquired rights.
22. (iiil While moderate nuclear armament by
the two great powers ensured enough mutual
deterrence to guarantee peace, the accumulation
of nuclear weapons in no way enhances deter-
rence but increases the risk of accident or of
someone gambling that a limited nuclear war is
possible.
23. (iv) Although there is no direct link between
expenditure on annaments and assistance to the
third world, the disproportion between the two
types ofexpenditure is particularly scandalous in
a world marked by hunger in so many areas.
This disproportion fuels revolt in public opi-
nion, and in particular among the younger ele-
ments, against the injustice of society and some
resort to violence to demonstrate their objection
and opposition to western defence policy.
2a. 0 Finally, even before negotiations achieve
tangible results, the very fact that they are being
held helps to reassure public opinion about the
potential opponent's intentions in reducing
tension and the risk of armed conflict.
25. The fact is that the negotiations which had
been conducted by the two gtreat powers for
more than twenty years have been broken off in
recent years. In 1980, the United States Senate
refused to ratifu the SALT II agreement on inter-
continental nuclear missiles signed in Vienna on
18th June 1979 because ofthe Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. The START negotiations on nu-
clear warheads had begun on 30th June 1982,
but the Soviet Union decided to suspend them
in November 1983 because of the new situation
arising from the deployment of American Euro-
missiles in Europe. For the same reason, on
22nd November 1983 they halted the Geneva
negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear for-
ces (INF).
26. This break led to the further develop-
ment of several types of nuclear armaments by
the two great powers:
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27. (a) For intercontinental-range weapons, the
United States had announced before beginning
the START negotiations that it would conform
to the SALT II provisions, even though this
agreement had not been ratified, by not increa-
sing its stock of strategic missiles above a ceiling
of 2,250. However, both the United States and
the Soviet Union continued their efforts to per-
fect their armaments, in particular by increaiing
the number of nuclear warheads carried by each
missile and by improving the latter's sbecifi-
cations.
28. (b) Faced with a speed-up in the deployment
of Soviet SS-20 Euromissiles, in autumn 1983
the United States began, in application of
NATO's twofold decision of December 1979, to
prepare for the deployment of 464 cruise missi-
les and 108 Pershing II missiles in Western
Europe as from January 1984. The United
Kingdom, the Federal Republic, Italy and finally
Belgium have authorised deployment on their
territory while the Netherlands has not yet
followed up its decision of principle to allow
deployment if the Soviet Union does not reduce
its SS-20s deployed in Europe.
29, (c) On 23rd March 1983, President Reagan
referred in a speech to a strategic defence iniiia-
tive consisting of a long-term research pro-
gramme designed to allow space to be used for
defence against enemy strategic missiles. When
work was complete, installation of laser systems
on satellites was to allow the destruction of any
ballistic missile in flight towards United States
territory and ensure protection of American
territory. $26,000 million was earmarked for
this programme over a period of five years.
Congress has voted the first two annual instal-
ments of $1,500 million and $3,500 million.
30. [n fact, President Reagan's speech was just
a step in a movement already started by the two
great powers for the military use of space. Here
reference is made to research to take account of
the treaty of 27th January 1967 banning nuclear
weapons in outer space, the convention of 26th
May 1972, prolonged in 1977, linked with the
SALT I agreements to halt the deployment of
anti-missile missiles round certain centres, the
possibilities afforded by the development of
space technology in the two countries and the
development of new weapons, particularly
through laser technology. The decision then
announced to earmark a large sum for such
research was followed by the adoption in 1984 of
a budget of about $1,500 million for this
purpose, increased in 1985 to about $3,500 mil-lion. It can thus be seen that most of the bud-
get effort should be concentrated on the last
years of the programme, which makes one
wonder whether the President of the United
States did not deliberately choose to announce
this programme in order to encourage the Soviet
Union to agree to overall negotiations on the
limitation of armaments.
31. As Mr. Atkinson stressed in his report on
East-West economic relations (Document 958)
in 1984, it might seem that at a time when the
United States has fully recovered its economic
dynamism after a period of stagnation and when
its growth rate is rising rapidly the Soviet Union
can no longer increase the proportion ofits gross
domestic product earmarkod for armaments
without risking very serious economic difli-
culties. Although some Americans believe that
a new stage in the arms race might give their
country the upper hand once and for all and
hence something of a victory without war, thereis every indication that the Department of
State's true aim in this matter was to lead the
Soviet Union to the negotiating table to discuss
the various aspects of the limitation of arma-
ments. It may thus be claimed that it was
President Reagan's speech on 3rd March 1983
that was behind the resumption of negotiations
in 1985.
32. The world was therefore on the verge of a
rapidly accelerating escalation of the anns race
when, in autumn 1984, it was decided that the
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two great
powers should meet in Geneva on 7th and 8th
January 1985. Since it already seemed certain
in September that President Reagan would be re-
elected and it seemed unlikely that a democrat
candidat, considered a priori an easier partner
for a dialogue, could win, the Soviet Union was
no doubt encouraged not to wait for confir-
mation before reaching agreement with Presi-
dent Reagan. Certainly the very firm attitude
so far adopted by President Reagan now places
him in an easier position for negotiating both in
the eyes of his Soviet partners, who will have to
take account of this firmness, and in those of
American and European public opinion which
will not be tempted to suspect him of weakness.
33. The meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr.
Gromyko did not mark the opening of negotia-
tions but was simply intended to prepare for a
resumption on matters and in conditions which
had to be defined. In fact, it produced positive,
specific results. The major achievement was to
define the three areas to be covered, namely
strategic missiles, Euromissiles and the military
use of space. Moreover, it is to be hoped that
the opening of these three vital negotiations will
introduce a new spirit into East-West relations
and allow the other ongoing rhultilateral negotia-
tions to move more quickly tbwards satisfactory
solutions. These include the MBFR negotia-
tions in Vienna, the conference on disarmamentin Europe being held in Stockholm in the
context of the CSCE and the Geneva negotia-
tions in the special committee on chemical
weapons of the Disarmament Conference.
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34. (t) The START negotiations, which were
opened on 3fth June 1982 following the signing
of the SALT I[ agreement, cover intercontinen-
tal-range nuclear weapons, i.e. carried by ballis-
tic missiles with a range of at least 5,500 km.
These negotiations had been broken off by the
Soviet Union on 9th December 1983 and on 8th
January 1985 Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko
decided to reopen them. In 1982, the aim was
to reduce the number of nuclear warheads of
each of the two great powers by one-third. The
United States, anxious above all to maintain its
deterrent capability while protecting its strategic
nuclear f61ss against a Soviet first strike, had
proposed the destruction of two old missiles
each time one of the parties deployed one
missile of a new type, which could have reduced
the number of warheads deployed by each side
to about 5,000, while allowing the progressive
introduction of mobile launchers.
35. (ii) The INF tall<s cover intermediate-range
weapons, i.e. with a range of less than 5,000
km. In November 1981, President Reagan pro-
posed the zero option, i.e. the United States
would not deploy Euromissiles if the Soviet
Union agreed to dismantle the SS-20s it had
already deployed. The Soviet Union refused this
solution under which it would have had to dis-
mantle weapons already deployed while the
Americans would have merely had to refrain
from introducing new weapons. In July 1982,
the two negotiators, Mr. Paul Nitze and Mr.
Yuri Kvitsinsky, seemed to have agreed on a
compromise solution: the United States would
have deployed only 3@ cruise missiles and no
Pershing IIs if the Soviet Union kept to only 75
SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, but in the end
neither government endorsed this solution.
36. The Soviet Union must then have felt it
could be rather uncompromising in this respect
because of the con@rn and unrest caused in
1982 and 1983 by the prospect of the deploy-
ment between January 1984 and 1990 of 464
cruise missiles and 108 Pershing IIs in five
Western European countries in face of the 330
Soviet SS-20s, each carrying three nuclear
warheads. This unrest mlght well have led the
European countries, which had initially accepted
NATO's twofold decision of December 1979
providing for such deployment, not to fulfil their
undertakings when the time came. However, in
autumn 1983 the first preparatory measures
were taken and in January deployment of
American Euromissiles began in the United
Kingdom, the Federal Republic and Italy.
Deployment began in Belgium early in 1985.
The Soviet Union was therefore able to see that
it could no longer hope to take advantage ofthe
concern of the peoples of Western Europe to
separate their countries from NATO and that it
was in its own interests as well as those of the
Western European countries to terminate the
Eurostrategic anns race. Based in Western
Europe, these weapons could in fact reach a vital
part of the Soviet Union while, although the
whole of Western Europe was threatened by the
SS-20s, the United States was out of range. Mr.
Gorbachev's proposal in April 1985 to freeze the
deployment of Euromissiles at their present level
could not, at the present stage of deployment on
both sides, be endorsed by the West as it would
have finalised an imbalance tipped sharply in
the Soviet Union's favour.
37. (iii) President Reagan's speech on 23rd
March 1983 in which he referred to a strategic
defence initiative, soon dubbed " star wars ",
immediately worried the Soviet Union, although
the latter had already been conducting research
for military purposes in space for several years.
This initiative was admittedly a long-term pro-
gramme, but it was seen as a threat by the Soviet
Union because, if successful, it would give
American territory almost total protection
against Soviet ballistic missiles and thus deprivc
Soviet nuclear weapons of all deterrent credi-
bility. Agreed, the Soviet Union could also
embark upon military space research. Although
in certain areas such as electronics it seems to be
trailing behind the United States, in others, such
as ballistics or astronautics, it is holding its own.
However, the American research programme
calls for the enormous investment of $26,000
million in the first five years and it seems that
the United States is capable of shouldering this
burden in view of its economic and monetary
recovery since 1983. Conversely, the Soviet
Union already seems to be having serious difli-
culty in maintaining the present pace of its
armaments effort and, for the past ten years or
so, has managed to do so only at the expense of
its civil investment. To embark upon such a
cosfly new operation might be disastrous for its
entire economy.
38. It is not therefore surprising that the
Soviet Union has done its utmost to induce the
Americans to halt their research into the military
use of space. On 24th June 1984, it proposed
holding negotiations on the subject in Vienna.
Without rejecting this proposal, the Americans
made it conditional on reopening the START
and INF negotiations, which the Soviets refused.
39. The meeting between Mr. Shultz and
Mr. Gromyko allowed both sides to adjust their
positions. The Soviets made real concessions
since the Americans did not go back on their
decision to continue their research nor did they
agree to a moratorium on weapons tests. There
were no prior conditions to the joint decision to
hold negotiations. But it is diflicult to foresee
how these negotiations will be able to proceed
since they are to deal with weapons many ele-
ments of which do not yet exist, and this should
make the dialogue rather difficult.
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a0. (iv) The Geneva communiqui specifies that
the three negotiations will be conducted by a
single delegation from each side divided into
three groups.This is probably designed to ensure
the independence of each series of negotiations
and their obvious interdependence, since it is
only the concessions made by the Soviets in
regard to nuclear weapons that allowed them to
obtain a no less important concession from the
Americans, i.e. that space weapons too be sub-ject to negotiation.
al. @ Finally, the communiqu6 specifies that
the aim of the two countries is to limit and
reduce armaments and adds that their efforts
'should lead to the complete elimination of
nuclear arms', which probably goes further than
the hopes one might nourish for the negotia-
tions. However, the Geneva communiqu6 had
hardly been issued before very serious differ-
ences of interpretation emerged between the
American and Soviet negotiators. Speaking on
television in the presence of Soviet journalists
on l3th January, Mr. Gromyko said he consider-
ed that:
(i) the continued deployment of Ameri-
can Pershing II and cruise missiles in
Europe would call in question the
future negotiations;
(iy' negotiations on the limitation of
nuclear weapons must be linked with
negotiations on the military use of
space;
(iii) French and British nuclear forces
must be taken into account in disar-
mament talks;
(iv) it was not possible to separate
research into the military use of
space from the deployment of new
weapons in space ;
(v) the Soviet aim was to achieve equality
in security.
42. There was an immediate response from
Mr. Shultz and Mr. Weinberger, United States
Secretary of Defence, who asserted that :
(i) the United States would pursue
deployment of Euromissiles in Eu-
rope as planned ;
(ii) they saw no link between talks on
space weapons and the limitation of
nuclear weapons ;
(iii) preparatory work on space defence
would continue.
43. Furthermore, the British and French
Governments stated that they would not agree to
their nuclear forces being included in the nego-
tiations, at least as long as the two great powers
had not considerably reduced their own arsenals.
44. Undue importance shottld probably not be
attached to remarks made befbre the opening of
such significant negotiations. It is normal for
each participant to adopt extreme positions now
so as to be able to make concessions later. The
fact that the United States has since appointed
its representatives for the throe areas of negotia-
tion implies that it by no means consideri the
result of the Geneva meeting jeopardised by
Mr. Gromyko's demands which were perhaps
not discussed in Geneva but which were in any
event already known in the West, just as the
refusal of the Americans and their allies was well
known to the Soviet Union. The initial stages
of the negotiations were again accompanied by
such statements which are largely a matter of
tactics.
45. Thus, although French and British nuclear
weapons, which moreover represent only about
3% of the nuclear potential of the Atlantic
Alliance, had not been officially taken into
account, the SALT I agreement provided for
slightly more means of delivery for the Soviets
than the American entitlemont which means
that the negotiators of the agreement had not
overlooked this British and French contribution
to the military strength of the Atlantic Alliance.
Moreover, it would be dillicult to insist on
France and the United Kingdom conforming to
the results of negotiations in which they have
not been asked to take part. Truly successful
negotiations would most probably bring all the
nuclear powers to review their armaments posi-
tion but Mr. Gromyko must well realise that
such a count cannot be a prior condition to the
opening of American-Soviet negotiations.
46. It should probably also be borne in mind
that the American refusal to modifr the pro-
gramme for the deployment of Euromissiles or
to delay its research programme into the defen-
sive use of space is also a matter of tactics.
There is every reason to expect that the negotia-
tions which have just started will be lengthy and
neither side has any interest in the intervening
years being used to speed up the development of
their defence systems since this mlght change the
ratio of forces during the negotiations and slow
down and render even more difticult the final
outcome, not to mention all the tension and
misunderstanding that the deployment of new
weapons and the ensuing reactions against agxee-
ment that muht be aroused among public
opinion. But possibly one of the first questions
which the negotiators will havE to solve will be
the measures to be taken during the negotiating
period for slowing down the deployment or
development of new weapons. This will be
especially tricky in space matters since the mili-
tary use of space for observation and verification
purposes will still be essential and, although ins-
truments of war should not be placed in orbit,
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means of control in space will, on the contrary,
have to be encouraged.
47. Successive statements by the two govern-
ments directly concerned by President Reagan's
initiative show some convergence. The Soviet
Union made it clear that it would not react radi-
cally to American research into space defence
until the testing stage was reached but, on 14th
February, Mr. Israelyan, Soviet representative at
the United Nations disarmament conference,
said the first tests would put an immediate, per-
manent end to the American-Soviet negotiations
which are to be opened in Geneva on l2th
March. It is indeed evident that research
cannot be verified effectively but tests are far
easier to detect although the distinction between
research and testing is not clear+ut. The nego-
tiations on the use of space for defensive pur-
poses will very probably go into this point.
48. A more overall view of Western Europe's
interests in this matter shows that the first is
obviously the success of the negotiations as a
whole, which should ensure Europe's security
while reducing the armaments of the two great
powers and their direct or indirect threats to
Europe. This is clearly the case for Euro-
missiles which are targeted solely on Europe
whereas Europeans have only a very small say in
their use. It is also so for the use of space for
defending American territory against interconti-
nental nuclear weapons because the result would
be to separate Europe's fate from that of the
United States and consequently pave the way for
the possibility of a limited war in which Europe
would inevitably be the battlefield. To a lesser
degree, it is also the case for strategic missiles
because the excessive number of such weapons
held by the two gleat powers makes no real
contribution to mutual deterrence but involves
a multiplication of useless expenditure and
perhaps too a risk of war through misunder-
standing or accident.
49. European views have not been neglected
by the two great powers. Even before the
Geneva meeting, the Soviet Union instigated
exchanges of views with Western European
countries, in particular thanks to Mr. Gorba-
chev's visit to the United Kingdom. The
United States for its part informed its allies of
the Geneva negotiations in NATO and the Ame-
rican negotiators visited several European capi-
tals for this purpose.
50. However, there is room for consultations
between Europeans to try to ascertain the impli-
cations for Europe of the Geneva negotiations,
in particular, to determine Europe's reaction to
President Reagan's decision on the use of space
for the defence of the United States and possible
European proposals on measures to be taken for
the use of space for disarmament.
51. On 20th February, during her visit to
Washington, Mrs. Thatcher, United Kingdom
Prime Minister, expressed a position which
corresponds to that ofseveral European govern-
ments. She guaranteed her government's full
support for the American research programme
but reserved it support for everything relating to
tests and, a fortiori, deployment. Considera-
tion should be given to these stages only in the
light of the results of the negotiations. Mrs.
Thatcher was also reported as wishing British
firms to be invited to take part in the work and
benefits arising from President Reagan's initia-
tive, which endorses a proposal made to Euro-
pean firms by the President himself.
52. The Federal German Government for itspart considers President Reagan's initiative
likely to enhance the security of the West as a
whole insofar as it helps to protect the United
States' second strike capability which is, in the
last resort, the guarantee ofdeterrence, but it too
asks the United States to confine its activities to
research as long as the Geneva negotiations
continue.
53. However, the proposals by Mr. de la
Gorce, French representative at the Geneva
Disarmament Conference, on 12th June 1984,
and published by the French Ministry for Exter-
nal Relations on 7th January 1985 differ fairly
significantly from the positions adopted by
the other European members of the Atlantic
Alliance. The main points are:
"... international consultations must be
held without delay on the following
matters :
(a) very strict limitation of anti-satellite
systems, including a ban on those
which might reach satellites in high
orbit whose protection is most impor-
tant from the standpoint of the strate-
gic balance ;
(b) a five-year renewable ban on the
deployment on the gxound, in the
atmosphere or in space of guided
energy weapons capable of destroying
ballistic missiles or satellites at a great
distance and, as a corollary, a ban on
the corresponding tests ;
(c/ strengthening the existing declaration
system introduced by the conven-
tion of l4th June 1975 for registering
objects in space, each launching state
or organisation undertaking to provide
more detailed information on the fea-
tures and r6le ofobjects launched so as
to improve verification possibilities ;
(d) an undertaking by the United States
and the Soviet Union to extend
to the satellites of third countries pro-
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visions relating to the immunity of
certain space objects which they have
already agreed at bilateral level ... ".
54. These proposals, which seek to reserve the
prospects of progress offered by space research
for peaceful purposes and for instruments of
observation, communication and control which
may contribute to international stability, all-
round security and hence peace, mlght appa-
rently be considered carefully by all the Euro-
pean members of the alliance, even though diffe-
rences may still remain regarding their attitudein the immediate future towards Euromissiles
and, in the longer term, towards British and
French nuclear weapons. In any event, such
differences should not prevent the representati-
ves of the Seven meeting at the appropriate level
and in WEU to try to overcome them and to be
as united as possible in presenting the essential
requirements of Europe's security to their Ame-
rican allies.
55. It also seems that the opening of the
Geneva negotiations will give new impetus to
other negotiations, some of which have been
continued for many years, such as the MBFR
talks in Vienna. For instance, on l4th February
1985, the Soviet Union tabled a proposal at
that conference, which had been sitting since
1973 without producing any noticeable results,
for reducing Soviet land forces by 20,000 men
and American land forces by 13,000 men in
Central Europe. This agreement would be valid
for three years during which the countries in the
area would undertake not to increase their own
forces. The reductions would be verified by
observation posts on both sides. Finally, all
forces of the two alliances in the area would be
limited to 900,000 men of which 700,000 in the
land forces. Admittedly, these proposals do not
wholly meet western requirements since the
West wants prior agreement on the basis for cal-
culating troop levels on each side, but they may
allow the negotiations to be revived.
56. Finally, the Stockholm conference, which
started at the beginning of 1984 in the frame-
work of the CSCE, mlght advance in two areas,i.e. renunciation of the use and hence the
threat offorce in European conflicts and, above
all, the prior announcement of manceuwes and
the obligation to invite observers from the other
side. Some of the decisions of this type taken at
Helsinki were tending to lapse.
IIL Economic relations
57. One intention voiced by the signatories of
the Helsinki final act in 1975 was to promote
exchanges of all kinds between Eastern and
Western European countries and, first of all,
trade. Many considerations were behind this
intention, starting with the fact that more trade
is good in itself because it stimulates the eco-
nomy. It was also based on the idea that
d6tente has to be a many-sided process; if disar-
mament is to be encouraged mutual confidence
must prevail in public opinion and here trade is
a help. Finally, each side probably held di{fe-
rent views about the possible interest for the
Soviet Union and the westeril allies of develop-
ing trade. There were schools of thought on
both sides which considered that there was real
danger in such trade, in the West because it
might increase Soviet military strength or even
make the western countries dependent on the
Soviet Union and in the East because it might
lead to a dismantling of the socialist economic
system and subject the oastern countries,
through their debts for instance, to too much
western influence. Although on both sides Hel-
sinki was heralded as a victory for those who
advocated more trade, the other side has made
its influence felt strongly since 1980, in the
United States and the Soviet Union more than
among the European partners of the two great
powers.
58. However, during his 1984 election cam-
paign President Reagan asserted that he would
endeavour to have more constructive relations
with the Soviet Union during his second term of
oflice and there are good reasons for thinking
that he does not intend to confine these relations
to the limitation of armaments. In any event,
this seems essential if there is to be better
understanding between the United States and its
European allies for although differences in arma-
ments questions between the two sides of the
Atlantic are limited, they are far greater in terms
of East-West economic relations. While the
proclamation of martial law in Poland was met
with relative unanimity among the western
countries at the Versailles summit meeting in
1982 in regard to the political language to be
used with the Soviet Union and its allies, the
economic measures then taken by the United
States were strongly criticised by the European
members of the Atlantic Allia4ce.
59. (i) The most serious crisis related to the
conclusion of long-term agfeements between the
Federal Republic, France and Italy on the one
hand and the Soviet Union on the other for
building a pipeline linking the natural gas-
producing areas of northern Siberia with West-
ern Europe and delivering SOviet gas to these
countries. The United States criticised the
Western Europeans for providing the Soviet
Union with a stable flow of foreign currency and
above all for making their energy supplies
dependent on the Soviet Union. Fear of such
steps was further strengthened by the threat
mentioned on Soviet television in October 1984
of suspending deliveries of oil to the United
Kingdom because of the miners' strike.
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60. It is difficult to assess to what extent these
three countries depend on the Soviet Union. In
terms of the percentage of gas imported, it would
be between 28% and 35%. As a percentage of
energy consumed it would fall to 5% or
6Vo. Moreover, by acquiring Soviet gas, these
countries are trying to become less dependent on
their usual suppliers, the Maghreb and the
Middle East, thereby diversiffing their imports.
One way or another there is at present over-
production of natural gas throughout the world,
which further reduces Western European depen-
dence on the Soviet Union.
61. Since the United States was unable to
make its views prevail with its allies, it then
imposed an embargo on providing the Soviet
Union with know-how under licence from the
United States which would allow the gas pipe-
line to be built and operated. This made it
difficult for the European firms concerned to
continue operations. The question was settledin November 1982 when the embargo was
lifted. The International Energy Agency was at
the same time asked to conduct a study on
energy. According to information obtained by
your Rapporteur, this study, without calling for
restrictions on imports of Soviet gas, advocated
certain measures to limit the dependence of each
purchasing country: build-up of stocks, inter-
connecting distribution networks, equipment
able to run on both oil and gas. No collective
action is envisaged.
62. (iil The problem of restrictions on exports
of advanced technology to the Soviet Union also
brings out differences between the United States
and its European partners in the Atlantic
Alliance. All agree to ban exports of technology
directly usable for defence purposes, but they
cannot agree on a definition. Some American
experts tend to consider that anything the
Soviets import is, in the long run, destined to
increase that country's military strength in view
of the high level of investment in defence in the
Soviet economy. Moreover, modern weaponry
involves the use of increasingly varied techno-
logy in the concept of weapons systems, particu-
larly electronics. The lists drawn up by the
Co-ordinating Committee for controlling exports
of the Atlantic Alliance (Cocom) were therefore
revised and increased in 1984. These are lists
of products banned for export to Eastern Euro-
pean countries until 1988 to which were added
computers and communications equipment.
This hampered the completion of current
contracts between firms in the Federal Republic,
France and the United Kingdom on the one
hand and the Eastern European countries on the
other for telephone equipment. Moreover, it
appears that the United States believes these
measures, taken for a five-year period, should be
prolonged from year to year, which would make
these contracts lapse permanently.
63. (iii) At the beginning of 1982, western
loans to the eastern countries were practically
stopped. However, while European bankers
were in no hurry to gmnt loans to countries as
heavily in debt as Poland and Romania, there
was no hesitation for better-placed countries
such as Hungary in 1982 and the Soviet Union
which, after having tried to avoid debts with the
West, reappeared on the loan market in
1984. Since 1982, the United States, on the
other hand, had been trylng to reduce export cre-
dits to the eastern countries and above all to
withhold public support for them. Thus, not
without good grounds, it has seen that the
OECD includes the Soviet Union, the German
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia
among the " wealthy countries " to which
member countries have agreed to grant credit
only at a hlgh rate of interest (13.6% since June
1984) in cases where such credits had state
backing. This decision is obviously a handicap
for Western European countries which, because
of the weakness of their currencies, have to
maintain very high domestic rates of interest.
The United States for its part gtrants no more
guaranteed credits to the Soviet Union.
64. (iv) Another obstacle to the development of
East-West trade is that it is unbalanced and the
West has either to lend the eastern countries
much of the cost of their purchases from the
West or to trade on a barter basis for which
western firms are not well equipped. In other
words, the development of East-West trade
needs to be organised on a basis which cannot be
improvised because of the nature of the Soviet
economy.
65. (v) The practice of economic sanctions
against certain eastern countries for political rea-
sons also leads to restrictions on international
trade and to differences between the allies.
This for instance is so for Poland which, in
November 1981, applied for membership of the
International Monetary Fund in order to alle-
viate its financial situation by using special
drawing rights to pay back some of its debts.
This move was also in the interests of the
Western European countries to which Poland
owed money and, after agreeing to Poland's
application being suspended when martial law
was introduced, they subsequently agreed that
the application should be accepted when the
amnesty law was passed in July 1984, whereas
the United States continued to oppose it until
the end ofthe year.
66. Generally speaking, the United States
seems to wish to encourage trade with Hungary
and Romania, which appear to be pursuing a
policy which is more independent of the Soviet
LInion, but to limit trade with the Soviet lJnion,
Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, in particular by
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refusing to sell them advanced technology,
whereas for economic reasons the European
members of the Atlantic Alliance are more inter-
ested in trade with the Soviet Union and the
German Democratic Republic. Furthermore,
the Federal Republic attaches special importance
to the maintenance or even development of
trade between the two German states because it
fosters better relations between the two parts of
Germany and hence between the two blocs.
67. The policy of opening up trade with the
East advocated by Mr. Shultz is certainly not
unanimously endorsed by American public opi-
nion and Congress. Although approval is cer-
tain when, as with sales of grain, a large part of
the electorate is concerned, it is far less certain
for industrial products and it is diflicult to
foresee to what extent American-Soviet trade
mtght be liberalised.
68. But Western Europe's objections to the
development of trade with the Eastern European
countries are not so serious as the United States',
first because Europeans have always been more
sceptical than Americans about the effectiveness
of economic sanctions and second because they
have always believed that the development of
trade between the two halves of Europe further-
ed d6tente and might have an effect 
- 
admittedly
diflicult to assess 
- 
on other aspects of East-West
relations, be it the limitation of armaments
or evolution within the Eastern European
countries.
69. There is another area in which all the
European countries in both East and West have
a major interest in developing economic co-
operation, i.e. ecology, which is now a major
concern of Western Europeans because of the
threats to their environment. Here, interests
are shared and there is no reason to limit
exchanges to elaborate, develop and improve
techniques to protect the environment. On the
contrary, the joint definition of ecological stan-
dards can but foster trade in end-items between
the two parts of Europe and at the same time
improve the protection of nature since there is
no iron curtain in this context.
70. In recent years, concerned not to provoke
conflict with their American partners, the Euro-
pean members of the Atlantic Alliance have pro-
bably been too acquiescent to American require-
ments. Certainly nothing could be more detri-
mental to Europe's security than a confrontation
between them on trade matters. However, the
greater flexibility the United States administra-
tion is now showing in trade should allow the
Europeans to make their views better known, if
they are convergent.
71. External trade is obviously the responsibi-
lity of the Community rather than of WEU,
although the modified Brussels Treaty also
requires consultations between its members on
economic matters, thus recdgnising the impor-
tance of the economic aspects of European secu-
rity. In any event, insofar as trade is part of
overall relations which dominate Europe's joint
security, it must not be overlooked by the WEU
Council, if only in order to promote effective
consultation with the United States which, for
its part, has considered setting up a committee
of wise men appointed by heads of state to work
out proposals for an allied summit meeting at
which every aspect of East-West relations would
be examined, including the bilateral aspects of
economic relations. The United States worked
out several like proposals in 1984 but Europe,
although it had everything to gain, has so far
done little to promote its views on which there is
almost unanimity.
72. Moreover, the Soviet Union and its allies
have shown little interest in trade relations with
the West in recent years. The huge debts
incurred by Poland and Romania possibly seem-
ed to threaten their economic structure and
perhaps their exclusive dependence on Moscow.
Between l98l and 1983, the eastern countries'
imports from the West fbll by more than
30%. The Soviet Union has therefore tried to
limit its trade with the West to essentials and to
avoid accepting credit. Thus, its purchases of
grain from the United States, which rose sharply
during the same period, were paid for in cash.
73. Now that the United States and the Soviet
Union are preparing to reopen negotiations on
the limitation of armaments, a thaw is already
starting in economic relations. For the first
time in six years a delegation from the
United States Department of Commerce, led by
Mr. Olmer, visited the Soviet Union from 8th to
lfth January 1985 to promote a resumption of
trade between the two countries. Furthermore,
the ten-year Soviet-Americarl agreement on eco-
nomic, industrial and technical co-operation,
which expired in June 1984, was renewed until
1994 and the United States aflministration made
no secret of the fact that it was prepared to
encourage exports of non-agricultural products
too, including non-strategic Squipment items, to
the Soviet Union, and even tremove import res-
trictions on a few items frorn the Soviet Union,
some of which date back to the Korean war. In
a speech at the University of Los Angeles in
October 1984, Mr. Shultz rgmarked that these
restrictions had not furthered the United States
economic interests any more than they had
gained political concessions from the Soviet
Union, and he advocated reviving economic co-
operation between the two countries.
74. On 30th November 1983, the Assembly
adopted Recommendation 401 on economic
relations with the Soviet Union. It recom-
mended that the Council " adapt these principles
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accordingly in the light of results obtained in
international negotiations on the limitation of
armaments ". Your Rapporteur believes these
principles are still fully valid but circumstances
in 1985 should allow them to be applied flexi-
bly. One aspect of President Reagan's initiative
is that American defence policy calls on a large
number of new technologies in which the mili-
tary aspect is not always the principal one.
Consequently, " to ban all exports of advanced
technology which mlght be used for armaments
purposes " would be more or less tantamount
to banning any development of trade with the
East and in recent months the United States has
brought strong pressure to bear on its Cocom
partners to lengthen the list of equipment
banned for export. Your Rapporteur considers
that, while taking account of American views,
the European partners should eutiously con-
tinue to try to develop their trade with the East,
avoiding any unnecessary extension of the
Cocom lists.
IY. Political ospects of East-lltest relations
75. It is obviously the political aspects of the
Helsinki final act which have been the least res-
pected and political differences largely account
for diffrculties with other aspects. For instance,
it was the invasion of Afghanistan that led the
United States Congress to refuse to rati$ the
SALT II agreement.
76- Generally speaking, the West considered it
had made a major concession to the Soviet
Union in the recognition of states and frontiers,
although the Helsinki conference involved a real
concession by the Soviet Union which had
finally accepted the presence of the United
States and Canada at a meeting which it had
wanted to be exclusively 'all-European ". The
Iirmness of the western powers in this matter
had been extremely successful and, above all,
had shown the Soviet Union that it could not
hope to divide the West on such an important
question. An undenaking to respect the sove-
reignty of all states was to the advantage of both
sides. The Soviet Union and its allies had
made serious concessions to western views on
personal freedom and exchanges of all kinds.
However, the concessions each side made were
different because by recognising states and fron-
tiers the West was merely acknowledging a situa-
tion which it had in fact accepted for a long time
and it reserved the right, moreover, to call this
situation in question by peaceful means, whereas
the concessions made by the Soviet Union
concerned the future. But there are many signs
that in 1975 the Soviet Union was surprised by
the extent of claims in its own country, and
above all in the people's democracies, which
invoked the Helsinki final act in calling for far-
reaching changes in the communist r6gime.
77. The fact that the Helsinki final act made
no provision for registering violations of com-
mitments nor, a fortiori, for sanctions obviously
weakened considerably the act's stipulations
since everyone was free to interpret it on a case-
by-case basis.
78. The invasion of Afghanistan, the mainte-
nance of arrangements to protect the inhabitants
of the eastern countries against information
from the West and finally the repressive measu-
res taken in the Soviet Union itself against dissi-
dents and in the people's democracies 
- 
particu-
larly in Poland since l98l 
- 
against persons and
organisations calling for greater freedom were
violations of the final act and led to retaliatory
measures in East-West trade and the limitation
of armaments. Representatives of Poland were
even boycotted.
79. The Soviet Union presented many events
which seemed to challenge Soviet domination as
being the result of western intervention which
would also have been contrary to the Helsinki
provisions since it would have constituted inter-
ference in the internal affairs of certain states
and would have called in question rOgimes and
frontiers recognised at Helsinki. Thus, the
invasion of Afghanistan was presented as justi-
fied retaliation to agitation against the Afghan
communist r6gime which the West was accused
of having provoked and kept aflame. Similarly,
the crisis in Poland with the activities of Solida-
rity was denounced as a challenge to the Polish
r6gime from external powers. The absence of
freedom of information in the Eastern European
countries and the Soviet Union makes it diflicult
to ascertain the credence to be given to interpre-
tations thus circulated.
80. Consequently, contrary to the hopes of its
signatories, the Helsinki final act laid no solid
foundation for understanding between East and
West on their political differences. Subsequent
verification conferences in Belgrade and Madrid
have done little to allow these diffrculties to be
overcome.
81. However, examination of the state of East-
West political relations at the end of 1984 shows
not a clear turning point, as for disarmament
and economic relations, but a number of factors
favourable to the redevelopment of d6tente, pro-
vided the facts are seen in their historical
context and not in relation to principles or arti-
cles in international conventions.
82. Indeed, although the last decade produced
many conflicts in Africa, Asia and Latin Ame-
rica, the two great powers have carefully avoided
direct involvement and consequently confronta-
tion. The most serious conflict is certainly the
war between Iraq and Iran. The former is a
major customer of the Soviet Union, for arms at
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least, but the Soviet Union has avoided giving it
direct military assistance. It has sent only a
very limited number of advisers whose sole task
is believed to be the training oflraqi experts in
handling arms bought in the Soviet Union.
However, the Soviet Union is believed to have
started delivering arms to Iran in 1984. The
United States for its part made it abundantly
manifest that it did not wish to supply Iran with
the wherewithal to prolong the war and finally
opted for Iraq in spite ofSoviet support for that
country. Thus, with the coming to power in
Iran of the most fundamentalist factions of the
Moslem world, the United States and the Soviet
Union considered that the most serious danger
for them, for international balance and for the
maintenance of peace in the world came from
Iran's threats to the stability of the entire
Moslem world. Neither used the means at its
disposal to take advantage of this war for the
purposes of East-West rivalry.
83. It is more difficult to assess the attitude of
the Soviet Union in other conflicts in the Middle
East, particularly because it is very diflicult to
analyse the relationship between the Soviet
Union and certain countries such as Libya.
Libya is certainly well armed thanks to its pur-
chases from the Soviet Union. But there is no
indication of a Soviet hand behind the attacks
on the multilateral buffer force in Lebanon in
1983 or behind the attacks organised since then
by terrorist organisations established in Libya or
behind the latter's aggression in Chad. Even if
the Soviet Union supplied arms, it remained
well behind the scenes in regard to all the
dubious operations of countries claiming to be
its allies, probably to avoid confrontation with
the United States, just as the United States has
been very cautious in its activities abroad since
the end of the Vietnam war, particularly where
Afghanistan is concerned. Finally, at the end of
1984, there was no direct conflict between the
two great powers and both could consider
resuming a proper relationship without disturb-
ing its relations with its allies.
84. Moreover, the trend of the freedom of the
population in the Soviet Union and the people's
democracies is not altogether negative. Some
eastern bloc countries now seem to have a
certain degree of freedom, mainly but not solely
economic, of which they had been deprived in
the past. This is the case of Hungary. Repres-
sion is still widespread, particularly in the Soviet
Union, but it seems to have diminished since
the Helsinki conference, although information
on the matter is not very reliable.
85. The circumstances of the Polish question
itself were different from the crises in Hungary
in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, since it
was the Polish Government itself that took
repressive measures to try to curb the develop-
ment and action of Solidarity. It was the
government that had recourse to a state of emer-
gency, numerous arrests and various repressive
measures. But the state of emergency has been
terminated. However, there is still considerable
uncertainty about developments in Poland
where repressive measures alternate with mea-
sures of detente for reasons which evade us.
Between the condemnation of the murderers of
Father Popieluszko after a public trial with a full
hearing and the arrest the following week of the
principal Solidarity leaders, the conduct of the
Polish authorities is far from clear and points at
the intention, imposed by the Soviet Union or
not, not to tolerate true free trade unionism or
even, perhaps, religious freedom.
86. The Soviet Union still exercises pressure
on the countries it dominates. In September
1984, Mr. Honecker, Prime Minister of the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, had to cancel the
visit he was to have made to,the Federal Repub-
lic following Soviet pressure intended to put a
brake on the development of relations between
the two German states which nevertheless
conformed fully to the Helsinki final act. But
pressure is not the same as in the past and leaves
a wider maryin for the adaptation of states'
internal policies to what the people want, which
allows them, in repressing any political opposi-
tion, to avoid availing themselves of the means
they had no hesitation about using in 1956.
87. Finally, it should be recalled that although
the Belgrade meeting to verify application of the
Helsinki final act was a complete failure this was
not so for the Madrid meeting which, even
before the two g;reat powers had agreed to
resume negotiations on the limitation of arma-
ments, allowed the East-West dialogue to conti-
nue on a number of important matters in specia-
lised meetings. Although renunciation of the
use of force is still a very procarious element of
stability and peace in an ovel-armed world, pro-
ceedings at the Stockholm conference allow it to
be hoped that meaningful progress will be made
towards definite measures to limit the level of
armaments in Europe and to consolidate mutual
confidence, just as recent events in Poland
perhaps indicate that the He[sinki decisions on
human rights have not remained a dead letter.
88. It may therefore be thought that a resump-
tion of negotiations on the limitation of arma-
ments, accompanied by a reactivation of trade,
will also lead to an improvement in East-West
political relations. Conversely, if the West
adopted uncompromising positions because the
eastern countries failed to apply the Helsinki
final act, the consequence might be to block pro-
gress towards disarmament and the liberalisation
of trade and, in the long run, to heighten politi-
cal tension. The international situation at the
beginning of 1985 places the West before a
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choice on which will depend the future of East-
West relations and probably also the future of
western society itself, which is finding it increa-
singly difficult to understand the need for the
effort it has to make to ensure its security which
it considers to be threatened just as much by the
build-up of nuclear weapons or prospects of an
extension of defence systems in space as by
Soviet policy.
89. East-West meetings planned for the
coming months, including the Ottawa meeting
on human rights, must be used to reach a realis-
tic agreement on these matters, i.e. one which
takes account of what the Soviet Union consi-
ders essential for its security, even if this is far
from satisfactory from a western point of view.It is better to have a minimum definition of
the rights which the parties involved will really
respect than a more satisfactory definition of
commitments which would be flouted, as were
the undertakings the Soviet Union accepted in
Helsinki. But the principle of non-interference
in the internal affairs of states must not be used
as an excuse for not respecting rights thus
defined.
Y. Conclusions
90. The President of the Assembly informed
your Rapporteur that he sent the following tele-
gram to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council
on 3rd January:
* Welcoming the opening of American-
Soviet talks on the control of armaments,
I count strongly 9n lhe Council of WEU,in pursuance of the Rome Declaration, to
examine without delay the guarantees
necessary for the security of Western
Europe in the new conditions that might
be created by a significant reduction of
nuclear and conventional weapons and to
make known the importance all its mem-
bers attribute to an international aglee-
ment reserving the application of space
research to peaceful uses. In conveying
my best wishes for the new year to you
and the members of the Council I can do
this in no better way than by expressing
on behalf of the Assembly the hope that
WEU will have an even more active r6le
to play in efforts for peace, as you yourself
expressed the wish when addressing the
Assembly. Signed: J.-M. Caro, Presi-
dent of the WEU Assembly'.
91. It is to be hoped that an answer will be
soon received to this message since the disarma-
ment experts of the WEU member countries met
in Bonn on I lth February in accordance with
the proposal made by Mr. Genscher, Chairman-
in-Offrce of the Council, when addressing the
Assembly on 6th December 1984. There is
every reason to believe that the experts will have
taken account of the letter from Mr. Burt,
United States Under-Secretary of Defence,
asking the members of WEU not to take separate
decisions on arms control policy. This does not
seem to exclude consultations in WEU, but
leaves the United States a free hand in
negotiations.
92. Moreover, since the Warsaw Pact is due
for renewal, your Rapporteur proposes that the
Council be invited to ask the countries of the
Warsaw Pact and of the Atlantic Alliance to
include in the two treaties the principle of the
renunciation of the threat of recourse to force
as defined in the Helsinki final act.
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Amendment I 20th May 1985
Eost-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act
AMENDMENT 1 
'
tabW by Iard Reay
l. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add :
" while bearing in mind that any reaffrrmation of the non-use of force should be accompanied by
an agreed confirmation of the need to respect human rights. n
Signed: Reay
l. See 3rd sitting 2lst May 1985 (amendment consolidated with amendment 3 and agreed to).
t37
Document 1013
Amendment 2
21st May 1985
East-tAest rebtions ten years after the Helsinki final oct
AMENDMENT 2I
tabW by Mr.I-agorce
2. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:
" Considering that WEU's action should allow the CSCE process to- be strenglhened and 
-inparticular th? views of the European pillar of the alliance to be heard at the Stockholm
conference on disarmament in Europe ; ".
Signed: Lagorce
l. See 2nd sitting, 2lst May 1985 (amendment agreed to).
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Amendment 3
21st May 1985
East-West rehtions tens years after the Helsinhi final act
AMENDMENT 3 
'
tabled by Mr. Lagorce
3. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add :
" while preparing and implementing specific mutual measures of confidence and confirming by
common agreement the need to respect human rights. "
Signed: Lagorce
l. See 3rd sitting, 2lst May 1985 (amendment consolidated with amendment 1 and agreed to).
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Amendment 4
21st May 1985
East-|l/est rehtions ten yeors after the Helsinki final act
AMENDMENT 4I
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Lord Reay
4. In the draft recommendation proper, at the end of paragraph 2(d), add * with immediate applica-
tion to Afghanistan ".
Signed: BennaL ReaY
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1. See 3rd sitting 2lst May 1985 (amendment agreed to).
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QUESTTON 249
put by Mr. Hill
on ITth October 1984
Is the Council aware that the Belgian
Government is examining a contract for theiale
of $l billion worth of nuclear equipment to
Libya ?
Why should Libya, with vast reserves of
gas and oil and a small population, need a
nuclear power plant ?
Will the Council give the Belgian Govern-
ment assurances that, if it decides not to accept
this contract, no other Western European
country will accept such a contract from Libya ?
Written_Questions 249 to 256 and replies of the Council
to Wriuen Questions 249 to 252 and 254 to 2SS
15th May 1985
REPLY OF THE COfINCIL
communicated to thc Assembly
on 18th March 19E5
l. The Council has seen reports about an
incident involving a Soviet submarine in the
Straits of Gibraltar on l8th September 1984 and
a Soviet merchant vessel.
2. The Council considers that it would be
inappropriate to comment on the attitude of
non-WEU member governmonts to such inci-
dents. It is for the governments of the coun-
tries concerned to make their views known if
they so desire. Similarly, it is not for the
Council to take decisions about the interpreta-
tion and application of the fou,r Geneva conven-
tions on the law of the sea in such cir-
cumstances.
QUESTTON 251
put by Mr.ItnZer
on 27th October 1984
Further to Written Question 240 of lTth
October 1983 and the Counsil's reply of lgth
September 1984, will the Council inform the
Assembly on:
(a) the progress ofthe proposed European
fighter aircraft ;
(b) the bi- and trilateral plans of member
governments on joint helicopter pro-jects ;
(c) the development of new military
transport aircraft ;
(d) the development of the second genera-
tion of European missiles;
(e) the planning of " emerging technolo-
gies " in Europe, as adopted by the
Conference of National Armaments
Directors.
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 17th Apfl 1985
l. In its reply of l9th September 1984 to the
written question of lTth October 1983, the
Council stressed the significance of European
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on l9th April 198i
The Council is aware of negotiations that
have taken place between Libya and a private
Belgian firm which related to the non-sensitive
part of two nuclear power stations, namely the
industrial architecture and part ofthe conventio-
nal hardware. It is to be noted that the Libyan
authorities have stated that their aim is to
prepare for the " post-oil " era.
As far as the Council knows, no decision
has yet been taken as to the follow-up to this
matter.
QUESTTON 2s0
put by Mr.lAikinson
on 22nd October 1984
Is the Council aware of the passing of a
nuclear attack submarine of the Soviet Union
hidden behind a Soviet freighter through the
Straits of Gibraltar on l9th September 1984
under water instead of surfacing and showing the
flag?
Is such a passage acceptable to the coastal
states of Spain and Morocco and according to
the 1958 Geneva law of the sea convention ?
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armaments co-operation and transatlantic colla-
boration. This was underlined with particular
clarity by the decisions taken on the occasion of
the thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty by the Foreign and Defence Ministers
at their extraordinary meeting in Rome on 26th
andZ7th October 1984. On this occasion it was
recoenised that Western European Union could
provide a political impetus with regard to the
IEPG.
2. In the Independent European Programme
Group (IEPG) Defence Ministers met for the
first time in The Hague on22nd-23td November
1984. On this occasion they took decisions to
intensiff above all European armaments co-
operation.
3. Participating nations have succeeded in
achieving further progxess on the projects men-
tioned in the written question. Further to the
reply to Written Question 240 the following is
stated :
As regards a common European fighter
aircraft (EFA), France, the Federal Republic of
Germany,Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain
are currently conducting a joint industrial and
technological feasibility study. The studies,
which are essentially carried out in the industries
of the five nations, are based on the harmonised
requirements of the air forces (European staff
target) signed jointly in Rome on lOth October
1984. The ministers are following the pro-
gramme very closely and intend to take a
decision on its continution in the summer of
1985. The Netherlands are considering partici-
pation in the EFA project.
With regard to a multilateral joint heli-
copter programme, which is designated * NATO
helicopter for the 1990s " and includes a heli-
copter for the NATO frigate and a tactical trans-
port helicopter, a memorandum of understan-
ding for a feasibility/predefinition study between
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is
under preparation. As for a future transport
aircraft, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands have established, in an
IEPG study Broup, common requirements to be
met by such an aircraft. At the IEPG ministe-
rial meeting mentioned above, it was decided to
explore jointly the possibilities of co-operation
and an investigation has been set in hand.
At a bilateral level, mention should be
made of the Franco-German anti-tank helicopter
programme (HAP/HAC). Moreover, full deve-
lopment of the Anglo-Italian EH-lOl helicopter,
which has ASW, civil passenger transport, and
utility transport (civil or military) variants, is
now well in hand.
4. The IEPG programme for anti-tank
guided weapons of the new generation - the
second generation being already in service - is
currently in its definition phase, which is jointly
conducted by France, the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United Kingdom. In the
meantime, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands,
Greece, and Spain have declared their readiness
to participate in the programme under agreed
arrangements beginning with the development
phase.
Concerning new generation systems, men-
tion can also be made of the future medium
surface-to-air missiles referred to in the minis-
terial declaration of the IEPG meeting on 22nd
and 23rd November 1984.
With regard to possible use of emerging
technologies in the short and medium terms, the
Conference of National Armaments Directors
(CNAD) has identified during 1984 thirteen pro-
jects which are given first priority by at least four
member nations. For nine of these thirteen
projects special measures are being taken to
monitor progress so as to help achieve introduc-
tion into service according to existing military
requirements at the beginning of the nineties.
Reports on these projects are submitted half-
yearly to the Defence Planning Committee
(DPC) and the North Atlantic Council. In the
long term it is planned in the CNAD to evaluate
the military and technological-economical
aspects of key emerying technologies which are
to be given special attention within NATO. In
the IEPG it is planned also to intensiff Euro-
pean technological co-operation as a basis for
transatlantic co-operation and to define " co-
operative technology projects " (CTPS).
QUESTION 2s2
put by Sir Dudley Smith
on 3rd December 1984
As the Council, in its reply to Recommen-
dation 404, states that the competent authorities
of the Atlantic Alliance have been informed of
the specific ideas contained in the recommenda-
tion, but does not itself reply to them, will it
ensure that an adequate reply prepared by
NATO is communicated to the Assembly as it
did on similar occasions in the past, in particular
in reply to Recommendations 83 and 288 ?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 14th May 1985
The Council has apprised the competent
NATO authorities of the question put by the
honourable member. The information given in
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reply to the Council confirms that the member
governments of the integrated military stnrcture
have not formally adopted any joint positions on
the specific problems raised in Recommendation
404.
QUESTTON 2s3
pat by Mr. Goerens
on 6th December 1984
Many estimates in the defence budgets of
the various WEU and NATO countries do not
always have a direct connection with military
expenditure proper.
The question which I have the honour toput therefore refers to sums earmarked for
technological research in the defence budgets of
the various WEU countries and the United
States.
What percentage of the military budgets of
the WEU countries and the United States res-pectively is earmarked for technological
research ?
What percentage of defence budgets of the
WEU countries and the United States is
earmarked for advanced technology ?
*
ri*
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
QUESTTON 2s4
put by Mr. Bloaaw
on 14th January 1985
In view of the statements by many minis-
ters of WEU governments concerning the need
to prevent, through equitable, verifiable and
balanced arms control agreements, an anns race
in outer space, and in the light ofparagraph 2 of
Recommendation 415 of the Assembly, will the
Council explain why, in paragraph 4 of the
North Atlantic Council communiqu6 of l5th
December 1984, there was no specific reference
to the need to ban such weapons, although that
paragraph calls specifically for nuclear weapons
to be substantially reduced ?
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 14th May 1985
The Council has noted the honourable
parliamentarian's question and wishes to draw
his attention to its replies to Recommendations
413 and 415 which express tlhe position of the
seven member countries of WEU on current
issues in the field of arms control and disarma-
ment.
QUESTTON 2ss
put by Mr. Batmel
on Sth Febraary 1985
In view of the threat posed by concerted
terrorist actions in Western Europe, has the
Council considered co-ordinating the struggle by
member countries against groups which attack
persons and organisations dealing with defence ?
Does it plan to strengthen the protection
given to WEU and its staff?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 28th March 1985
The terrorist threat is of the utmost
concern to WEU and other western countries.
At a number of WEU meetings held recently, the
protection of its staff and premises were discus-
sed as a matter of urgency. The necessary steps
are being implemented.
The honourable member will appreciate
that it is not the usual practioe to make known
details of such measures.
QUESTTON 256
put by Mr. Mascfudri
on l4th March 1985
What measures does the Council intend to
take to ensure that the A-129 helicopter (Man-
gusta) produced by the Italian group Agusta is
adopted by the armed forces of the WEU coun-
tries in view of the fact that A Franco-German
consortium is at present planning to produce a
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new combat helicopter with specifications simi-
lar to those of the one being produced by
Agusta ? Does the Council not think it would be
more logical to choose the Italian helicopter, and
what possibilities are there for industrial co-
production between the countries concerned so
that economic forces are not dispersed ?
Production will start on Agusta's multi-
purpose light combat helicopter at the end of
this year and prototype tests have given excep
tional results; moreover, the Franco-German
project is still at the simple prefeasibility study
stage.
Production of two similar helicopters
would be contrary to the goal of standardising
the armaments of Western European countries.
*
**
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
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Document 1015 13th May 1985
Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1985
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 
'
tabled by Mr. Ferrari Aggrodi
on behalf of the Presdential Committee
further to the decision talccn on 15th April 1985
The Assembly,
(i) Considering it essential that its needs be considered in the context of the revision of the
budget of the whole organisation ;(ii) Taking accolnt of the urgency of the problems facing the Assembly and the time neces-
sary for the work of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;(iiil Noting that the measures which need to be taken cannot be long delayed,
Dmrc, s rne PnrsroBvnnr Courrarrrrr
To submit these comments to the Council.
1. See lst sitting, 20th May 1985 (order amended and agreed to).
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Amendment I
20th May 1985
Badget of the Assembly for thefinancial year 19E5
AMENDMENT 1 I
tabM by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi
1. Redraft the motion for an order proper as follows :
'To invite the Council, in the light of the above, to give favourable consideration to
the proposals the Assembly is soon to make for improving its conditions of work. "
Signed : Ferrari Aggradi
l. See lst sitting 2fth May 1985 (amendment agreed to).
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II. Relations with the Council
l. By adopting Order 58, the Assembly
decided to set up a body for liaison with the
Council. This body, adapted to the require-
ments of the informal talks which are now being
held, should, at times when docisions have been
prepared but not yet adopted, be able to meet
either the Council of Ministers or its Chairman-
in-Oflice or the Permanent Council.
The Presidential Committee should form
this liaison group with the seven members of the
present Bureau and, on the basis oftheir present
numbers, one (in the case of the communists
and liberals) or two (in the case of the christian
democrats or socialists) representatives of each
of the political groups not represented in the
Bureau. Each of them might arrange for a
replacement to be appointed. Replacements
would be convened only in the event of the titu-
lar member of the liaison group announcing that
he could not attend a meeting so as to guarantee
the limited numerical composition of this group.
2. Where the Assembly committees iue
concerned, it will be particularly important for
each of them, in accordance with its own point
of view, to maintain and develop the dialogue
with the Council.
3. The Assembly maintainpd and developed
its activities at a time when the Council was
curbing its own. It must retain this essential
aspect of its autonomy, i.e. the freedom to
choose its own agenda in accordance with the
provisions of Article I of the Charter. It is
therefore legitimate for the Assembly and its
committees to examine mattetrs not tackled by
the Council but which are discussed in other
bodies. This is current practioe and the Assem-
bly has always asked the Council to be kept
informed of these discussions (particularly in
NATO) and its wishes have generally been
met. Hence the dialogue between the commit-
tees and the Council should npt be confined to
matters actually handled in dre framework of
WEU.
Methods of work of the Assembly
The Assembly's new conditions of work
MEMORANDUM
by Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, President of the Assembly,
adopted by the Presidential Committee on ISth April lgBS
I. New basic facts
The measures already taken by the Coun-
cil to turn WEU towards new activities and
those it is now preparing to adapt the institu-
tions to the tasks which have thus been rede-
fined imply a review of relations between the
Council and the Assembly and also re-examina-
tion of the Assembly's own methods of work.
Your President has learned from his talks with
the Ministers and with the members of the Per-
manent Council that all are quite prepared, in
parallel with the transformation of the activities
of the Council and of its organs, to seek a defi-
nite improvement in their relations with the
Assembly and in particular to hold effective
consultations with the Assembly, especially
during this period of reflection and preparation
of decisions which will commit the future of
WEU.
It is already certain that the very elaborate
procedure which governed relations between the
Council and the Assembly when matters relating
to the control of armaments and the enlargement
of the European Community dominated the
Council's activities needs to be changed now
that these activities are more politically-
oriented. Conversely, more informal, frequent
and confident relations can be established since
the Council has shown that it intends to keep the
Assembly better informed of its activities and
the latter has every interest in obtaining a more
accurate idea of the Council's views on essential
matters so that its voice may be heard more
clearly by the Council and by public opinion.
Efforts on both sides to give the dialogue
between the Council and the Assembly more
substance should not, however, lead to a confu-
sion of responsibilities which both wish to avoid.
Furthermore, insofar as the matters which
the Council is henceforth to handle should be of
greater interest to public opinion and the press,
it would increase its audience by becoming the
true, politically active partner which is essential
for the Assembly.
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4. Under Article IX of the treaty, the Assem-
bly discusses all the Council's activities which
the latter has to describe in its annual report.
The Assembly, its Presidential Committee
and its committees have to take account of the
very broad range of matters covered by the Brus-
sels Treaty and ensure co-ordination with the
activities of the other European organisations.
Conversely, Article I of the Charter and
Rules 16, L7, 28 and 43.1 of the Rules of Proce-
dure together allow the Council to submit to the
Assembly matters for an opinion, to address
reports and communications to the Assembly
and to ask the Assembly to discuss a matter
which was not on its agenda.
ln view of the wide range of options thus
available to the Assembly, the governments
should therefore be urged to play a far more
active part in the Assembly's deliberative work.
5. In the new situation, the committees
might take greater account of the Council's,agen-
das when drawing up thefu programmes of work
and the Council might be invited to bear the
Assembly's intentions in mind when preparing
its agendas. A continuing exchange of informa-
tion between the Office of the Clerk and the
Secretariat-General should facilitate co-ordina-
tion. The committees' programmes of work
could then be transmitted to the Council in due
time and on a reciprocal basis.
6. Some members of the Permanent Council
have expressed a wish to see committee rappor-
teurs. Such meetings citn obviously only be
held at the rapporteurs' request.
7. The Council knows that the Assembly
wishes to ensure the continuous presence of a
minister during sessions. Such ministers might
speak in debates without necessarily having to
make a speech or answer questions. The Coun-
cil seems in favour of such practice but believes
it would mean limiting the number of reports
submitted at each session and sending them to
the Council early enough for it to take the neces-
sary measures, This would mean reports being
adopted by the committees at least two weeks
before each session.
The Chairman-in-Office of the Council
can obviously not be expected to attend a whole
session but the draft order ofbusiness should be
sent to the Council long enough before each ses-
sion for it to arrange to be represented at each
debate by the minister best able to respond to
the Assembly. This would also require stricter
compliance with and respect of the order of
business. Account should be taken of the value
of the dialogue between the Council and parlia-
mentarians, particularly when it allows the latter
to put questions to a minister from a country
other than their own.
8. Since the principle of an annual report is
imposed on the Council by treaty, the Council
should be asked to report at each part-session,
through its Chairman-in-Office, on its current
work and plans, as was done in 1984.
9. Procedure for formal joint meetings
admittedly has its advantages. Conversely, pro-
cedure for informal meetings mlght be impro-
ved.
(a) First, the Council's decision to hold at
least two ministerial meetings each year implies
the need for prior meetings between the Council
and the liaison group. The liaison group must
also hold consultations with the Permanent
Council.
(b) Again, on the occasion of these two minis-
terial meetings each year, consideration might be
given to following them up with informal
consultations with one or other committee parti-
cularly interested in the Council's agenda in
accordance with the proposal under paragraph[.2.
@ Such forms of consultation should allow
representatives of all the governments, and not
only the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, to
play an active part.
10. The nex shape of the Council's agendas
and co-ordination of its agendas with those
Assembly sessions should allow the Council to
answer written questions and recommendations
from the Assembly far more quickly than in the
past.
III. The Assembly's methods of work
During the second part of the thirtieth ses-
sion of the Assembly we were all able to see that
certain difficulties hampered the smooth run-
ning of our work and I wish the Presidential
Committee to examine the causes and above all
to consider remedies. For the Assembly, imple-
mentation of the Rome declaration is liable to
make several of these problems worse, particu-
larly if the Assembly is to follow up the
Council's suggestion to develop significantly its
relations with other parliamentary assemblies
and with the Council. In this connection, your
President had a useful discussion with the
Permanent Council on l3th December 1984.
This twofold undertaking not only raises
questions of efficiency and budgetary questions
but also the question of the necessarily limited
time at our disposal during sessions. These two
aspects of the problem are closely linked since
the temporary staff who ensure the smooth
running of sessions could not continue to co-
operate if we are not able to guarantee acceptable
working hours for them, which means that more
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staff will henceforth be required for those
tasks. I would add that the permanent staff is
extended to the limit of its possibilities for
several weeks on the occasion of each session.
Yet the number of matters considered by the
Assembly has not increased and speaking time
has had to be sharply reduced for everyone.
I believe there are several ways these pro-
blems might be alleviated:
l. Holding a third annual session seems
rather unrealistic as long as the Assembly conti-
nues to be composed of parliamentarians who
are members of the Council of Europe and
already overburdened by the activities of that
assembly. It would require budget resources
which WEU does not have. The most that
might be done would be to prolong the two part-
sessions by a half day or even a whole day but
even then we should run into the obstacle of the
availability of parliamentarians, plus that of
budget constraints.
2. If we are to remain within the present
framework, it will be necessary to examine the
organisation of the debates. This would mean:
(a) Ensuring that conditions for the conduct
ofdebates are known beforehand :
- 
the recently introduced rule that spea-
kers put their names down and that
amendments be tabled before the end of
the sitting preceding the opening of a
debate should be confirmed;
- 
numbering all amendments after divid-
ing them into as many parts as is useful
for the clarity of the debate would allow
a little time to be saved when voting ;
- the participation of ministers should be
arranged in accordance with the proce-
dure referred to in paragraph II.7; in
the event of a ministerial address follo-
wed by questions, the hearing might be
organised and limited in time.
(b) In political debates of general interest in
which many speakers always put their names
down, speaking time should be limited. Prio-
rity should be given to :
- 
fifteen minutes for the rapporteur when
presenting his report ;
- 
ten minutes for the committee chair-
man and rapporteur to wind up the
debate;
- 
ten minutes for the spokesman of each
political group ifit has so requested.
The rest of the time earmarked for the
debate would be shared between the other
speakers who have put their names down.
(c) The presidency would inform the Assem-
bly in due time before the opening of each ses-
sion that debates are to be organised in this way.
3. Like many members of the Assembly, the
Council has expressed the wish that parliamen-
tary observers from member countries of the
Atlantic Alliance not members of WEU be
invited to attend Assembly sossions. Several of
these countries have shown keen interest in
participating. Hitherto, it has been the practice
of the Presidential Committee to invite obser-
vers from countries directly concerned by the
subjects on the agenda ofeach session.
4. Furthermore, there should be more meet-
ings between Assembly conlmittees and com-
mittees from the parliaments of member coun-
tries of the alliance. The cornmittees should be
urged to hold ad hoc meetings with parliamenta-
rians from those countries.
5. It would be desirable for several commit-
tees, including the Committee for Relations with
Parliaments, to gloup their mpetings in the same
place and during the same week. The value of
holding such meetings when reports are being
adopted should be borne in rnind :
(a) to make it easier to obtain a quorum
and to limit the number of journeys
which parliamentarians have to make;
(b) to make it easier te communicate the
results of the committees' discussions
to the press ;
(c) to facilitate contacts with representati-
ves of the government and parliament
of the host country, the presence of
observers from third countries and,
possibly, the presence of members of
the Council;
(d) to allow political groups to hold
working meetings in appropriate
conditions;
(e) to limit the budgetary implications of
meetings held away from Paris.
The Office of the Clerk would be responsi-
ble for planning such 'corlrmittee sessions "
when preparing the programmes of work which
the committee chairmen subrnit to their respec-
tive committees for each session. The latter
should be asked to take full account of such
plans.
Generally speaking, strong political, ope-
rational and budgetary reason$ militate in favour
of giving priority to the organisation of * com-
mittee sessions ".
6. The importance that mlght be accorded to
questions of disarmament and the limitation of
armaments in the work of the Council might
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make it necessary for the Assembly to reorganise
its activities. While it is obvious that the
budgetary implications of such an initiative and
its repercussions on the length of sessions makeit impossible at the present juncture, it is
nevertheless certain that it deserves to be
examined in depth with the governments. It
seems certain that a large part of the Assembly's
work will be devoted to the question of disarma-
ment. This option corresponds to the political
step just taken by the Council in deciding to
direct its work more particularly towards mat-
ters relating to the controlled limitation of arma-
ments. Consideration of this matter will be
resumed as soon as the budget permits.
7. One way or another, any extension of the
work of the Assembly, and in particular any par-
ticipation of representatives of non-member
countries, will have budgetary repercussions.
The Assembly cannot hope to obtain the neces-
sary funds if it is not unanimous in adopting its
draft budget.
8. It is with these prospects in mind that it
seems wise to base the Assembly's budget propo-
sals on political aims whose broad lines should
be laid down by the Presidential Committee in
good time. Rules 16 and 17 of the Rules of
Procedure do not limit its rdle to drawing up the
agenda of the next session. It also has to pre-
pare the register of the Assembly, which allows it
to envisage a longer-term programme of work.It will be for the Presidential Committee, on
the basis of proposals by the committees whichit will consult for this purpose, to define the
choice of political options.
9. The Presidential Committee would thus
be better placed to give its views in full
knowledge of the facts on requests from commit-
tees to hold meetings away from the seat of the
Assembly or to authorise journeys by rappor-
teurs.
The opinion of the Presidential Commit-
tee must be based on a twofold consideration:(i) the political expediency of any journeys on
behalf of WEU outside member countries; (i/
the financial implications of any journeys invol-
ving expenditure by WEU.
It might be agreed that journeys by a rap
porteur within member countries not exceeding
two days should not require discussion by the
Presidential Committee. But any larger com-
mitment of funds, be it for a journey by a
rapporteur or by a committee meeting away
from Paris, would require the prior authorisa-
tion of the Presidential Committee. Commit-
tees should therefore submit their requests to the
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration in time for him to be
able to inform the Presidential Committee of the
financial implications of the proposals.
I Y. P arliament ary pafi ic ipat ion
The growing r6le of WEU and the require-
ments of its political audience also mean promo-
ting parliamentary participation in the work of
the Assembly.
Shortcomings for the moment are limited
to two facts :
First, many members of national parlia-
ments interested in European defence policy lack
the motivation or are not approached to become
members of their country's parliamentary dele-
gation to the WEU Assembly.
Second, the dual mandate of members of
the WEU Assembly and of the Council of
Europe will not improve their availability.
Since the different vocations of the two assem-
blies make it necessary to cover a wide spectrum
of interests in forming national delegations, this
sometimes reduces the numbers of participants
whose priority interest is in WEU.
Can these shortcomings be overcome ?
Here are two suggestions :
First:. (a) the presidents of national parlia-
ments might be informed and asked to urge poli-
tical groups in their parliaments to attach greater
importance to the participation of parliamenta-
rians interested in WEU matters when appoin-
ting members of their country's parliamentary
delegation ; (b) to this end, the interest of chair-
men of defence and foreign affairs committees
should be aroused.
Second, consideration might be given,
when forming national delegations to the Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe, to appointing a
relatively large number of parliamentarians who
would be required to give priority to meetings of
the WEU Assembly.
In view of the political aspects of this
matter, the General Affairs Committee should
be asked to submit a proposal to this end as soon
as possible.
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For the first time, a report is being pre-
sented to the Assembly on the activities of
the Presidential Committee. This innovation
deserves some explanation.
We all believe the Assembly must not only
be informed but also heard. As the parliamen-
tary body of the Western European Union politi-
cal organisation, it is indeed essential for it to be
able to express its options based on a general
strategic view and propose courses of action to
the governments. It will thus be able to make a
particularly important contribution to the reacti-
vation of Western European Union since this
raises highly complex problems for the govern-
ments.
In a period of intensive activity, however,
the Assembly cannot confine itself to communi-
cating recommendations and criticism to the
Council twice a year and waiting for the latter to
answer. It must be associated intimately ydth
the Council's deliberations and, where appro-
priate, its decisions. This is the spirit in which
the Assembly in Order 58 instructed the Presi-
dential Committee at the last session :
" To establish permanent liaison anange-
ments with the Council or its presidency
and to see that the Assembly is enabled to
b.lnq to a successful conclusion its
mission in working out a new and more
important r6le for WEU. "
To be able to carry out this mission, which
is not merely one of supervision but also of
encouragement, the Assembly needs to be orga-
nised, like the Council, in such a way as to be
able to exercise its duties continuously. This is
indeed the r6le of the Presidential Committee
which, under Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure,
must " take all such measures as it considers
necessary for the activities of the Assembly to be
properly carried on ".
While endeavouring to give more political
substance to the dialogue with the Council, the
Presidential Committee is trying to give the
Assembly the means it needs to conduct its work
effectively. The committee's action has already
produced positive political results. It is to be
18th May 1985
hoped that the same will be true in budgetary
matters.
Since the ministerial meeting in Paris on
l2th June of last year, Westem European Union
has entered a period of reactivation and restruc-
turation, the Council having at last followed up
the recommendations so often formulated by the
Assembly.
It was above all essential for the Assembly
to be directly associated with the examination of
the reform of Western European Union. For
that reason, and to provide food for thought
prior to the Rome meeting, the President of the
Assembly transmitted a me(norandum to the
Council setting out his views on the r6le of
WEU in the establishment of a European pillar
of the alliance and as an instrument for harmo-
nising views on defence matt€rs.
In the context, the Presidential Committee
took part in a meeting with the Council at the
close of the Rome ministerial meeting and
convened an extraordinary session of the Assem-
bly to start an immediate dialogue on the results
of the Council's work and on the future of our
organisation. This session was possible thanks
to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr.
Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for
Forergn Alfairs of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, who agreed, in spite of many difficulties,
to present the Council's conclusions. The Min-
isters for Forergn Affairs and Defence of Italy,
by answering questions and remarks made by
members of the Assembly, allowed a particularly
searching study to be made of the results
obtained at the Rome meeting
This extraordinary session had been pre-
pared by a meeting at Gymnich on 9th October
1984 between the Chairman-in-Office of the
Council and a liaison group appointed by the
Presidential Committee composed of the mem-
bers of the Bureau of the Assembly and represen-
tatives ofpolitical groups not represented in the
Bureau. A similar meeting was held on l9th
November 1984 in preparation for the Decem-
ber session at which the Assembly drew conclu-
Action by the Presidential Committee
REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Mr. Ferrari Aggrudi, Yice-Prcsident of the Assembly
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sions concerning the reactivation of WEU. On
this occasion, the Assembly, in Order 58,
instructed the Presidential Committee to institu-
tionalise as it were the liaison group, which had
been set up more or less on a trial basis. By
approving the memorandum on the Assembly's
methods of work, the Presidential Committee
defined the membership and terms of reference
of the Committee for Relations with the Council
which henceforth has the status of a subcom-
mittee of the Presidential Committee, to which
it will report.
This new body had hardly been set up
before having to tackle a new problem: the time
fixed for the ministerial meeting of the Council
coincided with the spring session of the Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe. This year, there-
fore, it has not been possible to organise the tra-
ditional meetings with the Presidential Commit-
tee, Committee on Defence Questions and
Armaments and General Affairs Committee.
The Committee for Relations with the Council
thus seemed to be the most appropriate instru-
ment for consultations with the Council in
exceptional circumstances.
The President of the Assembly had prepa-
red this meeting by discussing with the
Chairman-in-Office of the Council the main
topics on which we consider an attempt should
be made to harmonise European positions.
The agenda of the meeting of the Commit-
tee for Relations with the Council covered the
principal subjects of concern to the Assembly.
Particular mention is made of problems relating
to the strategic defence initiative and Europe's
possible response to the United States, the
French proposal for co-operation in advanced
technology, the various problems connected
with the future of the organisation, its enlarge-
ment and external reactions to its reactivation,
particularly in the United States. It will be for
members of the Assembly to question the
Chairman-in-Office of the Council about the
positions adopted at the Bonn meeting. It
might merely be said here that the answers recei-
ved to our questions are not yet very specific,
but this is perhaps not so much a lack of trust in
us on the part of the Council as an indication of
the rather tenuous nature of the conclusions
reached by the Ministers.
It must be recognised that we are still far
from a decision on the fundamental problem of
strategic defence. We do not really understand
whether all the states are in favour of it or not ;
we have no very clear view of what strategic
defence really represents, nor what it will
cost. No agreement has been reached on the
participation of European states and we do not
know whether they are to participate on a collec-
tive or individual basis.
These problems should be taken as an
invitation to continue our efforts to induce the
Council to forge ahead with its task of harmo-
nising the views of members on the questions
now arising which are crucial for Europe's secu-
rity. The Assembly should therefore express
the wish, and the Presidential Committee ask
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, that
a further meeting be organised with the Com-
mittee for Relations with the Council to prepare
for the next meeting in Rome in November.
The Council should be further encouraged, after
completing its restructuration work, at last to
make meaningful progress towards union and to
assign tasks to the ministerial organs commen-
surate with the problems raised.
At the Bonn meeting, it was not possible
for the committees to hold a meeting with the
Council. The obstacles which arose last April
should not recur this autumn. The committees
concerned should decide how they wish their
participation in the meeting with the Ministers
to be organised and inform the Presidential
Committee of their views.
The Assembly's work on defence matters
and the dialogue with the Council are set in a
European and Atlantic context. The Presiden-
tial Committee therefore considered it necessary
to associate other parliamentary bodies with the
Assembly's deliberations in an appropriate
manner. According to an already well-estab-
lished tradition, observers from the parlia-
ments of member countries of the alliance have
been invited, at their request, to attend our
debates. They should be thanked for their inte-
rest in our work. We are particularly happy to
welcome a delegation from Portugal since that
country has applied to join our organisation and
a draft resolution presented by the General
Affairs Committee proposes that the participa-
tion of a delegation of Portuguese observers in
the work of the Assembly should be made
permanent. Denmark, Norway and Turkey
have also asked to be represented by parliamen-
tary observers. The Norwegian Parliament has
also expressed the wish that, in future, members
of its Defence Committee be invited to attend
certain meetings of our Defence Committee as
observers. It will be easy to meet these wishes
since the Presidential Committee has authorised
committees which consider it useful to organise
ad hoc meetings with representatives of parlia-
ments of non-member countries if they so
request. I would add that following a talk
between the President of our Assembly and the
President of the European Parliament the princi-
ple of an exchange of observers between our
Defence Committee and a subcommittee of the
Committee on Political Affairs of the European
Parliament has been agreed upon and a start has
been made with implementing it. Relations
152
DOCUMENT IOIT
with other parliaments are a complex matter
because of the different position of each of theparliamentary bodies concerned. They should
therefore be studied in detail in the light of
experience and the conclusions of the stud-y sub-
mitted to the Assembly in a future report.
^ This part of the report on the promotionof the dialogue with the Councii will be
concluded with a mention of the financial impli-
cations of the Assembly's political ambitions.
To.carry out its tasks, the Assembly needs the
assistance of a specially qualified, duly equipped,
secretariat and the assistance ofexperts tiom ttr6
agencies of the Council of Ministels. It should
also have the resources needed for organising its
m-eetings, journeys by committees ind pubtic
relations. We hope the Council will adbpt a
favourable attitude towards the proposals w-hich
the Assembly will soon be making with a view to
solving these problems.
rf
*rt
Statutorily, the presidential Committee
and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and
Administration work togetherln eitablishing the
Assembly's budget. It had been agreed witfi the
latter committee that a minimum interim draft
budget would be presented at the session last
December. This budget, which simply renewed
the previous one, left outstanding thd question
of adapting the Assembly's meais to tlie tasks
assigned to it in the context ofthe reactivation ofWEU. At the beginning of the year, the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Adniinistration
underlined the need to reconsider the means
available to the Assembly and planned to
request an increase in budgetary apprbpriations.
The Presidential Committee was informed
9f the wish expressed by the Committee onBudgetary Affairs and decided to submit a
motion for an order to the Assembly instructing
it to impress upon the Council the uigency of tn6
measures to be taken for the Assembly to carry
out its work in less precarious conditions. It il
therefore hoped that it will be possible to bring
home the truly disturbing position of the Assem-bly, whose budgetary problems are different
from those of the Council.
The new structures of the ministerial
organs were defined on 23rd April 1985 and spe-
cific tasks should be assigned to them in the nearfuture. The financial implications of reforming
WEU will become evident. Due to a reductioiin the duties of the Agency for the Control of
Armaments, resources are available for new
tasks without any increase in the organisation,s
overall budget.
The Assembly for its paft has increased its
activities without changing the number of its
staff. Like the Council oigans, it will have to
re-examine its budget. It would indeed be para-
doxical to consider that only the Assembly's
tasks remain unaffected by the reactivation'ofWEU. In the Rome declartation, the Councilitself recognised that the Assembly * is called
upon to play a growing r6le ".
But the Assembly's action is hindered by
the inadequacy of its secretariat for the taski
incumbent upon it and by the reduction in real
terms of its operating budget.
In Rome, the governments decided by
common agreement to give their support to the
Assembly. The Assembly is in faci -encounter-
ing growing dilliculties anO is liable to have ro
reduce its activities because of the reduction inits financial resources. Its staff is working
harder and harder but is finding it increasingl!
diflicult to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it.
The Council laid down the principle of
zero growth, but the way it has been applied has
led to a considerable reduction in rei6urces in
real terms:
(t) for several years, thre level of inflation
has been higher than expected ;(iil the cost of services and equipment
has increased more than the average
rate of inflation;
(iii) the incidence of the cost of pensions
on the budget has increased sharply,
thus reducing resources available-for
running the organisation ;
(iv) over the years, the cumulative effect
of these reductions has considerably
reduced the funds available to the
Assembly.
A particularly troublesome aspect of the
matter, which seems to correspond to no ratio-
nal reasoning, stems from the-desire to impose
on the Assembly the way it should use the
resources allocated to it and, further, to interfere
in the use of means available and the choice of
equipment which it considers it should procure.
For all these reasons, the Assembly is
forced to limit projects which it considers p6titi-
cally essential. This year, the Generat Afairs
Committee's visit to the United States has had
to be shortened. The Assembly has even foundit impossible to apply its own- Rules of proce-
dure, which provide that speeches in committee
may be made in the official languages of mem-
ber states. In committee, it is no longer possi-
ble to ensure the oral translation of speeches in
Dutch because of the cost of bringing in interpre-
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ters who cannot be found in Paris. The Scienti-
fic Committee is obliged to visit Canada without
interpreters. A fortiori, it is hardly possible for
the Assembly to carry out, in the requisite condi-
tions, projects to which it attaches great political
importanie and in which it has been encour-aged
byitre Council, such as establishing closer links
with other assemblies.
The Council should therefore respond
favourably to the revised draft budget which the
Assembly- is to submit to it in accordance with
proceduie soon to be fixed so as to remove the
obstacles still obstructing the attainment of the
aims it has set itself.
The Assembly's dialogue with the Council
will be even more productive if the Council is
more active politically. The Presidential Com-
mittee for iti part will continue to foster this
aim. It considers that after fixing the principles
for the reactivation of WEU in Rome last year
and the necessary supporting structur€ in Bonn
this year, the Council should make fuIl use of the
vast possibilities of the organisation at its
meeting in Rome next autumn'
WEU, which is a vital part of Europe's
identity, is not a military organisation but it is
incumbent upon it to bring about the political
conditions foi asserting a European personality
in the various bodies contributing to Europe's
security and, to this end, to harmonise views
and co-ordinate efforts.
The parliamentary Assembly wishes to
give the Council its full support in.this funda-
irental task and expects the Council to give it
the wherewithal to pursue ftiitful co-operation
with it.
In this spirit, the Presidential Committee
submits to the Assembly the motion for an order
in Document 1015, instructing it to draw the
Council's attention to the problems just mentio-
ned and, in the light of the views set out above,
to ask it to give favourable consideration to the
proposals the Assembly is soon to make for
improving its conditions of work.
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State of European security 
-
the central region
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions-and Annaments 2
by Dr. Millcr, Rapporteur
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Pignion 
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Introdactory Note
In preparing this report the committee as a whole met in the Federal Republic of Germany from
I 5th- I 7th October I 984, where it was briefed by :
Radio Free Europe 
- 
Radio LibertY
Mr. William Mahoney, O{Iice of Public Affairs; Mr. Keith Bu!!, Direcllor of Research, R1di.o
fiUertil- Ms. iiiraUett ieiioe and Dr. William Murphy, Radio Liberty Research and Analysis
Department.
Ministry of Defence, Bonn
Dr. Manfred W6rner, Minister of Defence; Brigadier General Oppermann; Colonel Bromeis;
Lt. Colonel Keller; Colonel Kellein.
Fighter-Bomber Wing 33, Buchel Air Base
Colonel Helmut Borchers, Commander; Lt. Colonel Jtirgen Stehli, Deputy_Wing Commander;
Major S.t.OO.r ; Major Becker ;'Lt. Colonel Christoph Keitel, Commander Flight Support Group.
Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), Brunssum, Netherlands
General L. Chalupa, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Eurole ;^AirChief Marshal Sir
Michaet Be"rrir, p.prty-Commander-in-Chief ; Lt. General H. Dry.ogr-ter, Chief-of-Staff; Lt. Colonel.
L. Denniston, Iirtettigedce Division;Major R. Boryer, Operations Division.
The committee as a whole met subsequently at the Palais d'Egmont, Brussels, 9n 15th February
19g5, ;h;n Ll Cenrraf Huitfeldt, Directorbf thd NATO International Military Stafi addressed._it on;-n.*rgi"g Gcfrooiogy and military strategy ". It then held a joint meeting with the Military
Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.
The committee then met in Strasbourg on 12th March 1985 where it was briefed_by-General
Charles de Llamby, Commander First Frenih Army and members of his staff; and at Headquarters
French Forces in Germany, Baden-Oos, where it wis briefed by Lt. General Houdet, Commander-in-
Chief and Commander 2nd French Army Corps, and his staff.
The committee met at the seat of the Assembly the following day and was received by M1.
Charles Hern", fvfiniiter of Defence, and then visited the French Defence Staff command post where it;; il;f.a Ui vic.-eamiral Louzeau, Major General of the Joint Defence Staff, and by General
Guichard, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Operations.
The committee met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly on l6th April, 7th May and 20th
May when it discussed and adopted the present report.
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament,
offrcials, senior officers and experts who metlhe committee and replied to questions.
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.
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Draft Recommendation
on thc stotc of Eurolnan security - the central region
The Assembly,
/y' 
^ . 
Noting that the.long-standing wqrlay Pact superiority in numbers of men, tanks, guns and air-
craft in the central region has not diminished ;(li) Aware however that with the improved defence effort made by most NATO countries in the lastfive years more modern equipment is now reaching NATO forces wtrictr still enjoy some qualitative
advantages in training and equipment ;
(iii) 
- 
Stresqing that the European countries provide some 80 to 90% of the ready forces and equipmentin place in Europe ;
(iv) 
. 
Welcoming the important contribution to allied defence made by the French cpnventional forces
stationed in Germany and in France which in the event of hostilities, should the French president so
decide, could be placed under the operational control of NATo commanders ;(t) 
- 
\q!gg that a referendum on continued Spanish membership of NATO is expected to be held inMarch 1986;
Qi) 
- 
Recognising that the stationing 9{ oyer 400,000 allied troops on the territory of the FederalRepublic of Germany represents a considerable social burden borne by that country iir ttre interesis of
allied defence;
(vii) Recalling that considerable further improvement in the effectiveness of the alllied defence effort
can be made at no addition4.cost throgsh standardisation and interoperability of equipment, and thai
logistic arrangements are still in need of improvement,
Rrcouueuos rner rnr Cor.lNCrL
Urge in the North Atlantic Council:
l. That a renewed effort be made to establish a genuine European defence industry with a view toimproving standardisation and interoperability ;
2.. That advantage F9 taken of any opportunities to reposition forces stationed in Germany to alle-
viate the present unsatisfactory deployment ;
1. That published NATO force comparisons take account of French and in due course of Spanishforces;
4. That Spain be requested to assign to SACEUR a modern mobile force of at least one division as
an early reserve for the central region, and that Spain be asked to respond to the NATO annual reviewquestionnaire as is the custom of all other NATOiountries.
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Expltnatory Memorandum
(submittet by Dr. Milbr, Rapportear)
I. Introduction
1.1. The committee called for a report to exa-
mine the forces deployed in the central region,
taking account in particular of information
obtained during the committee's fact-finding
visits to Germany and to headquarters Allied
Forces Central Europe in October 1984 and to
French land forces headquarters in March 1985.
1.2. The report concentrates on the land forces
in the central region; the status of the air
commands in the central region was described
in the committee's previous report on the state
ofEuropean securityr.
II. lAarsaw Pact forces - cental region
2.1. The land responsibility of headquarters
Allied Forces Central Europe, with its head-
quarters at Brunssum, Netherlands, extends
from the Swiss frontier in the south to the River
Elbe in the north, leaving the land area of
Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark between the
Elbe and the Baltic Sea under the Northern
European command with its headquarters out-
side Oslo. Assessments of Warsaw Pact land
forces facing the central region are not so neatly
divisible into those that mlght be engaged
against the Central Europe command and those
that might be engaged in the Baltic approaches.
A briefrng given to the committee assumes that
the Warsaw Pact's western theatre of military
operations (Western TVD), after a few days'pre-
paration, would be able to deploy some 40 active
divisions against the central front, organised in a
first and second echelon. These are the forces
based in peacetime in the forward area compri-
sing the German Democratic Republic, Czecho-
slovakia and Poland. After mobilisation a fur-
ther 30 divisions would be available as theatre
reserves and after thirty days it is assumed that
g;round forces could be built up to over 90 divi-
sions, drawing for this purpose on forces
stationed in peacetime in the western military
districts of the Soviet Union.
2.2. A summary of assesments of force balance
from various sources is shown at Appendix I.
Some of these estimates make global compari-
sons for the whole of the central and northern
region 
- 
i.e the area between the Alps and the
Arctic Ocean - others attempt to assess the
balance in the central region alone.
2.3. Allied Forces Central Europe has available
in peacetime some 20 divisions of " in-place
forces'which within ten to twelve days could be
increased by a further eight divisions, coming in
part from the United Kingdom. Further rein-
forcement by United States third corps would be
slower but the positioning of equipment in
Europe has improved the rate at which these
forces can arrive.
2.4. These figures take no account of French
forces, referred to in Chapter III, because they
are not assigned to NATO command. Never-
theless there are three French armoured divi-
sions stationed in Germany and a further ten in
France, not counting two light armoured divi-
sions which can be formed from training
schools.
2.5. The assessment of levels of air forces, as
far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned, is much
more conjectural because of the high mobility of
air forces which can be redeployed very rapidlyto other regions entirely. Headquarters
AFCENT assumes however that there would be
over 3,000 combat aircraft available in the War-
saw Pact western theatre which could be rapidly
increased to 4,500 by aircraft from western mili-
tary districts of the Soviet Union. These air
forbes have over 200 main and dispersal airfields
available in the forward area.
2.6. Aircraft available to Allied Air Forces
Central Europe 
- 
the air defence responsibility of
which extends as far as the Baltic - amount to
some 1,300 immediately-available combat air-
craft which can be increased by a further
1,000 aircraft, mostly from the United States,
within about thirty days, but there are insuffi-
cient airfields available fully to support all these
reinforcements. French aircraft are not statio-
ned in Germany, but France operates some air
defence radar stations in the country. The
French tactical air force based in France could
add some 270 combat aircraft to the above
numbers. Almost as valuable could be access
to affields on French territory if authorised by
the French Government.
2.7. For air defence, the central region has
some 240 air defence aircraft as well as a further
200 multirole aircraft. With the entry into ser-
vice of half of the planned airborne early warn-
ing aircraft, surveillance especially against low-
flying aircraft has been greatly improved. The
Nike long-range surface-to-air missiles will be
phased out and replaced in due course with
Patriot missiles which will also replace some of
the shorter-range Hawk units.1. Document 971, 
l5th May 1984, Rapporteun Sir Dud-
ley Smith, paragraphs 3.16 et seq.
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2.8. The overall force comparisons presented
to the committee have shown a 2 to I advantage
for the Warsaw Pact in air forces, with a NATb
p-!s1ti.on in proportional terms improving only
slightly after reinforcements. The hnd foices in
division equivalents are in the ratio of about 2 toI initially, increasing in favour of the Warsaw
Pact until United States reinforcements could
arrive or, possibly, French forces, if committed
in support of NATO.
2.9. Warsaw Pact numerical superiority is
most marked however in tanks, armoured per-
sonnel carriers and artillery. German estimitesfor Central Europe show 7,600 NATO main
battletanks compared with 25,500 for the War-
saw Pact; some 19,000 other armoured vehicles
for NATO compared with 43,000 for the War-
saw Pact and in the case of artillery 4,050 for
NATO compared with 17,500 for the Warsaw
Pact.
2.10. The corresponding figures in British
defence white papers are significantly different 
-
the two are compared at Appendix I.
2.11. As far as the hardware is concerned how-
ever, the latest models of tanks comprise less
than half of the Warsaw Pact totals but a some-
what higher proportion of the NATO total in
view of the more recent modernisation effort.
IIL Allied forces in the central region
3.1. The concentration of ground and air
forces on each side of the NATO-Warsaw pact
boundary is far greater in the central region than
on any other part of that boundary. Forces
from more different allied countries are statio-
ned in West Germany than in any other NATO
country 2 :
system which traverses French territory and hasits headquarters in Versaill0s. Frante grants
clearance for overflight of its territory Uy AUeO
military aircraft on a case-by-case basii.
3.3. Thus the territory available for the deploy-
ment of ground and air forces and their logiiticil
support in the southern half of the ientral
region, between the Moselle and the Swiss fron-tier, is seriously lacking in depth. At its
narrowest part the territory of West Germany is
only 300 kilometres wide.
3.4 The in-place NATO ground forces
assigned to conduct a forward defence of the
territory are described by army corps, from
north to south ofthe central rqgron.
Netherlands
3.5. The first Netherlands corps is assigned the
most northerly part of the central front. It
comprises two armoured brigades and four
mechanised infantry brigades but of these only
one annoured brigade is stationed in Germany
in peacetime. Of the main battletanks 135 are
Leopard II but over 300 are still the obsolescent
Centurion.
First German corps
3.6. The first German corps which is assigned
the next sector to the south of the Netherlinds
corps has some of its units stationed in peace-
time in the sector allocated to the neighbouring
Netherlands and British corps; they would have
to act as screening forces while the main units of
the Netherlands corps and some units of the
British corps moved up into the forward defenceposition in a period of alerrt. Equipment is
described in paragraph 3.13.
United Kingdom
3.7. The first United Kingdom corps with its
headquarters in Bielefeld is assigned the next
sector to the south of first German corps. It is
organised in three armoured divisions compri-
srng seven armoured brigadbs and one air
mobile brigade. During a period of alert it
would be reinforced by a further infantry divi-
sion which is stationed in the United Kingdomin peacetime. Main battletanks in the British
army include 70 of the new Challengers, which
will eventually equip four tank regiments in Ger-
many, and over 800 Chieftain tanks. It is not
clear how many of these are stationed in Ger-
many at present.
Belgium
3,8. The Belgian corps comprising two divi-
sions is assigned the sector to lhe south of first
British corps. The corps totals one armoured
Netherlands
Belgium
United Kingdom
United States
Canada
France
Torar-
3.2. Whereas Warsaw Pact forces have unres-
tricted access to the lines of communication area
and air space behind the East-West boundary,
stretching back through the territory of poland
and Czechoslovakia to the frontiers of the Soviet
Ilnion, NATO lines of communication rely on
the German North Sea ports and the Benelux
countries. Since the withdrawal of France from
the integrated structure in 1966 the use of
French territory fpr allied lines of commu-
nications is limited to the NATO fuel pipeline
8,000
30,000
67,500
243,000
5,500
49.000
403,000
2. Sources: MOD Bonn.
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brigade and three mechanised infantry brigades
of whictr one arrnoured brigade and one mecha-
nised infantry brigade and reconnaissance batta-
lions are stationed in Germany in peacetime.
Belgian forces are equipped with 330 I-eopard I
main battletanks.
3.9. Together the foregoing four corps com-
prise the forces available to Northern Army
Group which covers the area from the Elbe as
far south as Aachen to about Koblenz.
Third German corps
3.10. The third German corps comprising frve
armoured brigades organised in two divisions
occupies the next sector, the most northerly of
the Central Army Group. Like first German
corps in the north it has units deployed forward
near the East German boundary which would
have to provide screening forces while other
allied troops moved to their forward locations in
an alert. Equipment is described in paragraph
3.r3.
United States
3.11. The fifth and seventh United States corps
are assigned sectors in southern Germany and
represent the bulk of the United States ground
foices in Europe. They comprise two armoured
and two mechanised divisions and the equiva-
lent of a further four brigades. Including stock-
piled tanks for the strategic reserye,, United
States forces have 5,000 main battletanks in the
central region, mostly the M-60. Advanced
units of the United States third corps are now
deployed in the Bremen area in north Germany
wiih one brigade which forms an in-place
reserve in Northern Army Group area.
Second German corps
3.12. The second German corps is assigned the
extreme south of the central region in the neigh-
bourhood of the Austrian and southern Czecho-
slovakian border. It comprises three divisions
including a mountain division and, like the
other two German corps in the central region, it
has elements deployed well forward in peace-
time, partly in the area assigned to United States
seventh corps, which would act as screening
units during a period of alert while United States
forces moved to their wartime positions.
3.13. Collectively the German ground forces
provide six armoured, four armoured infantry,
one mountain and one airborne division, equip-
ped with about 2,500 Leopard I and 800
kopard II main battletanks as well as 1,000
older M-48 tanks. These forces include the
division in Schleswig-Holstein assigned to the
northern region.
Canada
3.14. Canada maintains a mechanised brigade
group with 59 kopard I main battletanks in the
iear area in Germany near Baden-Baden where
the French forces are stationed.
French forces in Germany
3.15. The committee was gratified to be able to
visit at its request headquarters First French
Army in Strasbourg and headquarters French
forces in Germany (which constitute second
French corps) near Baden. The committee had
not previously visited French forces in Ger-
many, and indeed since 1966 when France with-
drew its forces from the integrated military
structure, it had not proved possible to arrange
such a visit.
3.16. The committee was impressed by the
briefings, not only because of the emphasis
placedbn the important defence role of moder-
nised and reorganised conventional forces, but
also by the importance of the contingency plans
which, if the President of the Republic so
decided, would enable French forces to operat€
in support of NATO forces in the event of hosti-
lities-in the central region. The committee is
grateful to the French Minister of Defence for
iuthorising such a visit for the first time, and
examines ihe conditions in which it is intended
that French forces might co-operate.
3.17. The area in which French forces in Ger-
many are stationed with divisional headquarters
at Trier, I-andau and Freiburg corresponds to
their position when assigned to NATO prior to
1966 when their status was covered by the
NATO status of forces agreement of 1951
supplemented in 1959. The 1966 decision of
the French Government to withdraw its forces
from the integrated NATO structure led at first
to disagreement with Germany which at the
time felt that the French forces in Germany had
lost the legal basis for their presence on German
territory. France maintained its thesis that the
legal basis flowed from France's rights as an
occupying power under the 1945 agreements.
The outcome in 1966 was an exchange of letters
between France and Germany in which the latter
expressed the wish that the French forces should
remain on its territory. This exchange remains
the legal basis on which French forces are statio-
ned in Germany today.
3.18. Since then several agreements have been
concluded, both between French and NATO
commanders, and between the French and Ger-
man Governments, the former covering co-
operation between French and NATO forces in
time of war, and the latter for the most part
r60
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22nd August 1967: General fulleret,
3rd July 1974: General Valentrn,
General l-emnrtzer,
General Ferber,
pglstic support for French forces in Germany.
These agreements are:
Conclusion on French forces
3.22. The committee has no reason to doubt
that French forces (and not only those stationed
in Germany in peacetime) would be available for
allied defence in the event of hostilities, or even
in a period of tension and alent. No doubt too
the Soviet Union sees them in that light and
these forces therefore add to the deterrent.
Because oftheir geographical location they couldprovide a very useful reserve force for NATO
commanders. The committee therefore wel-
comes the contingency plans which would
enable French forces to operate " under the ope-
rational control " of NATO commanders.
3.23. The distinction between the conditions
under which French and other NATO forces
might operate under NATO command in the
event of hostilities is probably more political
and juridical than real. No forces (except
certain air defence forces) are under NATO
command in peacetime. Assigned forces
which are mostly the air and ground forces on
the central front 
- 
would pass under NATO
command only when the governments of the
various NATO countries concerned take an
autonomous decision that they should do so.This decision however would be expressed
collectively within the North Atlantic Council or
Defence Planning Committee and forces there-
after would operate " under command " of the
various NATO commanders (although their
Dgtstic support remains under national control).The equally autonomous decision which might
be taken by the French Government to commit
forces to the defence of Europe would be
expressed nationally and not in the collective
councils of NATO; the forces would then be
" under the operational -control " of NATO
commanders, and not " under command ".
What the distinction would be in practice is not
clear to the committee.
3.24. All NATO commanders who have briefed
the committee at various times have expressed
their confidence in the readiness of French
forces to support the alliance; at the same time
they have stressed the uncertainties which the
" separateness " of the French decision-making
procedure implies for NATO commanders. If
NATO defence plans ever had to be implemen-
ted following an attack by Warsaw Pact forces
NATO commanders would assume command of
assigned forces at the same time as they were
instructed to implement their plans. But they
continue to rely on two separate operational
plans to provide for the possibility that French
forces were not ordered to co-operate at the
same time as other allied forces were placed
under command. If other NATO countries
adopted the same attitude to national autonomy
as France, there could be no NATO command
structures or military infrastructure in place
French ChiefofDefence Staff SACEUR
Commander First French Army CINCENT
These have been supplemented by more detailed
agreements with headquarters CENTAG signedin 1978, 1979 and 1981. With German com-
manders there are two agreements on logistical
support signed in 1978 and 1980, and a number
of technical arrangements between the ministries
of defence were concluded in 1979 and two in
1982.
3.19. The three French armoured brigades in
Germany comprise some 436 tanks bothAMX-30 and AMX-10P. The improved
AMX-30 82 is entering service with the French
army, and at present accounts for some 165 of
the 1,100 AMX-30 tanks, but it is not clear how
many of these are in Germany. Altogether
French forces in Germany account for some
46,000 men, not counting the Berlin garrison.
3.20. The location of the French forces in Ger-
many makes them an ideal reserve for NATO
commanders, and the committee heard in some
detail of the contingency plans which, if the Pre-
sident of the French Republic so decided, would
enable second French corps to operate under the
operational control of the NATO commander of
Central Army Group, and for French forces in
their turn to be supported by other NATO forces
including air defence forces. The plans provide
for French Government decision at various
stages to permit the initial movement of French
forces prior to their commitment to a battle.
3.21. As mentioned above, other forces of First
French Army, stationed in France in peacetime,
can be made available as reserves for NATO.
Under a recent reorganisation the rapid action
force (FAR) has been created which includes the
fourth aeromobile division stationed just west of
the Rhine as well as the sixth light armoured
division and the ninth marine division all of
which are air-transportable. The rapid action
force also includes the eleventh parachute divi-
sion and the twenty-seventh alpine division.
The fourth aeromobile division is a newly crea-
ted division equipped with some 200 anti-tank
helicopters which have been withdrawn from the
army corps to which they were previously
assigned. The whole of the rapid action force is
designed 
.specially to be able to be deployed
overseas in an emergency or alternatively to be
used in support of NATO forces in the event of a
conflict in Europe. The new aeromobile divi-
sion is an especially welcome reserve for NATO
which could be deployed very rapidly on govern-
ment decision to counter a Warsaw Pact armou-
red breakthrough.
l6l
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around which collective defence could be organi-
sed in the event of a crisis. Speaking in Paris
on l0th April 1985, Lord Carrington, the
Secretary-General of NATO, said:
" The French have produced an answer
which is in many respects a very good one.
It ensures in particular that the French
defence budget is seen by the French tax-
payers as money to be spent for the
defence ofFrance... but I do not think that
you would expect the Secretary-General of
NATO to commend it as an example to
others. The integrated military structure
is, as you know, integrated by consensus,
not by command; and there are areas
where I would very much like to see that
consensus further developed by the
Defence Planning Committee. Both for
the political signal that this would give;
and because we cannot afford not to get
the best value for the money which we
spend on defence. "
" Maldeployment "
3.25. The peacetime locations of forces assigned
to NATO in the central region are unsatisfactory
- 
they still reflect to a large extent the locations
they occupied when the defence of NATO was
based on the Rhine, in a period before the Ger-
man armed forces had joined their allies in
NATO. The present NATO strategy of forward
defence requires these forces to take up defence
positions in a period of alert in close proximity
to the East-West boundary. Apparently with
the only exception of the first United States
armoured division and another United States
regiment, only elements of the various German
corps are located in forward positions in peace-
time today. This again is partly for historical
reasons because at the time the German forces
were created all appropriate accommodation for
military units in areas further west was already
occupied by the forces of the other allies.
3.26. A consequence of this situation is that
even the M-day NATO forces in the central
region, which are supposed to be deployed in
accordance with SACEUR's requirements,
would take up to two days to reach their forward
defence positions. Once these forces arrive, the
German screening forces have to move sideways
to their own alert positions.
3.27. One consequence of this situation is that
several days' warning time is essential for
NATO. Confidence-building measures such as
those agreed in the Helsinki final act, and under
discussion in the Conference on Disarmament in
Europe in Stockholm, can contribute to provi-
ding warning time.
3.28. The deplorable incident which led to a
United States army oflicer, a member of the
United States military liaison mission in East
Germany, being shot by a Soviet sentry on 24th
March has recently drawn attention to the r6le
of military liaison missions maintained by the
United Kingdom and the United States in East
Germany, and by the Soviet Union in West Ger-
many, under the terms of the immediate post-
war three-power agreement. These liaison mis-
sions are allowed freedom of movement within
the two countries with the exception of specific
military zones. The British and United States
missions in East Germany would certainly be in
a position to observe any Warsaw Pact prepara-
tions for an offensive, or unusual activities if
military zones closed to them were to be
suddenly enlarged. United States State Depart-
ment on l6th April announced that the Soviet
Union had agreed not to permit the " use of
force or weapons " against United States military
liaison personnel in East Germany 3. The state-
ment followed a meeting in Potsdam on l2th
April between General Otis, Commander-in-
Chief United States Army Europe, his counter-
part and the Soviet General Zaystsev. It was
understood that the ground rules governing the
activities of these liaison teams in the two Ger-
manies would be clarified in future meetings.
This would obviously be a welcome develop-
ment, but the accuracy of the state Department's
version of the agreement between the two
commanders was challenged by the Soviet
Embassy in Washington on 22nd April 1985.
IY. Conclusions
4.1. Most NATO countries have increased
their defence effort over the last five years.
While not all have achieved the agreed NATO
target of 3% real increase per annum for five
years, the United States defence expenditure
from 1980 to 1985 increased by over 50% 
- 
equi-
valent to an average 8.5% per annum growth in
real terms. Despite the large numerical superio-
rity of Warsaw Pact forces on the central front in
tanks, guns and aircraft the relative position of
NATO conventional forces has improved some-
what over that period. But adequate warning
time remains essential for NATO forces to
achieve their maximum defence capability,
particularly because of the unsatisfactory deploy-
ment of these forces in peacetime.
4.2. The committee welcornes the emphasis
being placed by France on the role which its
conventional forces could play in support of
NATO forces in the event of hostilities, and
recommends that NATO include French forces
162
3. International Herald Tribune, 8th April 1985.
DOCUMENT IOI8
in its periodical publication " NATO and the
Warsaw Pact 
- 
force comparisons ". The latest(1984) edition of this publication notes:
" France and Spain are members of the North
Atlantic Alliance but do not participate in its
integrated military structure. At their request
therefore no account of French and Spanish
forces is taken in this comparison, although full
statements of these forces are available in
documents published nationally ". The exclu-
sion of French forces from offrcial force compa-
risons is anomalous. France has always replied
to the NATO annual review questionnaire on
the defence effort, and French statistics are
included with those of the other NATO coun-
tries in the oflicial NATO defence statistics
published each year and which, as in the past,
are annexed to the present report. French
ground forces, because oftheir geographical loca-
tion, make an invaluable contribution to defence
on the central front as a reserve available to
commander CENTAG.
4.3. The committee notes that the referendum
on Spanish membership of NATO is due to be
held in March 1986. It suggests that Spain be
encouraged to provide a modernised air-trans-
portable force which could be available as a fur-
ther reserve on the central front. The Spanish
defence effort should similarly be included in
NATO official statistics and Spanish forces
included in the NATO force comparisons.
4.4. The committee expresses its appreciation
of the invaluable contribution which United
States forces make to defence on
front and welcomes in particular
central
efforts
which have led to an improvement in potential
United States reinforcement capabilities which
amount to 95 aircraft squadrons and 15 divi-
sions. Contrary to the impression in some
United States quarters however, the committee
points out that the great part of combat forces in
Europe are provided by the European countries.
In Europe as a whole European forces account
for 90% of the ground forces, 80% of the combat
aircraft, 80% of the tanks and 70% of the ships in
European waters. Of the ground and air forces
actually stationed in the territory of Western
Germany in peacetime, TlVo are provided by the
European countries. The improved infrastruc-
ture programme recently agreed of some $9 bil-
lion for the next six years will in particular pro-
vide shelters for some of the United States
reinforcement aircraft squadrons.
4.5. In the long term considerable improve-
ments in defence capability can be achieved with
no greater expenditure through standardisation
and interoperability of equipment, and through
improvements in the stationing of forces in
peacetime. The committee has frequently
drawn attention also to the problem of logistics.
Emphasis is now being placed on improving sus-
tainability by increasing stocks of ammunition,
but other proposals for improving the logistic
posture of NATO forces remain to be implemen-
ted as recommended in the study on collective
logistical support by General Dijkstra a.
the
the
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APPENDIX I
Force comparisons from various soarces
Central region (or central and northern regions)
(a) NATO and Wanaw Poct - force compafisons, NATO, spring 19El I
Defence of northern and central regions
NATO AIR FOACES
136 FIGHTEA/BOMBEAS
5M INTEBCEPTORS
I45 RECONNAISSANCE
NATO
14 BNIGADE.GNOUPS
II5 TANXS
52O ANTILLCAY/MOFTAB
Northern and central regions 
- 
in-place air forces
Fighter/Bomber
Ground/Attack Interceptors Reconnaissance
NATO
Warsaw Pact
N..8. .'Some interceptors can be used in
| 1,345I r,sss
ground attack r6les.
s00
2,635
145
390
l. Excludes French forces.
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COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1980-1984
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT
Country National currency unit Defence expenditure(national currency, current prices) d
Defer.ce expenditure
(current pripes 
- 
US $ mitlion) a
GDP in purchasers' values
(current prices 
- 
US $ million) a D Population (thousand)
Defence expenditure as % of
GDP in purchasers' values
Defence expenditure per head
(current prices 
- 
US $) a Defence expenditure as % of total WEU
1980 1981 l 982 1983 1984f 1980 l98l t982 1983 1984 f 1980 1981 r982 l 983 1984 f 1980 l98l t982 1983 1984 f 1980 1981 r982 1983 1984 f 1980 1981 t982 1 983 1984 f 1980 1981 r982 1983 1984 f
(0) (l)
-5) -4) (- 3) (-2) (- l) I (2\ (3) (4) (s) (6) (7) (8) (e) (10) (t l) (12) ( l3) (14) (1 s) (16) (17) (18) (le) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (2e) (30)
Tleloi Million B. Frs.
Million F. Frs.
Million DM
Milliard Lire
Million L. Frs.
Million Guilders
Million f, Sterling
115,754
lll,672
48,518
8,203
1,534
10,476
I1,510
t25,689
129,708
52,193
9,868
1,715
11,296
12,144
132,127
148,021
54,234
12,294
1,893
ll,92l
13,849
136,853
165,029
56,496
14,4@
2,104
12,149
15,952
147,496
175,770
58, l4l
17,100
2,296
12,757
17,506
3,958
26,425
26,692
9,579
52
5,269
26,776
3,385
23,867
23,094
8,681
46
4,527
24,627
2,892
22,522
22,350
9,090
4t| 4,464
24,242
2,676
21,654
22,127
9,481
4t
4,257
24,198
2,669
21,130
21,486
10,246
42
4,185
24,783
116,936
655,305
814,986
395,543
4,547
169,378
534,1 I 5
95,725
572,5r6
682,920
353,254
3,842
l4l,4l2
514,074
84,251
543,079
659,482
348,532
3,388
137,724
493,834
80,087
519,208
652,567
352,824
3,302
131,993
455,400
79,278
518,970
648,485
365,105
3,297
128,966
458,690
9,847
53,714
s9,667
56,416
365
14,150
56,304
9,852
53,963
59,790
56,502
366
14,247
56,379
9,856
54,219
59,753
56,639
366
14,310
56,335
9,866
54,468
59,538
56,825
367
14,362
56,377
9,876
54,740
59,324
56,995
367
14,448
56,377
3.4
4.0
3.3
2.4
1.2
3.1
5.0
3.5
4.2
3.4
2.5
1.2
3.2
4.8
3.4
4.t
3.4
2.6
1.2
3.2
5.0
3.3
4.2
3.4
2.7
t.2
3.2
5.3
3.4
4.1
3.3
2.8
1.3
3.2
5.4
402
492
447
170
144
372
476
344
442
386
154
126
318
437
293
415
374
160
ll3
312
430
271
398
372
167
tt2
296
429
270
386
362
180
113
290
440
4.01
26.76
27.03
9.70
0.05
5.34
27.\t
3.84
27.05
26.r8
9.84
0.05
5.13
27.9r
3.38
26.31
26.11
10.62
0.05
5.22
28.32
3.17
25.65
26.21
11.23
0.05
5.04
28.66
3. l6
24.99
25.41
t2.12
0.05
4.95
29.32
Fsnne /r\
G
Italv
Luxembourg....
Netherlands.....
United Kingdom
Torr WEU 9E,152 8t6or t-4fi4 2,690,810 2,363,742 z,xo,29o 2,195,382 2,202,790 250,463 2il,099 251,478 251,803 252L2',1 i-7 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 394 351 340 335 33s 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0088,228 64, ).1I
C.ena<1e Million C. $
Million D. Kr.
Million Drachmas
Million N. Kr.
Million Escudos
Million L.
Million US $
5,499
9,117
96,975
8,242
43,440
I 85,656
143,981
6,289
10,301
142,865
9,468
51,917
313,067
169,888
7,655
11,669
176,270
10,956
63,817
447,790
196,390
8,086
12,574
193,340
12,395
76,765
556,738
217,154
9,273
248,4r8
13,209
92,211
803,044
250,01I
4,703
1,618
2,275
1,669
868
2,442
143,981
5,245
1,446
2,578
1,650
844
2,815
169,888
6,20s
1,400
2,639
l,69g
803
2,755
196,390
6,561
1,375
2,195
1,699
693
2,469
217,154
7,278
2,372
1,712
679
2,441
250,01I
259,117
66,322
40,147
57 ,7ll
24,670
56,917
2,606,625
290,745
57,638
36,724
57,091
23,928
57,669
2,933,460
298,052
56,4r9
37,898
56,277
23,365
52,951
3,052,088
325,142
56,776
34,460
54,997
20,668
49,425
3,288,411
343,444
57,076
34,979
56,298
20,386
48,796
3,625,144
24,070
5,125
9,642
4,097
9,93s
44,737
227,738
24,366
5,122
9,730
4,100
9,978
45,747
230,019
24,659
5,1 19
9,792
4,1t6
10,016
46,788
232,309
24,907
5,114
9,870
4,1 30
10,096
47,864
234,496
25,206
5,107
9,949
4,142
10,177
48,965
236,841
1.8
2.4
5.7
2.9
3.s
4.3
5.5
1.8
2.5
7.0
2.9
3.5
4.9
5.8
2.t
2.5
7.0
3.0
3.4
5.2
6.4
2.0
2.4
6.4
3.1
3.4
5.0
6.6
2.1
6.8
3.0
3.3
5.0
6.9
r95
3t6
236
408
87
55
632
215
282
265
402
85
62
739
252
274
269
412
80
59
845
263
269
222
4tt
69
52
926
289
238
413
67
50
1,056
4.76
1.64
2.30
1.69
0.88
2.47
145.80
5.95
1.64
2.92
1.87
0.96
3.19
192.56
7.25
t.64
3.08
1.98
0.94
3.22
229.42
7.77
1.63
2.60
2.01
0.82
2.92
257.19
8.61
2.81
2.03
0.80
2.89
295.73
Denmark(ireece
Norwa
Porfusal
Turkev
United States
Tornr NoN-WEU. I 57,555 184,466 211,889 232,146 265,893* 3,1 I 1,508 3,457,254 3,577,05C 3,829,878 4,186,122 325,334 329,062 332,799 336,477 340,387 5.1 5.3 5.9 6.1 6.4* 484 561 637 690 781't 159.55 209.08 247.53 274.94 314*
Tornl NATO (d).. 256,306 272,694 297,490 316,580 350,434* 5,802,318 5,820,996 5,837,34C 6,025,259 6,388,91 : 575,797 580,161 584,277 588,280 592,514 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.3 5.5* 445 470 509 538 591 2s9.s5 309.08 347.53 374.94 4l 5*
a_.-
For the period 1980-1984, the following rates ofexchange have been applied:
Units per US $
Country
(0)
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Canada
Denmark
Greece
Norway
Portugal
Turkey
United States
1980
(2)
29.24300
4.22600
t.81770
0.85640
29.24300
r.98810
0.4298'l
l. I 6930
5.63590
42.61700
4.93920
50.06200
76.04000
1.00000
1981
(3)
37.13100
5.43460
2.26000
1.1 3680
37.1 3 100
2.49520
0.49312
1.1 9890
7.12340
55.40800
5.73950
6 1.54600
I I 1.22000
1.00000
1984 f
(6)
55.26300
8.31 870
2.70600
1.66890
55.26300
3.04810
0.70636
t.274tO
9.895 10
104.75000
7.7tsto
135.70700
328.94000
1.00000
National currency unit
(l)
Million B. Frs.
Million F. Frs.
MillionDM
Milliard Lire
Million L. Fn.
Million Guilders
Million Pound Sterling
Million C. $
Million D. Kr.
Million Drachmas
Million N. Kr.
Million Escudos
Million Turkish Lira
Million US $
1982 1983
(4) (5)
45.69100 51.132006.57240 7.62t302.42660 2.553301.35250 1.51890
45.69100 51.132002.67020 2.854100.57t27 0.65920
1.23370 1.232408.33240 9.14500
66.80300 88.064006.45400 7.29640
79.473W 110.78000
162.55000 225.4600]01.00000 1.00000
Note b : GDP (p.v.) - Gross domestic product in purchasers'values, current prices.
Note c : France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only.
Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available.
e = Preliminary estimate.
,f = Forecast.
. . - Not available. t
t' 
= WEU OfEce of the Clerk estimates.
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(84)28.
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(b) White Paper 1983- The security of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Ministry of Defence, Bonn, October 1983 
NATO' 
Balance of forces in Central Europe 
(c) Statement on the defence estimates 1985, 
Ministry of Defence, London, Map 1985 
Warsaw Pact 
DOCUMENT 1018 
1. Includes French forces in the Federal Republic of Germany which are not declared to NATO. Excludes the Berlin garrison. 
2. Excludes Warsaw Pact tanks in storage and training units, some of which were included last year. 
3. Corresponds to a balance of 57 Warsaw Pact to 33 NATO divisions. Warsaw Pact divisions normally consist of fewer 
personnel than many NATO divisions, but contain more tanks and artillery. 
4. Crew served systems and vehicle or helicopter mounted systems. 
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B. MANPOWER EFFORT 
- 
1984
Period of compulsory I
military service
(months)
Army Navy Air force
Total in armed forces 2
military personnel
(thousands)
(e)
Total armed forces 2(military and civilian)
as percentage
ofactive population
(e)
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
United Kingdom
103 103 103124 124 12415 15 15t2 18 t2
voluntaryt4-t6 t4-17 t4-17
voluntary
r08
571
495
507
1
103
336
2.7
3.1
2.4
2.4
0.9
2.2
2.t
Tornr WEU 2,121 2.5
Canada
Denmark
Greece
Norway
Portugal
Turkey
United States
voluntary99922 26 24t2 15 l5t6 24 2t-2420 20 20
voluntary
83
31
177
39
94
815
2,269
1.0
1.6
5.1
2.4
2.3
4.5
2.9
TornrNoN-WEU 3,509 3.0
Torlr NATO 5,629 2.8
Sources:
l. ISS, MilitaryBalance, 1983-84.
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (84) 28.
3. Eight months if served in Germany.
4. Eighteen months for overseas.
e = estimate.
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Amendment I
State of European security - the central region
AMENDMENT 1 
'
tabled by Mr. Yerdon
l. lrave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.
22nd May 1985
Signed: Verdon
l. See 6th sitting 23rd May 1985 (amendment negatived).
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Document 1019 20th May 1985
Application of the Brassels Treaty 
-
reply to the thirtieth annual report of tie Council
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armamentsz
by Mn Scheer, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Ixrnooucrony Nore
Dnarr RncoIr,t trtrxoerton
gn tle application of the Brussels Treaty 
- 
reply to the thirtieth annual report of
the Council
ExpteN.c.tony MEMoRANDUM
submitted by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. WEU and European security
III. Agency-for the Control of Armaments and the residual arms control provi-
sions of Protocol No. III
IV. Future role of the Agencies
V. Conclusions
APPENDICES
I. Annex IV to Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels Treaty
II. Specifrc tasks.sl,Bgested.for the Agencies for Security Questions (with some
comparison with the United States Arms control and biilrmameni Agency)
III. Resolution relating ro Annex III to protocol No. III 
- 
27th June l9g4
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini, Amadei,
uan den_Bergh. 9onnel, Bourges, Bro.w-n,-Cox (Alternale: b1 Mllle).DejarAin, frU (itemati: iuiii,'Cdf.v <nti..nit , frrii,
-Gzrsll Giust,.Qirltntlo_ny Gralt (Altgrnale: I,ord Newal[), MM.'ituyghues des dtages, Konen, ilr"xir",isti"1n,-i;;;;i;i:,Natiez, Pecchioli, Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith,I[lM. Steverlynck, Stolies (Alternate:-Wittcinsonl.
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
169
DOCUMENT IO19
Introdactory Note
In preparing this report the Rapporteurhadinterviews as follows :
4th March 1985 - Paris
Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, former Prime Minister (RPR);
Mr. Pierre Morel, Political Director, Ministry for External Relations.
5th March 1985 
- 
London
Foreign and Commonwealth OJJice:
Mr. Michael Jenkins, Assistant Under-Secretary ;
Mr. John Barrass, WEU Affairs in Defence Department.
German Embassy
H.E. Baron Rtidiger von Wechmar, German Ambassador.
6th March 1985 - London
Western European Union :
H.E. Mr. E. Longerstaey, Secretary-General;
Dr. J. Diesel, Deputy Secretary-General;
Mr. Peter Fraser, Assistant Secretary-General.
NIA, Chatham House:
Mr. William wallace, Deputy Director, advisor to the Liberal Party.
House of Commons:
The Rt. Hon. Denis Healey, MP, Labour Party spokesman.
18th March 1985 
- 
Rome
Communist PartY:
Mr. Tullio Vecchietti, Senator;
Mr. Ugo Pecchioli, Senator.
Christian Democrat PartY :
Mr. Gerardo Bianco, Chairman of the Italian Delegation to WEU.
Ministry for Foreign Alfairs :
Ambassador Bruno Bottai, Political Director ;
Mr. Paolo Andrea Trabalta, WEU Affairs.
Ministry of Defence:
Mr. Olcese, Under-Secretary of State.
The committee as a whole metat the Palais d'Egmont, Brussels, on l5th February 1985, when Lt'
General Huitfeldt, Director of the NATO International Military Stafl addlgssed it on " Emerging
t".ti"oiogy and military strategy ". It then held a joint meeting with the Military Committee of the
North Atlantic Assembly.
The committee then met in Strasbourg on l2th March 1985 where it was briefed by General
Charles de Llamby, Commander First French Army and members of his staIf, and at Headquarters
French Forces in Germany, Baden-Oos, where it was briefed by Lt. General Houdet, Commander-in-
Chiefl and Commander 2nd French Army Corps and his staff.
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The committee met at the seat of the Assembly the following day and was received by Mr.
Charles Hernu, Minister of Defence, and then visited the French Defence S'taffCommand post where it
yaq prief-e{ by Vige-A{miral louzeau, Major General of the Joint Defence Staff, and by GeneralGuichard, Deputy Chief-of-Stafl Operations.
The committee_met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly on l6th April, 7th May and finaily
on 20th May when it discussed and adopted the present report.
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament,
officials, senior offtcers and experts who met the committee and replied to questions.
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed are those of the committee.
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Draft Recommendation
,,,f;,::;;',f f #:r",*ilfr ',:;;i;f il,?8,;*u
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the recent steps taken by the Council to implement the Assembly's demand that
WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s;
(ii) Expressing its appreciation of the successfully completed work of the Ageqcy for the Control of
Armaments ovei the last thirty years, which has contributed to the present solidarity of Europe ;
(iit) Welcoming in particular the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984 providing for all qsPectsof
European security to be discussed in the WEU Council and for the ministerial organs of WEU to be
reorganised to piovide institutions, available to the Council and to the Assembly, to study these
questions;
(iv) Welcoming the references in the communiqu6 of the Bonn ministerial meeting of the Council on
22nd and 23rd April which show that Ministers discussed questions of European security, disqma-
ment, armaments co-operation and research and the creation of a technological community within the
European Communities;
(v) Welcoming in particular the emphasis placed i! the communiqu6 on the need-for " agreements
aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing an arms race in space " and the importance
attached " to respect for existing treaty obligations " ;
(vi) Welcoming the establishment of the three agencies for security questions as evidence of the
Council's determination to continue active study of all the foregoing questions ;
(vii) Calling for the provisions of the Rome Declaration to be fully and continuously implemented,
RrcouueNos rnlt rHe CoUNCIL
1. Keep under continuous study at permanent and ministerial level all major problems affecting
European security;
2. In particular continue to keep under continuous review all outstanding East-West arms control
and disarmament questions, attaching equal importance to those negotiated in a multilateral and in a
bilateral framework, with a view to reaching a common position on :
(a/ President Reagan's strategic defence initiative and a reply to Secretary Weinberger's invita-
tion for allied participation, in order to prevent an arrns race in outer space and ensure
respect for existing treaty obligations ;
(b) the treaty to ban chemical weapons being negotiated in the forty-nation Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva;
(c) General Secretary Gorbachev's declaration of a six-month unilateral freeze on the deploy-
ment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Europe ;
(d) a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the reported Soviet offer to accept a moratorium on all
nuclear testing from the fortieth anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb ;
3. Entrust the new WEU agencies for security questions with the tasks identified in the report of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, including an urgent study of the cost of the joint
production by Western European Union of observation satellites to provide independent intelligence
relevant to arms control and security ;
4. Subject to reciprocity by Warsaw Pact countries, declare the levels of forces, and in the future the
levels of nuclear weapons, stationed on the territory of all WEU countries, as a contribution to
confidence-building measures ;
5. Make material provision to ensure that the new agencies for security questions will be able to
provide more fully effective assistance to Assembly committees than the international secretariat of the
Standing Armaments Committee has been in a position to provide in the past ;
6. Make adequate budgetary provision to enable all WEU organs to carry out their respective tasks.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur)
L lntroduction
1.1. It is in a very constructive atmosphere
that your Rapporteur is able to introduce this
y€ar the committee's report on the application of
the Prussels Treaty, which replies to those parts
of the annual report of the-Council for l9g+
which are referred to the committee:
- 
defence questions;
- 
Agency for the Control of Armaments;
- Standing Armaments Committee.
The Council, particularly in the decisions incor-
porated in the Rome Declaration, adopted at the
meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of
Defence in October 1984, has now gone a long
lvay toyalds meeting the Assembly's suggestion
" that WEU should be adapted to mEt the
requirements of the 1980s ", first formulated in
the historical Recommendation 380 adopted by
the Assembly on l5th June 1982t. The tasi<
now is to ensure that the Council duly applies
the decisions set forth in the declaration.
1.2. Successive reports of the committee on
the application of the Brussels Treaty during the
last seven years pointed the way to the adapta-
tion of WEU which is now in progress. These
reports began with those by Mr. Tanghe (Docu-
ments 777,31st May 1978, and 808, 22ndMay
1979), continued with the two reports by Mr.
Prussen (Documents 908, 20th April 1982, and
948, 18th May 1983), culminating in the report
by Mr. De Decker last year (Document 973, l5th
May 1984). These reports called first for the
removal of the remaining restrictions on the pro-
duction of conventional weapons in Germany
and later for the removal of quantitative
controls on conventional weapons in all member
countries on the mainland of Europe. The
Assembly in Recommendations 320 (June
1978), 348 (June 1980), 365 (June l98l), 380(June 1982), 397 (November 1983) and 406(June 1984) endorsed the committee's views.
Recommendation 320 (June 1978) on the com-
mittee's report (Document 777) first called for
" a European centre for defence studies at the
disposal of intergovernmental defence bodies
and the Assembly, making use of the WEU
Agency for the Control of Armaments and its
Standing Armaments Committee ". Finally, in
its report on the control of armaments and disar-
mament last December (Document 998, Rap-
porteur: Mr. Blaauw), the committee suggested
specific tasks which might be assigned [o the
Agency for the Control of Armaments now that
the internal controls on conventional weapons
previously carried out by that Agency have been
largely abolished by the Council in accordance
with the recommendations of the Assembly.
1.3. In the Rome Declaration the Council
announced three broad decisions :
(y' to use the WEU Council for active
ministerial discussion of specified
issues affecting European security ;
(it) to abolish completely by lst January
1986 the internal controls on conven-
tional weapons hitherto applied in
the Brussels Treaty framework;
(iii) to reform the institutions of WEU,
within an overall zero growth frame-
work, to meet the new requirements
of the organisation in the light of the
two foregoing decisions.
In the following chapters the report describes
these decisions in more detail and examines the
extent to which the Council has so far imple-
mented them.
II. WEU and Europun security
2.1. In the Rome Declaration adopted on 27th
October 1984 and the attachod document on the
institutional reform of WEU, the Council
decided, inter alia, that in future it would nor-
mally meet twice a year with Foreign Ministers
and Defence Ministers and that the presidency
of the Council would be held by each member
state for a one-year term. While the " indivisibi-
lity of security within the North Atlantic Treaty
area " was stressed, ministers decided :
" to hold comprehensive discussions and
to seek to harmonise their views on the
specific conditions of security in Europe,
in particular:
- 
defence questions;
- 
arrns control and disarmament ;
- 
the effects of developments in East-
West relations on the security of
Europe;
l. Adopted on the committee's report: application of the
Brussels Treaty, Rapporteur: Mr. Prussen, Document 908,
20th April 1982.
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- 
Europe's contribution to the strengthen-
ing of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in
mind the importance of transatlantic
relations;
- 
the development of EuroPean co-
operation in the field of armaments
in respect of which WEU can provide a
political impetus.
They may also consider the implications
for Europe ofcrises in other regions ofthe
world. "
2.2. The declaration stressed the importance of
liaison with states in the alliance which were not
members of WEU, and the presidency of the
Council was specifically made responsible for
informing those countries.
2.3. As far as armaments co-operation was
concerned, the declaration called attention to the
need 'to provide a political impetus to institu-
tions of co-operation in the field of armaments ".
2.4. As far as institutions of WEU are concer-
ned, the declaration stated that the Secretariat-
General should be adapted to take account of the
enhanced activities of the Council, while the
Permanent Council was to reoryanise the Agency
for the Control of Armaments, the international
secretariat of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee and the Standing Armaments Committee
itself:
" in such a way as to fuIfi.I a threefold
task :
- 
to study questions relating to arms
control and disarmament whilst carry-
ing out the remaining control func-
tions ;
- 
to undertake the function of studying
security and defence problems ;
- 
to contribute actively to the develop-
ment of European armaments co-oper-
ation. "
2.5. Most interesting for the Assembly are
various proposals concerning relations between
the Council and the Assembly - the committee
is already glad to note that, for the first time in
many years, the annual report of the Council for
1984 was received by the end of February this
year. The Rome Declaration mentions the
improvement of contacts that take place after
ministerial meetings of the Council. In this
connection the Rapporteur believed it essential
that the committee should have exercised its tra-
ditional right of meeting with the Council at
ministerial level at the end of the ministerial
meeting held in Bonn on 23rd April. Ministe-
rial Council meetings are, in practice, the only
occasions when the committee can hope to find
ministers from all seven countries present at a
meeting. This particular date raised a difficulty
in that it coincided with a meeting of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
which concerns dl representatives. This
conflict of dates raises the issue of the composi-
tion of the Assembly itself - a subject at present
being studied by the General Affairs Committee.
2.6. Future committee reports must keep
under review the extent to which the Council
has succeeded in holding substantive discussions
on the items listed in paragraph 2.1. The pre-
sent annual report covering the period up to 31st
December 1984 makes no reference to any sub-
sequent Council activity, and there was some
evidence that the Permanent Council had
become bogged down in discussing organisatio-
nal and administrative details arising from the
institutional decisions taken in Rome, and had
devoted insufficient time to preparing the politi-
cal and security items which should be on the
agenda of the ministerial meeting.
2.7. The committee particularly welcomes
however the meeting of arms control experts
from national capitals which met in Bonn on
llth February 1985 under the chairmanship of
Ambassador Ruth, commissioner for anns
control and disarmament problems in the
German Ministry of Defence. This meeting
was called specifically to study arms control
aspects of European security with particular ref-
erence to negotiations on a chemical weapons
ban and on the control ofweapons in space, the
object being for the WEU countries to be able to
establish a common position on these matters.
The Rapporteur has been given to understand
that certain representations were made by the
United States, which appears to have misunder-
stood the purpose of the meeting. Recent press
reports have even referred to an unpublished
letter sent to WEU governments by Mr. Richard
Burt, the United States Assistant Secretary of
Defence for European Affairs, cautioning that
attempts to co-ordinate a European position on
arms control should not be allowed to cut across
existing procedures within NATO 2. The com-
mittee considers it essential that the WEU coun-
tries should be able to take a common position
on arms control questions which affect the secu-
rity of Europe. The committee welcomes the
cdl by the Italian Minister of Defence, Mr. Spa-
dolini, at the end of the NATO Nuclear Plan-
ning Group meeting in Luxembourg on 27th
March, for a common response to be given to
the United States concerning the strategic
defence initiative 3 and for the matter to be dis-
cussed at the WEU Council on22nd-23rd April:
2. The Times, 3rd April 1985.
3. The committee considers the SDI in another r€port on
emerging technology and military strategy, Rapporteun Mr.
van den Bergh.
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" Europe must not act as individual units on
matters which concern its very survival. On
this point I received a unanimous opinion from
my British and German colleagues. " a.
2.8. In the event, the success of the ministerial
meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April shows
that Ministers have so far implemented the
Rome decisions. The meeting was duly atten-
ded by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and
Defence. Paragraphs 2 to 4 of the communiqu6
show that security questions were discussed ;
paragraphs 5 to 8 deal with various aspects of
current arms control negotiations, both those
that are the subject of bilateral negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union
and those that are the subject of multilateral
negotiations in which all or most WEU countries
participate directly.
Levels offorces
2.9. Under the terms of Protocol No. II to the
modified Brussels Treaty and two subsequent
texts 5, the maximun levels of forces and arma-
ments which WEU countries are permitted to
maintain on the mainland of Europe have to be
approved by certain procedures according to the
category offorces concerned :
Category offorce
(y' Forces committed to
NATO command
Authority required
to approve maximum
permitted levels
WEU Council 6
(iy' Forces for the commoD
defence NOT committed to
NATO command North Atlantic Council
(iiy' Forces for the defence of
overseas territories National government
(iv/ Internal defence and policeforces WEU Council
These arcane routines are followed each year
and duly recorded in the Council's annual
reports. Since French forces on the mainland
of Europe were withdrawn from NATO
command in 1966 their status under Protocol
No. II has become unclear. The Council's report
records under the heading " Forces under NATO
command " that on 28th February 1984 the
Council " noted that the level of forces of the
member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO
force plan, fell within the limits specified in Arti-
cles I and II of Protocol No. II, as at present in
4. Atlantic News No. 1706, 2gthMarch 1985.
5. Resolution concerning the level of forces of the seven
WEU powers placed under NATO command, WEU Council
l5th September 1956, and agreement drawn up in imple-
mentation of Article V of Protocol No. II of the Brussels
Treaty, Paris, l4th December 1957.
6. Or by consent of WEU members expressed in the North
Atlantic Council.
force. It also took note of a declaration on
French forces made by the representative of
France. "
2.10. For some years the prooedures for approv-
ing maximum levels of fotces have had nopoint. NATO communicates relevant informa-
tion concerning current forre plans and the
Council duly notes that the levels specified in
Protocol No. II of the Brussels Treaty as at pre-
sent in force are not exceeded. Verification of
the levels of conventional weapons, discussed in
the next chapter, is limited to a sampling
method of inspection based on budgetary
studies, a questionnaire, and information from
NATO.
2.11. For the future the important point will be
to preserve the fruits of the WEU experience for
the purpose of military confidence-building mea-
sures in East-West relations such as those discus-
sed in the Stockholm Conference on Disarma-
ment in Europe. The committee therefore pro-
poses that controls on force levels which have
hitherto been internal WEU controls should, as
a confidence-building measure, contribute to
multilateral controls in the East-West frame-
work. An oflicial declaration of the levels of
forces covered by Protocol No. II could be
envisaged, subject to an agxeement on recipro-
city on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries.
This concept could be extended to include a
declaration concerning the letels of all national
and allied forces stationed on the territory ofall
WEU countries (Protocol No. II covers only
national forces on the mainland of Europe).
The concept could be further extended to a
declaration on the levels of all nuclear weapons
stationed on European territory in the area of
the Stockholm conference 
- 
the Atlantic to the
Urals 
- 
in the framework of confidence-building
measures covering nuclear weapons.
III. Agency for the Control of Armaments and
the rusidual orrns control provisions
of Protocol No. III
(a) Residual functions of thc Agency under the
treaty
3.1. In application of the dpcision announced
in the Rome Declaration, thp Council on 23rd
January 1985 adopted a resolution 7 reducing by
about half, from lst January 1985, the quanti-
tative controls applied to conventional weapons
on the mainland of Europe, and abolishing these
from lst January 1986. The few remaining
restrictions on the production of conventional
weapons in Germany (Annex III to Protocol
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No. III) had previously been removed by the
Council resolution of 27th June 1984 t.
3.2. In this latter connection the German
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Genscher,
stated in the Bundestag that the Federal
Republic did not intend to make use of the
removal of these last restrictions as it did not
intend to produce the weapons concerned. The
statement was made in response to anxiety
expressed in the Bundestag as to whether dele-
tion of the last items would arouse the mistrust
of the Warsaw Pact if, for example, the Federal
Republic were now to develop and produce
long-range missiles. This matter deserves.parti-
culir attintion in connection with a policy of
confidence-building measures which, with the
Helsinki final act and the Stockholm negotia-
tions, is only in its initial stage.
3.3. As far as emerying technology and
conventional weapons are concerned, the ques-
tion of its political impact on East-West rela-
tions has to be examined. The possibility could
be considered ofboth sides renouncing the pro-
duction of weapons with olfensive capability so
as to enhance the credibility of the defensive
character of defence policy. The committee's
important conclusions on this subject are con-
tained in another report e.
3.4. The Rome Declaration also states that
" the commitments and controls concerning A, B
and C weapons would be maintained at the exis-
ting level and in accordance with the procedures
agreed up to the present time. " As Council
reports have always pointed out that controls on
nuclear (atomic) and bacteriological weapons
have never in fact been applied, the extent ofthe
remaining internal controls which will be
applied under the Brussels Treaty from January
1986 are thus very few. The Council has an
accepted list ofbiological agents, last updated in
198[, which would be the basis of any controls
on such weapons if they were to be applied.
The Council renewed this list for 1984 and will
presumably continue to do so in 1986. The
iame applies to chemical weapons in respect of
which the Council has a list of chemical agents
subject to control.
3.5. As in the past, the annual report for 1984
states that the Agency did not exercise any
control in the field of atomic or of biological
weapons. As far as chemical weapons are
conierned, the Agency in its questionnaire asks
the six countries which have not renounced the
right to produce such weapons whether effective
pioduction has started and whether they hold
any stocks of chemical weapons whatever their
origin. As in the recent past all the countries
concerned replied in the negative, the Agency
carried out no quantitative controls of chemical
weapons in 1984. The committee suggests that
the 
-Council 
make a more public declaration
concerning the non-production and non-posses-
sion of chemical weapons, as a confidence-
building measure as proposed in paragraph 2.1 l.
3.6. As far as non-production controls of che-
mical weapons in the seventh country are
concerned, annual reports ofthe Council prior to
that for 1983 have contained the reservation of
that for 1982:
" As the convention for the due process of
law t0 has not yet entered into force, the
control measures carried out by the
Agency at.private concerns had, in 1982,-
as in previous years, to take the form of
agreed control measures.
One consequence of this situation is that,
in order to obtain the agreement of the
firms concerned, the Agency has to give a
few weeks' notice. Since this agreement
has never been withheld, the 1982 pro-
gramme of control measures at privately-
owned plants was therefore drawn up with
full confidence that it could be implemen-
ted as in previous years. "
With that reservation the Agency each year
conducts agreed verification visits to chemical
plants in the country concerned, but is not per-
mitted to take samples because the convention
referred to is not in force. It has been ratified by
six countries but not bY France.
3.7. The Council has now established a new
agency for the study of arms control and disar-
mament questions while the present Agency for
the Control of Armaments will lose most of its
staff to become a largely token body. It thus
appears that as from lst January 1986 the sole
activities of the token agency, the residual arms
controls prescribed by Protocols Nos. III and IV
of the Brussels Treaty, will consist of the fore-
going agreed verification visits to a chemical
plani and the circulation to member countries of
its annual questionnaire henceforth limited to
the questions concerning chemical weapons
mentioned in paragraph 3.5. The Council each
year will merely agree to renew the lists of che-
mical and bacteriological agents theoretically
subject to control.
8. Text at Appendix IlI.
9. Emerging technology and military strategy, Rappor-
teur: Mr. van den Bergh.
10. Convention concerning measures to be taken by
member states of Western European Union in order to
enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out
its control effectively and making provision for due process
of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels
Treaty, as modified by the protocols signed in Paris on 23rd
October I954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).
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(b) Activities of the Agency in 1984
3.8. During 1984 the Council's report makes
clear that the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments carried out its activities fully in verifring
from documentary sources and spot checks that
the quantitative levels specified for certain
conventional weapons for troeps under national
command on the mainland of Europe were not
exceeded. The number of inspections conduc-
ted are listed in the table hereafter.
3.9. The conventional weapons concerned are
those listed at Annex IV to Protocol No. III of
Notes a, D .' From l97l onwards tle Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of iirspections, thenceforth
counting inspections_of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An ipparent reduction in numbers of
inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities ofthe Agency. Foi comparison, the Corincil reported both sets ofngu.ii(old and new style 
- 
a and b) for the years I 970 and I 97 l.
n.a. : lnformation not available.
_ 
Sourc-es :_Figures for total-control measures (all categories) grven in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of theCouncil.- Withregard totht various categories ofcontrols (columns I to 6), figures for l96i-65 a.e alro derived from thepullished^annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been-made available to the oommittee. Those for
1970 to 1984 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permisJion io
Plbtigh them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in sbme totals result frorn diflerencesof dinnition of 
"iiit ar?i;t;16;isignificance.
* Confidential information available to the committee deleted from the published report.
Numbers and Opes of inspections carried oat by the Agency for the Control of Armaments - 196l-84
Quantitative control measures
Non-production
control
measures Total
control
measures (all
categories)at
depots
at units
under
national
command
at
production
plants
Sub.total
at
production
plants
(of which
non-
production
of chemical
weapons)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
961
2
3
4
5
29
26
35
39
26
15
20
l3
l9
t6
t2
l1
l3
l3ll
66
57
6t
7t
53
7
7
l0
9
7
(2)
(2)
(4)
(4)
n.a.
63
65
74
80
60
6
7
8
9
*
*
*
*
*
,i
*
{.
*
rl.
*
{.
*
*
*
{.
*
ri
*
{.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
(3)
78
70
79
77
970
I
2
3
4
5
ab
**
rt*
*
*
*
{.
ab
rl. *
**
*
*
*
*
ab
**
**
*
*
*
*
ab{.*
**
r*
rl.
*
*
ab{.*
rt*
l.
{.
*
{.
n,a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
b
72
72
66
66
7T
72
a
82
Y
6
7
8
9
*
*
{.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
{.
*
*
*
!t
,1.
rli
ri
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
7t
70
68
70
980
I
2
3
4
*
*
:f
,1.
*
{.
*
*
*
rl
*
!t
*
*
tl.
*
*
*
*
*
{.
*
*
*
*
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
70
70
69
72
66
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the Brussels Treaty. The Council on 23rd
January 1985 took the following decision :
" Resolution
The Council of Western European Union,
In implementation of the decision contai-
ned in paragraphs 3(a) ofsection III ofthe
document on the institutional reform of
WEU adopted in Rome on 27th October
1984, and having regard to the relevant
provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty
of 23rd October 1954,
Article I
Has oecpro that, with effect from lst
January 1985, the controls shall be lifted
on the following types of armaments in
the list contained in Annex IV to Protocol
No. III, signed in Paris on 23rd October
1954 : the elevating mass referred to in
paragraphs 5, 6(a), 6(b),7,8(c),9, 10, ll(b)
an.d ll(c).
Article 2
Hes oecpeo that, with effect from lst
January 1986, paragraphs 2 to I I inclusive
of the abovementioned list shall be can-
celled. "
The effect is to remove from the list about
half of the conventional weapons subject to
quantitative controls. The original text of the
list, with the items removed underlined, is at
Appendix t. It is anticipated therefore that
Agency activities under the treaty will be redu-
ced to about one halfduring 1985.
3.10. The Committee has welcomed the inclu-
sion in the Council's reports of a section on the
production and procurement of armaments for
the forces of WEU countries stationed on the
mainland of Europe. It is included in the 1984
report at Appendix II. In the light of the new
tasks to be assigned to the new Agencies and the
phasing out of the tasks of the old Agency,
the committee recommends that this list be
extended to cover armaments for all the forces of
all allied countries stationed in Europe.
3.11. At the conclusion of the first phase
of the Agency's work, the application of
controls provided for in the modified Brussels
Treaty, the committee records its great apprecia-
tion of the diligent yet discreet way in which the
Agency has carried out its task over the last
thirty years, in difficult conditions created lar-
gely by the Council's early decision that
controls provided for in the treaty should
not be fully applied, and those on A and B
weapons not at all. The very effectiveness
of the Agency has contributed in no small
part to the present cohesion and unity of
Western Europe which has finally made un-
necessary the very controls the Agency was
intended to apply.
IY. Future rille of the agencies
4.1. Much more important for the adap-
tation of WEU to the requirements of the
1980s is the future r6le of the three agen-
cies for security questions which the Council has
established to enable it to carry out the new tasks
referred to in the Rome Declaration :
* (b) The Ministers have instructed the
Permanent Council to define, in consulta-
tion with the directors of the ACA and the
SAC, the precise modalities of an overall
reorganisation affecting both the ACA, the
international secretariat of the SAC and
the SAC which could be structured in such
a way as to fulfil a threefold task :
- 
to study questions relating to arms
control and disarmament whilst car-
rying out the remaining control func-
tions;
- 
to undertake the function of studying
security and defence problems ;
- 
to contribute actively to the develop-
ment of European armaments co-oper-
ation.
(c) As regards the first two functions
indicated above, the intention would be to
have available a common basis of analysis
which could form a useful point of refer-
ence for the work of both the Council and
the Assembly and also for informing
public opinion.
This reorganisation will have to be carried
out taking into account, on the one hand,
changes in duties resulting first from the
reduction and then from the abolition of
the control tasks and, on the other hand,
the need to have the appropriate experts
available.
(d) As regards armaments co-operation
WEU should be in a position to play an
active r6le in providing political impetus :
- 
by supporting all co-operative efforts
including those of the IEPG and the
CNAD;
- by encouraging in particular the activity
of the IEPG as a forum whose main
objective is to promote European co-
operation and also to contribute to the
development of balanced co-operation
within the Atlantic Alliance;
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- 
by developing continuing concertation
\Mith the various existing bodies.
(e) ln this general context, the Permanent
Council will also take into account the
, 
existence of the FINABEL framework. "
4.2. In application of the Rome Declaration
the Council, at the ministerial meeting in Bonn
on22ndand,23rd, April, announced in the com-
munique that the Agency for the Control of
Armaments, the international secretariat of the
Standing Armaments Committee, and the Stan-
ding Armaments Committee itself would be
comprehensively reorganised, three agencies for
security questions being established in their
place:
- 
an agency for the study of arms control
and disarmament questions ;
- 
an agency for the study of security and
defence questions;
- 
an agency for the development of
co-operation in the field of armaments.
The Permanent Council is to report to the next
ministerial meeting of the Council on the new
tasks attributed to these agencies.
4.3. At appendix the committee listsrr those
specific tasks which it suggests should now be
entrusted to the agencies. The most important
aim should be the constitution of a European
data base on all issues concerning arms control.
Of particular impqrtance is the Council's recog-
nition that the Assembly mrght make use of
contributions from the technical institutions of
WEU. The Council has already authorised the
international secretariat of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee to assist Mr. van den Bergh in
the preparation of his report on emerying tech-
nology and military strategy. Co-operation of
this type should continue in the future. The
committee must be enabled to call on the ser-
vices of the three agencies in appropriate cir-
cumstances.
4.4. The committee also recommends that the
new agencies should undertake urgently a study
of the cost involved in the joint acquisition by
WEU of observation satellites to provide Euro-
pean countries with an independent source of
intelligence relevant to arms control and (ecu-
rity, and recalls in this context its earlier propo-
sals for the acquisition of such a system by ihe
United Ndtions. It welcomes the continued
support of France for such a project, evidenced
by the reply of Mr. Curien, French Minister of
Research and Technology, to a written question
in the National Assembly on 4th February 1985 :
" The creation of an international satellite
controls agency was proposed by France
in the United Nations in 1978 and conti-
nues to be supported by the French
Government... The possibility of design-
ing such a system in the framework of
the European Space Agency remains to be
defined. Disarmament control satellites
inevitably have military implications.
The project could be relaunched when
one or several European states have recon-
naissance satellites serving both for
defence and crisis control... "
In the view of the committee such reconnais-
sance satellites should be acquired by WEU
collectively; the high cost involved alone should
recommend a joint approach.
4.5. In order for these agencies to be able to
assist Assembly committees effectively, material
resources must be provided. Where Rappor-
teurs undertake missions of enquiry in preparing
their reports, budgetary provision must be made
to allow expert staffof the agencies to acompany
them. This did not prove possible in the case
of the report mentioned above because the
Council did not authorise travel costs of SAC
staff assisting Mr. van den Bergh to be borne on
the SAC budget, and the Assombly's own travel
budget is already too small. Full use could not
therefore be made of the invaluable expertise of
the SAC staff.
4.6. The comprehensive reorganisation of the
WEU ministerial bodies, with the establishment
ofthese three new agencies in Paris provides an
opportunity to further improve material co-
operation between the agencies and the Offrce of
the Clerk of the Assembly. Cost-effectiveness
can be improved and unnecessary duplication
eliminated.
4.7. With the universal introduction of auto-
matic data-processing equipment, in particular
word processors, it is essential that all material
be compatible throughout all ofEces of WEU in
London and Paris, both in the agencies and in
the Oflice of the Clerk. This will permit the
transmission of all texts in machine-readable
form and eliminate costly rety$ing.
4.8. The new agencies it is rlnderstood will be
staffed in part by analysts on sfrort-term contract
or secondment, who will reqrlire wider sources
of data than their predecessors. The compre-
hensive public documentary resources of the
Oflice of the Clerk, based on the collection of
official texts of all kinds supplemented by syste-
matic press cuttings, should be expanded and
made available to the new agencies. With
larger staff and premises it should incorporate
the present small library of the Agency for the
Control of Armaments based mostly on the tech-
nical press.11. At Appendix II.
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Y. Conclusions
5.1. The Ministerial Council at its Bonn
meeting on 22nd and 23rd April established
three new agencies for security questions.
- 
an agency for the study of arms control
and disarmament questions ;
- 
an agency for the study of security and
defence questions ; and
- an agency for the development of
co-operation in the field of armaments.
The Permanent Council is to define these tasks
more closely, but the agencies must assist not
only the Council, but also the Assembly. The
committee's proposals are set forth in para-
graphs 4.3 to 4.8.
5.2. The committee is glad to note that the
fears raised last year by the decision to restruc-
ture WEU, lest within WEU there should be a
two-speed security policy - possibly because of
Franco-German co-operation for example
have not materialised. Co-operation on the
basis of equality between the seven WEU mem-
bers, with the possibility of welcoming new
European countries to the fold, is essential.
5.3. Thus the Assembly has a leading r6le to
play. It is then unacceptable that the Council of
Ministers should attend Assembly debates only
sporadically. The Assembly should insist on
the presence of a representative of the Council of
ministerial rank throughout the duration of its
two annual half-sessions.
5.4. The Assembly, which promulgated its own
Charter, will not of course limit its debates to the
subjects listed in the Rome Declaration. That
means that the Assembly as in the past will
continue to examine strategic questions, which
still cause controversy between the WEU coun-
tries, with a view to finding a new and wide
consensus.
5.5. This applies equally to arms control and
disarmament questions. Discussion of this sub-ject is essential in order to reach agreement on a
common policy which takes account of Euro-
pean interests. The Council should attach
equal importance to multilateral arms control
negotiations and to bilateral negotiations. Six
of the WEU countries participate directly in the
forty-nation Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva where three main topics are on the
agenda: a ban on chemical weapons, a compre-
hensive test ban and prevention of an arms race
in outer space. The committee in the draft
recommendation makes specific recommenda-
tions on all three, reiterating the points already
adopted by the Assembly in Recommendation
415 adopted on 4th December 1984 on the
committee's last report 12 and drawing attention
to the reported offer by the Soviet Union to
accept, provided other nuclear powers do also, a
moratorium on all nuclear testing from 6th
August 1985 
- 
the fortieth anniversary of the
Hiroshima bomb. On this subject of disarma-
ment so vital for Europe it cannot be claimed
that the United States should have exclusive
competence.
5.6. Studies undertaken by WEU agencies
- 
and perhaps also in the future WEU initiatives
on arms control and disarmament - suppose
autonomous sources of information, hence the
need for common means of satellite reconnais-
sance so that WEU countries will not be solely
dependent on information supplied by others.
12. Control of armaments and disarmament, Document
998, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.
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APPENDIX I
Annex IY to Protocol No. III to the modified Brassels Treaty
(Items removedfrom the list by the Council resolution of
23rd January 1985 are printed in italics)
Lsr or rypns oF ARMAMENTs ro BE coNTRoLLED
l. (a) Atomic,
(b/ biological, and
(c) chemical weapons,
in accordance with definitions to be approved by the Council of Western European Qnion as indicated
in Article I of the present protocol.
2. All guns, howitzers and mortars of any types and of any r6les of more than 90 mm. calibre inclu-
ding the following component for these weapons, viz., the elevating mass.
3. All guided missiles.
Definition: Guided missiles are such that the speed or direction of motion can be influenced
after the instant of launchingby a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile;these include
V-type weapons developed in the recent war and modifications thereto. Combustion is considered as
a mechanism which may influence the speed.
4. Other self-propelled missiles of a weight exceeding 15 kilogrammes in working order.
5. Mines of all types except anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.
6. Tanks, including the following component parts for these tanks, viz :
(a) the elevating mc*s;
(b) turret castings and/or plate assembly.
7 . Other armoured fighting vehicles of an overall weight of more than 10 metic torls.
8. (a/ Warships over 1,500 tons displacement ;
(D/ submarines;
(c) all warships powered by means other than steam, diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines ;
(d) small craft capable of a speed of over 30 knots, equipped with offensive armament.
9. Aircraft bombs of more than 1,000 kilogrammes.
10. Ammunitionfor the weapons described in paragraph 2 above.
I l. (a) Complete military aircraft other than :
(i) all training aircraft except operational types used for training purposes ;
(ii) military transport and communication aircraft;
(iiy' helicopters;
(b) airframes, specifically and exclusively designedfor military airuaft except those at (i), (ii) and(iii) above;
@ jet engines, turbo-propeller engines and rocka mobrs, when these are the principal motive
power.
l8r
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APPENDIX II
Specifrc taslu suggested for the Agencies for
Security Questions
(with some comparison wilh the United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)
Europe should have its own source of
comparative factual information on defence
capabilities of various countries and anns
control issues. At present, the United States is
the principal source of much public information.
A. Studies
l. Study extent of verification measures
necessary to provide adequate assurance of com-
pliance with arms control agreements, in parti-
cular a chemical weapons ban, a comprehensive
test ban, and MBF reductions.
2. Arms control impact statements. The
United States ACDA reports annually to
Congress on the possible effect on disarmament
negotiations of the introduction of any ne\H wea-
pon system being considered in the United
States. A similar assessment should be avail-
able to European governments and parliaments.
3. World military expenditure and arms
transfers. United States ACDA published this
statistical data each year. It covers all countries
of the world, as well as regions and major
alliance (NATO and Warsaw Pact). There
should be an independent European source, not
open to accusations of political manipulation.
4. In the above context, there should be an
independent European assessment of the level of
the Soviet defence effort, based both on rouble
costs and dollar (or other convertible currency)
costs.
5. Threat assessment. On the basis of statis-
tical data and value judgments concerning inten-
tions, the Agency could assist in preparing a
European threat assessment. It could contri-
bute also to the NATO publication NATO and
the Warsaw Pact 
- 
Force comparisons, two edi-
tions of which have not been published by
NATO 
- 
they are far more objective than the
popularised United States publication, Soviet
Military Power.
B. Operational rctivities
6. The Agency could conduct field exercises
by sending observers to allied maneuwes to
investigate the extent of facilities which obser-
vers would require in the context of any MBFR
agreements if they were to be able reliably to
detect the size and extent of movements of
troops and military equipment.
7. The Agency could also train and co-
ordinate the activities ofobservers sent by Euro-
pean allied countries to observe Warsaw Pact
exercises under the terms of the Helsinki agtree-
ments.
C. Urgent study
8. The committee recommends that an
urgent study be undertaken ofthe cost involved
in the joint acquisition by Western European
Union of observation satellites to provide an
independent source of intelligence relevant to
arms control and security.
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APPENDIX III
Resolution
relating to Annex III to Protocol No. III
27th tane 19E4
The Council of Western European Union,
Having regard to Article II to Protocol No. III of the Brussels Treaty modified by the Agreements
signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954, and Annexes I and III to that protocol ;
Having regard to the recommendation dated 8th June 1984 of the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe relating to the cancellation of paragraphs IV and VI of Annex III to Protocol No. III ;
Having regard to the request to this effect submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany in a letter dated l5th June 1984 ;
Dscmss:
Single article
Paragraphs IV and VI of Annex III to Protocol No. III, entitled respectively " Long-range
missiles and guided missiles' and " Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes ", are cancelled.
N.8. The committee has published the texts of Annex III to Protocol No. III, as originally agreed, and as amended by the Council
prior to the cancellation of paragraphs IV and VI referred to above (see Document 973, Thirty years of the modified Brussels
Treaty, I 5th May 1984, Appendix II). The above resolution has the effect of cancelling all remaining items on the list of (conven-
tional) weapous which the Federal Republic of Germany further undertakes not to manufacture on its territory.
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Amendments lr2r3and4
22nd May 1985
Applicatioa of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the thirtiefi annual report of the Council
AMENDMENTS 1,2,3 and 4 r
tabW by Mr. Yerdon
l. In pararaph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from'attaching " to the end of the
paragraph, and insert:
* underlining the importance the Council attaches to respect of commitments under existing bila-
teral treaties and endorsing the determination of the countries participating in the CSCE to bring
about an East-West rapprochement in the long term so that the WEU member countries adopt a
co-ordinated reaction to : ".
2. kave out paragraph2(a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" (a) Prcsident Reagan's strategic defence initiative in response to the invitation from
Mr. Weinberger, Secretary of Defence, to take part, while confirming that the growing impor-
tance of technology should lead to Europe's own capability being strengthened, with a view to
creating a European technological community ; "
3. Irave out paragraph2(c) of the draft recommendation proper.
4. Leave out paragraph2(d) of the draft recommendation proper.
Signed: Verdon
l. See 5th sitting 22nd May 1985 (amendments negatived).
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Document 1020 20th May 1985
Revision and interpretation of the Rulu of Procedure
Terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments
REPORT I
submitted on behalf of the
Committet on Ruks of Procedure and Privileges2
by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur
Draft Resolution
on the ameadopnt ol Ruh 12 bis to eilargc thc ampeteace ol
the Committefor Rebtioas vith Pailiaments
The Assembly,
DBcroes
To amend Rule 42 Drs of the Rules of Procedure as follows :
l. Title
Leave out'Committee for Relations with Parliaments' and insert * Committee for Parliamen-
tary and Public Relations ".
2. Paragraphs 3 and 4
I-eave out paragraphs 3 and 4 and insert:
" 3. The committee shall:
(a) select from the texts adopted by the Assembly those which, in its opinion should be
debated in national parliaments ;
(b) make all necessary arrangements with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the
attention of national parliaments and inviting them to follow it up ; and
(c) make all necessary proposals with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the
attention of the public and the press in member countries. "
3. Paragraph 5
Leave out * It " and insert * In the exercise of its functions under paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b), the
committee ".
4. Paragraph6
At the end add " including any draft orders or resolutions ".
5. Renumber the paragraphs accordingly.
1. Adopted in committee by 8 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Schulte (Chairman) ; MM. Eysink (Alternate : van der Sanden), Woodall (Yice{hairmen) ;
MM. Antoni, Airtretter, Colemau (Alternate : JesseI'1, Corrie (Alternate: Earl of Kinnoull), Delehedde, Sit Geofrey Finsberg, Mt.
Gorla, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, MM. Koehl (Alternate ; Caro), kpenta, Marchio, Michel, Pdoiaux, Spies von Billlesheim,
Unland, Vial-Massat, van der Werff(Alternate: Stolfelen), Wilquin.
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Erplanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. lessel, Rapporteur)
l. The Committee on Rules of Procedure
and Privileges has been instructed by the Presi-
dential Committee to study the terms of refer-
ence of the Committee for Relations with Par-
liaments. The latter committee has expressed a
desire that :
(i) the rules should be changed so as to
permit it to present a draft recommen-
dation or order to the Assembly ; and
(iy' it should be renamed the Committee
for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions.
Present Rule 42 bis
2. The present constitution and scope of the
committee is set out in Rule 42 bis. The com-
mittee is composed of fourteen members, two
from each member country, unlike the five per-
manent committees which are larger and where
national representation is not equal. Secretaries
of national delegations may be invited to the
committee's meetings. The duty of the com-
mittee is (a) to select from texts adopted by the
Assembly those which it considers should be
debated in national parliaments, and (b)to make
all necessary arrangements to call the work of
the Assembly to the attention of national parlia-
ments, and to invite them to follow up the
work. A report on these activities is submitted
twice a year.
3. The Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments should not be considered as empowered
to lay recommendations before the Assembly for
approval unless it has been formally instructed
by the Presidential Committee, under Rule 17
on the settlement of the agenda, to present to the
Assembly a report in the sense of Rule 42 (which
is different from a report on its activities).
Casefor and against change
4. In the course of consideration of the com-
mittee's request, first made in December 1982, a
number of arguments have been put forward for
and against amending the rules as the committee
wishes. In favour of a change, it was argued
that the existing rule deprived the Committee
for Relations with Parliaments of any possibility
of taking substantive parliamentary action, and
thus arguably of its raison d'Ate. The change
sought conferred on the committee no wider
powers than those enjoyed by the corresponding
committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe. Article VII of the Charter
permits the Assembly to create new committees,
and the Assembly has in fact used this power to
create the Committee on Scientific, Technologi-
cal and Aerospace Questions.
5. On the other hand, the committee's pro-
duction of reports and substantive texts might (it
has been argued) cut across the functions and
responsibilities of the policy committees and
impinge on the Budget Committee's r6le in the
allocation of funds. There might be conflict
with the Presidential Committee over the organ-
isation of the work of the Assembly. The par-
ticipation of secretaries of national delegations is
important and should be safeguarded. Mem-
bers of the committee have other individual or
collective means of influencing the work of the
Assembly. The phrase " relations with... the
public " was thought to be too vague.
Proposals
6. It is not for the Committee on Rules of
Procedure but for the Assembly to take a defini-
tive decision on whether or not to accede to the
request of the Committee for Relations with
Parliaments. The purpose of this report is
therefore only to make proposals for the
amendment of the rules which would make pos-
sible Assembly agreement to the request. At
the same time, the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure has made its suggestions with three consi-
derations in mind.
7. The first is that the Rome Declaration of
October 1984 and the consequent efforts to rein-
vigorate WEU have substantially changed the
background against which the decision is taken.
The Assembly ought to be able to consider
how best to play its part in making known the
work of WEU to a wider public than has so far
been reached. It also has a separate responsi-
bility for drawing public attention to its own
unique and democratic rdle within WEU. The
amendments proposed will permit the Assembly
to discuss these matters and (if the changes are
agreed) the committee can then work out details.
8. Secondly, the form of the amendments
proposed does not impose a mandatory duty on
the committee, but permits it to make up its own
mind whether to make proposals on the " public
relations " aspect of its duties.
9. Finally, the amendments proposed try to
take account of the objections to the change
which have previously been voiced. All of
these are important, but none is necessarily fatal
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to the proposal. Attention is drawn to. the
following aspects of the proposed amendments :(t The attached alterations to Rule 42
Dl's do not give the committee power
to bring forward draft recommenda-
tions or opinions addressed to the
Council, which mlght cut across the
proper concerns of the permanent
committees. The committee would
be limited to suggesting resolutions
and orders, which tend to concern the
affairs of the Assembly itself or its
external relations. These should
allow it to carry out its functions
without becoming involved in sub-
stantive political issues. It is not
suggested that the committee should
be added to the number of permanent
committees. The committee's draft
resolutions or orders must in any case
be within the scope of paragriph 3
and its reports within paragraph6. If on any occasion the committee
should go beyond its remit of parlia-
mentary or public and press relations,
it would be proper for any member to
move to recommit a report as ultra
vires.
(ii) There is no suggestion in paragraph 3
that the committee has any direct
concern with the organisation of the
work of the Assembly or responsibi-lity for the allocation of funds.
Draft resolutions or orders may on
occasion be agreed to by the commit-
tee which may, for example, have
financial effects. But such proposals
will be open to comment by the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and
could not in any event be implemen-
ted except with the agreement of that
committee.
(iii) No change is made in the practice of
inviting administrative secretaries of
national delegations to meetings,
though their participation is (as
before) restricted to the business aris-
ing from the committee's work vis-i-
vis national parliaments.
(iv) The powers and duties of members in
influencing the work of the Assembly
individually ol tlyoqglo committees
remain untouched. The committee
is being given an extra and very spe-
cific task, for which no individual
member or group of members now
bears any responsibility 
- 
the deter-
mination of the Assembly's policy on
how to present to best effect the work
which it collectively does.
(v) By proposing to add the words " and
the press " to paragraph 3(c) the
Committee on Rules of Procedure is
making clear how, within the discre-
tion of the Committee for Relations
with Parliaments, the amended rule
might operate. Of course the public
at large are a body_ too amorphous
even in a national context to be
regarded as a target for Assembly
publicity. The problem is exacer-
bated if seven mernber countries are
involved. Nevertheless, to regard
the seven parliaments and govern-
ments as the sole (or at least thepredominant) audience for the
Assembly's views is to neglect the
logic of democracy itself, and the
popular basis on which parliaments
rest. The means of communicating
with the public at large is the same on
a European as on a national stage 
-
through the press. Individual mem-
bers will no doubt continue to draw
press attention to Assembly texts or
speeches: but press relations are also
a matter of common concern. For
that reason, it is right that procedures
should be devised which will allow
the most effective presentation to be
made in all countries. No doubt the
Assembly's Press Counsellor will be
ready both to advise the committee
and to act on any of its proposals
which the Assernbly may accept
without limiting his responsibility to
assist individual members who may
ask for his help.
(vi) lf the foregoing arguments are accep-
ted, the change in the committee's
title seems conssquential. At the
same time, there soems to be no need
to alter the present composition of
the committee, because its work will
continue to be distinguished by its
breadth and non-partisan character.
Conclusion
10. If these proposals are adopted, they will
not hinder or devalue the work the Committee
for Relations with Parliaments now does in
encouraging colleagues in national parliaments
to take up and develop work begun by WEU.
Nor will they force on the committee any parti-
cular course of action which it may be reluctant
to adopt. By agreeing to the amendments to the
rules, members would be clearring the way for the
committee to advise on how WEU in general
and the Assembly in particular can develop an
important aspect of reinvigoration 
- 
deepening
public understanding of WEU's contribution to
the maintenance of peace and security.
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Document 1021 21st May 1985
Withdrawal of a repon from the agenda
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 
'
tabled by Dr. Millcr and others
The Assembly,
(t) Regretting that the vote in the Committee on Defence Questions.?,nd Armaments will defer
tonsidera-tion oIMr. van den Bergh's report on emerging technology and military strategy, dealing inter
Aia wittr the strategic defence initiative,-since this deiision denies to the Assembly an early opportunity
of discussing matiers of great importance and prevents the only-.European assembly specifically
empowered 5y treaty to discuss defence and security issues from fulfilling its obligation ;
(ii) Believing that the decision calls in question the meaningful reactivation of the organisation,
INsrnucrs rnr CoututrrEe oN DrreNcr QuEsrIoNs AND ARMAMENTS
To report on this subject without fail to the second part of the thirty-first session.
Signed: Miller, Woodall, Cox, van den Bergh, Stoffelen, Brown, Hardy, Hughes, Tummers,
Fourr0
1. See Sth sitting, 22nd May 1985 (order agreed to).
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Document 1022 21st May 1985
Iran-Iraq war
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 
'
tablcd by Mr. Hardy and others
The Assembly,
Aware of the continued-crisis arising from the Iran-Iraq conflict which presents a threat not only
to regional stability, but to global security;
Concerned at the aggressive character of the Khomeini r6gime, which has already cost enormous
numbers of lives;
N_oting lhe apparenlly irlcreasing concern of many Iranian people that a cease-fire should be
arranged and that negotiations for peace should commence,
UnoEs member states to express further their desire for peace and to use their diplomatic,political and economic influence to secure this end.
Signed: Hardy, Cox, Hughes, Woodall, Miller, Pignion, Stoffelen, P1criaw Bogaerts, Brown
l. See 4th sitting,22nd May 1985 (motion included in the register of the Assembly).
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Document 1023 21st May 1985
Sitaation in l*banon
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 
'
tabled by Mr. Manino and others
with a request lor urgent procedure
The Assembly,
(i) Alive to the cry of anguish coming from the martyred territory of kbanon disrupted by civil war
accompanied by killing, bloodshed and genocide;
(ii) Considering that the indifference shown by member states and Euro_pean organisations makes
th6m bear heavy iesponsibility in the crimes against humanity committed in kbanon,
Rrcorvruervps rnnr rnr CoLJNCIL
1. Call upon its Chairman-in-Office and all member governments to use all the means at their
disposal to h;lp to restore peace by acting directly, or in the framework of international organisations,
so as to exert an influence in favour ofpeace ;
2. Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to make a solemn appeal to the Government of I-ebanon and to
those of neigftbouring countries to respect human rights for all the I-ebanese people, whatever their race
or creed ;
3. Urge the United Nations to undertake immediately an examination of the situation in Lebanon
*itt 
" 
viEw to promoting a transitional solution guaranieeing the population against a resumption of
the massacres;
4. Ask all member countries of the Council of Europe to endorse these steps.
Signed: Martino, Ferrari Aggradi, Cifurelli, Cavaliere, Milani, Amadei, Sarti, Mezzapesa,
Michel, Vecchietti, Sinesio
l. See 4th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (urgent procedure agreed to).
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Document 1024 21st May 1985
Organisation of the work of the Assembly
and of its committees
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 
'
in implementation of aproposal by the Bureau
The Assembly,
(i) 
^ Hgyrng 1-o!ed the proposal by the Bureau communicated at the beginning of the morning sittingon 2lst May 1985 ;
Qil Recalling its commitment to the reinvigoration of WEU and particularly its recent agreement to
the report on action by the Presidential Committee;(iii) Congerned to improve the efficiency of its operations, so as to ensure that committee reports are
available for a reasonable period before the Assembly comes to debate them, and that the order of
business-agreed by the Presidential Committee should not normally need serious adjustment at the first
sitting of the Assembly,
Iusrnucrs rHe PnrsDer.{Tnr Couurrree
To consider and discuss with the chairmen of the pennanent committees the organisation of a
mini-session of committee meetings to be held before the December part-session, in sufricient time to
allow reports to be circulated two weeks before the Assembly first sits.
l. See 4th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (order agreed to).
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Document 1025 22nd May 1985
Situation in l*banon
REPORT I
submitted on behalf of the General Atfairs Committec2
by Mr. Martino, Rappnrteur
Draft Recommendation
on the situation ia l-abanon
The Assembly,
Greatly disturbed by the situation in Lebanon, which is disrupted by internal warfare
accompanied by killing, bloodshed and genocide,
Rrcouurxps rrnt rsr CoLJNcIL
l. Call upon its Chairman-in-Office and all member gov€rnments to use all the means at their
ai.posa to ielp to restore peace by actirlg directly, as well as in the framework of international
organisations likely to exert an influence in favour ofpeace ;
2. Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to make a solemn apped to the Government of Lebanon and all
the internal parties concerned and to the governments of neighbouring countries to respect human
rights for all Lebanese, whatever their race or creed ;
3. Urye the United Nations to undertake immediately al examination of the situation in I-ebanon
*itn 
" 
viEw to promoting a transitional solution guaranieeing the population against a resumption of
the massacres;
4. Ask all member countries of Western European Union to associate themselves with these steps.
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Michel (C\airman); MM. Har{y, v.an der Wertr(Altertate: Blaau.w). (Vice-Chairmen); M-r.
lirei, Sir Freieric Bennett (Alternate: Sir Paul Hawkins), MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, lurgrcr (Alternate: Henge[),_4111,
Johnston, Mn. Kelly (Alternaie: Horacek), MM. Koehl, Iagneau, Lag9r9e, Martino, Masciadri (Alternate: Cavaliere),.Mtile4prouvosi Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann,Rtrct, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spirclla (Alternate: Giust), Vecchiet l, de Vries (Alternate:
Tummers).
N.B. The names of those taking pan in the vote are printed in italics.
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Document 1026 22nd May 1985
Institutional connection of the Assembly
with other orgails of IYEU
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 
'
tabled by Mr. Spiu von Biillesheim and others
The Assembly,
Endeavouring a closer co-ordination of the defence policies of its member states,
INsrnucts lts PnxroeNuer Corrlurrrrr
To ask the competent committee for the preparation of a report on the possibilities, conditions
and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with othir org"ns of wgu. ttli
report should consider also the following possibilities :
(a/ responsibility of the Secretary-General of WEU also with respect to the Assembly;
(D/ re-sp_o_nsibility of the different expert secretariats for both the Assembly and the other organs
of WEU;
(c) one single budget for all WEU organs including the Assembly ;
(d) centrahsation of all WEU organs in one place;
(e/ consideration of all other possibilities suitable further to promote the cause of WEU.
- 
This report should restrict itself to a presentation of the factual conditions and legal possibilities
as a basis for the necessary political follow-up and an eventual deoision Uy ttreloipeient bodies
according to the Brussels Treaty.
. 
Siglyd:. 
-S-oies von Bullesheim, Stoffelen, Blaauw, Schulte, Eysink, Miller, Fischer, Finsberg,Enders, Woodall, Antretter
l. See 6th sitting, 23rd May I 985 (order agreed to).
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